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Abstract 
This thesis explores Heidegger's philosophy of Being and Nothing in the context 
of the problem of nihilism. Nietzsche diagnosed the present age as an age of 
nihilism in the sense of a 'devaluation of the highest values'. Heidegger argues 
that Nietzsche's diagnosis suffers from a fundamental failure to question the 
meaning of 'nihil' in 'nihilism'. This failure is, according to Heidegger, shared by 
the history of metaphysics which Nietzsche brings to completion, and it is closely 
connected with the failure of metaphysics to address the question of Being as 
such. 
We shall examine the emergence of Heidegger's early phenomenological 
approach to the question of Being in his engagement and confrontation with 
Husserl's phenomenology, and trace its subsequent development in major 
writings of his. It will be argued that Heidegger's philosophy of Being permits for 
the first time a more adequate understanding of the problem of Nothing. 
Throughout the thesis, the horizon of the discussion is the question of the 
meaning and the ground of nihilism, which will also be addressed explicitly 
through an examination of Heidegger's confrontation with Nietzsche. 
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Introduction 
If by the end of the 19th century nihilism, as announced by Nietzsche, 
'Stood at the door', by the end of the 20th century it made itself so well at home 
that today it attracts no attention and is not even noticed. In fact, a concern for 
nihilism in an age where technology seems to hold in store freedom for all and 
promises ever new possibilities for the future, may seem outdated, untimely. 
So, why redeem the question of nihilism? Is it the nostalgia for God and 
old fashioned morality, or is it the usual pessimism, the resentful attitude of the 
powerless that prompts such interest? 
Here, of course, one understands 'nihilism" as proclaimed by Nietzsche in 
relation to the death of God and all 'eternal truths' - an event by the consequence 
of which all values devalue themselves and Being becomes meaningless. 
Nihilism, accordingly, originates from the weakness of man and his inability to 
sustain God or to create new gods, new truths and new values. Nietzsche thought 
he found the answer to the problem of nihilism in the advent of the Ubermensch 
and the eternal recurrence. 
Meanwhile, this thesis explores another view on nihilism, expressed in the 
thinking of Heidegger, who sees nihilism's origin not in the 'weakness of man', 
but in man's becoming the sole ground of truth. This view articulates the 
meaninglessness of Being, not in relation to the death of God, but as the 
consequence of a mis-conception of the meaning of Being and Nothing that began 
with Plato and continues to hold sway today. In Heidegger's view, Nietzsche 
belongs to the same metaphysical tradition he criticizes -a metaphysics shaped 
and sustained by the 'oblivion of Being' - consequently his ideas for 'overcoming 
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nihilism' constitute an even deeper entanglement in the problem. According to 
Heidegger, however, nihilism is not merely a transitional crisis, a problem for the 
19th and 20th centuries, but a promise for the future, a promise yet to unfold. 
This thesis will follow Heidegger in arguing that nihilism cannot be 
understood properly unless the meaning of Nothing is thematized and addressed 
in its own right. Nietzsche did not explicitly concern himself with the 
fundamental question of the meaning of 'nihil' in 'nihilism', or rather, it could be 
argued that he unquestioningly took over a certain interpretation of it - nothing as 
lack - from the metaphysical tradition. But did not Hegel, at least, in his Science 
of Logic explicitly raise and resolve the question of Nothing on the basis of 
thinking? Since this thesis will reject the idea of thinking as the ground of Being 
and Nothing, it will suggest, contrary to Hegel's view, that Nothing can never be 
an object for thinking and therefore cannot be determined as negation, the 'other' 
of 'something'. If Nothing is to be considered as not just another being, then it 
must be approached indirectly and questioned, not in terms of predication or 
(whatness', but in its relation to the meaning of Being. 
No other thinker has questioned the essence of nihilism in connection with 
the neglect or misapprehension of Nothing (and Being) as much and as thoroughly 
as Martin Heidegger. Nothing, for Heidegger, far from being just a convenient 
tool serving to challenge traditional understandings of Being, is of equal 
significance to Being, and as such detenninative of truth. Indeed, it is Heidegger 
who, more than any other philosopher in the era of modernity, has insisted on the 
exigency of explicitly questioning the meaning of Nothing, and of doing so on the 
basis of raising anew the question of the meaning of 'Being'. The thesis, 
therefore, will seek to approach the meaning of 'Nothing' in relation to 'Being' 
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through a close analysis and interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy. We shall 
begin by tracing the emergence of Heidegger's question in his early immersion in, 
and engagement with, the phenomenology of Husserl. We shall then follow its 
first independent development in Heidegger's Being and Time. Finally, we shall 
seek to understand the development of the question in Heidegger's writings after 
1930. All the while, the horizon for our interpretation of Heidegger will be that 
which prompted our concern with Nothing in the first instance: namely the 
problem of nihilism. We shall, therefore, also confront Heidegger's interpretation 
of nihilism in some detail with Nietzsche's earlier and perhaps more 'influential' 
enunciation of it. 
The hen-neneutic approach chosen by this thesis is to engage, as much as 
possible, with the texts themselves. This applies not only to Heidegger, but also, 
albeit to a somewhat lesser extent, to the other two philosophers figuring 
prominently here, in confrontation with whom Heidegger found and pursued his 
path of thinking: Edmund Husserl and Friedrich Nietzsche. The itinerary of our 
investigations will be as follows. 
Chapter I will address the philosophical context from which Heidegger's 
early 'phenomenological' approach to the question of Being arises. This context is 
his close involvement with Husserl's phenomenology during the early 1920's. 
Heidegger at that time agreed with Dilthey that Husserl's philosophy was of 
ýcentral significance' and represented 'the first great scientific advance since 
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason", in which the 'geat Western philosophical 
1 Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, trans. T. Kisiel, (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1992), p. 24. Henceforth cited as HCT. 
tradition' has been 'thought ... to an end'. 
2 His most explicit discussion of the 
achievements and the limitations of Husserl's phenomenology is given in his 
Marburg lectures of 1925, published under the title History of the Concept of 
Time. We shall interpret and assess Heidegger's confrontation with Husserl in that 
text,, and we shall see that,, and how, Heidegger shows the question of Being to be 
implicit in the problem of the Being of intentionality in Husserl, while not being 
thematized as such by him. 
In chapter 11, we shall turn to Being and Time (1927), where this question 
is taken up and developed explicitly by Heidegger. We shall seek to understand 
his existential analytic of Dasein, undertaken as a first step towards the 
questioning of the meaning of 'Being as such'. Our concern will particularly lie 
with the following aspects of this text: The three modes of Being of entities - 
being-in-the-world, readiness-to-hand, and presence-at-hand - and the sense of 
not-being in each case. Here, Nothing will be presented as the ground of being-in- 
the-world -a ground that is an abyss into which all beings, including Dasein, 
collapse. The themes of death, finitude and anxiety are therefore central to this 
chapter. 
Chapter III explores Heidegger's changing emphasis after Being and Time 
from an approach to Being and Nothing through the Being of entities, to a 
questioning of Being (and Nothing) as such. Our textual focus in this chapter will 
be twofold. We shall first interpret Heidegger's inaugural lecture of 1929, 'What 
is Metaphysics? ' Here some of the implications of the analyses of Being and Time 
are made more explicit, but also presented with a somewhat changed accent, in 
2 Martin Heidegger. Logik. GA 21 (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), p. 88 and p. 114. 
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which the history of thought as metaphysics comes into view. Why has 
metaphysics ignored Nothing? Why has Nothing, throughout the history of 
metaphysics, been excluded from truth? In order to follow this Heideggerian 
direction of questioning further, we shall turn to his Introduction of Metaphysics 
(193 5), where Being is interrogated through the history of its determinations. The 
chapter will conclude with an introduction of the determination of Being as value, 
and some reflections on ethics. Both of these themes will serve as a transition to 
Heidegger's confrontation with Nietzsche. 
This confrontation is the theme of Chapter IV, where we return explicitly 
to the question which constitutes the horizon of our entire discussion: the question 
of nihilism. 
The final chapter is concerned with some aspects of Heidegger's 
interpretation of Being and Nothing and their essence in tenns of 
aA? 70aa and AqO77 in the lectures on Parmenides of 1942-43. May what is 
adumbrated in Heidegger's reading of Parmenides contribute to a beginning for a 
future thinking of the essence of Being? 
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A Note on Translations 
We have modified the standard English translations of texts by Husserl 
Heidegger, and Nietzsche, in a number of places. Such modifications have 
generally been indicated in footnotes. 
(Das) Sein in Heidegger texts has in our translation always been capitalized as 
'Being', except where it occurs in composite constructions such as In-der-Welt- 
sein. This has been done purely in order to avoid confusion with the occurrence of 
'being' in ordinary participle constructions and in the translation of das Seiende 
(see below). The same goes for our translation and spelling of (das) Nichts as 
'Nothing'. This capitalization, again, is merely to avoid confusion in sentences 
such as, for example, 'metaphysics has nothing to say about Nothing'. 
(Das) Seiende and Seiendes has been translated as 'beings' or 'entities', although 
in quotations from the English translation of the volumes on Nietzsche we have 
sometimes retained the translator's literal-minded (and unidiomatic) 'the being'. 
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Chapter I 
Heidegger on Husserl: Phenomenology and the Neglect of 
the Question of Being 
Heidegger's 'discovery' of the question of Being is associated by many readers with 
his main work written during his phenomenological period, Being and Time. 
However, as Theodore Kisiel has shown in his detailed study of the genesis of Being 
and Time, the question of the Being of entities had been an overt theme of 
Heidegger's thinking at least since 1921, the beginning of a period of intense work 
on Aristotle. ' Yet the immediate context shaping Heidegger's explicit formulation 
of, and method of approach to, the question of Being in Being and Time is 
incontrovertibly his critical engagement, in the period immediately preceding the 
composition of his early magnum opus, with the phenomenology of Edmund 
Husserl. Indeed, in the Introduction to Being and Time, he states categorically: 
'Phenomenology is our way of access to what is to be the theme of ontology [i. e. the 
Being of entities], and it is our way of giving it demonstrative precision. Only as 
phenomenology, is ontology possible' (BT, p. 60). But Being and Time is itself only 
the last of a series of drafts on Heidegger's theme. Throughout this text, the 
phenomenological method - however modified - is quite explicit, yet the context of 
debate - in particular for many of Heidegger's critical remarks - is often not so 
apparent, as many readers have noted, sometimes in frustration. In order to bring this 
context to light, it is particularly illuminating to turn to what Kisiel has called the 
penultimate, 'ontoeroteric' draft of Being and Time, Heidegger's Marburg lectures of 
1925, first published in 1979 under the title Prolegomena zur Geschichte des 
Zeitbegriffs. 2 This text provides a unique insight at once into the development of his 
1 Theodore Kisiel. The Genesis ofHeidegger's Being and Time, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1993), p. 364, and pp. 227 f., esp. 23848. 
2 Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, p. 362. For more detailed information 
on the history of this text, henceforth quoted as HCT, see the publisher's foreword in the English 
translation: Martin Heidegger. History of the Concept of Time, translated by Theodore Kisiel, 
(Bloomington and Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1992). See also T. Kisiel, 'On the Way to Being 
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understanding of phenomenological research and his substantial critique of 
Husserlian phenomenology. It is this very critique which led the author to distance 
himself from Husserl and in doing so to formulate the distinct understanding of the 
question of Being which informs Being and Time. The text is especially relevant to 
the present research because it delineates the problems that arise, according to 
Heidegger, through the neglect of the question of Being and indicates why the 
question of Being is urgent and how it needs to be addressed by phenomenology, 
properly understood. In other words, History of the Concept of Time enables us to 
understand Heidegger's departures from the tradition in Being and Time as the result 
of an immanent critique of the tradition itself. The question of Being is neither a 
half-forgotten ancient one, nor a newly 'invented' question external to the 
mainstream of the modem philosophical tradition, but a question that is 
simultaneously pointed towards and neglected by the most 'advanced' or at least 
most topical and influential philosophy of the time. Indeed, it is significant that, 
despite his criticisms of the shortcomings of phenomenology as conceived by 
Husserl, Heidegger is at pains to show that the results of phenomenological research 
themselves point to the question not raised explicitly by its founder. Accordingly, 
HCT is both appreciative of the impulses and achievements of the Husserlian 
enterprise and profoundly critical of its shortcomings and lacunae, which in 
Heidgger's view are of course very fundamental, originating in Husserl's inadequate 
understanding of the authentic horizon for the investigations of phenomenology. 
It is important to emphasize what is not being claimed here. We are of course not 
suggesting that Heidegger 'found' the question of Being in Husserl - far from it. If 
this was the target of our search, we would perhaps do better to look at, say, Plato's 
Sophist, or at Aristotle's Metaphysics, or at Duns Scotus. Rather, our aim in this 
chapter is a different and twofold one: first, an elucidation of the specific 
methodological context and approach of Heidegger's posing of the question of Being 
in Being and Time; and secondly, an attempt to follow and understand Heidegger in 
and Time: Introduction to the Translation of Heidegger's Prolegomena zur Geschichte des 
Zeitbegriffs' Research in Phenomenology XV (1985). 
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his immanent demonstration or Agfweisung of the hidden and unnoticed presence, 
the 'trace' we might say, of the issue of Being in the modem philosophical tradition 
itself through a particularly distinguished representative of it. 
We shall approach Heidegger's confrontation with Husserl in three stages. In Section 
I. we shall clarify Heidegger's own understanding of the method and meaning of 
'phenomenology' during this crucial period. In Section 2, we shall seek to 
understand Heidegger's interpretation of the achievements of Husserlian. 
phenomenology. Section 3 will address both Heidegger's critique of Husserl and his 
rejection of the fundamental direction given to phenomenology by Husserl. 
1. Methodological Clarifications 
1.1 The Meaning of 'Phenomenon' 
Husserl developed his idea of phenomenological research, the study of 'phenomena', 
first in the context of epistemological and logical concerns. This idea required the 
'presuppositionless' study of cognitive acts or 'experiences' and their 'objects' 
purely as they are given in possible experiences. A phenomenon, for Husserl, is at its 
most formal something that is given, as it is given, in experience or consciousness. 
In fact,, however, Husserl accords primacy to phenomena which are fully grasped or 
cconstituted' as 'objects' by consciousness. As we shall see later in developing 
Heidegger's critique, according to the logic of Husserl's analysis of truth, what a 
phenomenon is 'in truth' or eigentlich is what it appears as when fully present to a 
constituting, intuitively grasping (anschaulich erfassend) consciousness. To see why 
and indeed whether Husserl unambiguously holds this, we will need to unravel some 
of the details of his account of truth. At this stage, what is important for us is that 
Heidegger from the beginning avoids this Husserlian understanding of 
4 phenomenon' and gives a quite different explication of the properly 
phenomenological meaning of this central concept: 
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There are two basic meanings of 'phenomenon'; first the manifest, that which shows itself, 
second that which presents itself as something manifest but which only gives itself out in 
I this way - semblance. ' 
This claim by Heidegger is presented in FICT as based upon an etymological analysis 
of the relationship between Oalvopevov and OatvcuOa1. Oalvca0at, which as the 
infinitive of Oa1vqpcvov means 'to show itself is, in turn, related to the word 
Oat vco: 'to bring something to light', 'to make it visible in itself or 'to put it in a 
bright light'. Oa - Ocoor, which constitutes the stem of the word Oal vo) means 
'light', 'brightness', 'that wherein something can be manifest and visible'. 
'Phenomenon'. ) therefore, understood 'correctly' (i. e. etymologically) means 'that 
which shows itself. This implies that an entity which shows itseýf 'ftom itseýf and 
'in itself is a genuine phenomenon and vice versa. In fact, Ta ov-ra, i. e. entities, 
says Heidegger, are identified by the Greeks with the totality of that which shows 
itself Erom itself. 
Ta ovi-a, or entities, can however show themselves in different manners or 
modes. There is, for instance, the possibility that an entity may pretend to be 
something that it is not. When an entity shows itself as something which it 
nevertheless is not, this way of self-showing is called semblance. In this case, 
though the meaning of 'phenomenon' - as that which 'shows itself in itself - is 
modified, that which presents itself seemingly is still a phenomenon. This is because 
Oai vea0al means also 'showing itself as' - 'only looking like'. For, that which 
looks like can only do so and pretend so if it shows itself and manifests itself, even if 
such a self-manifestation happens in terms of 'seeming as'. Accordingly, 
'phenomenon' has two senses. In the first sense, 'phenomenon' denotes a mode of 
encounter with entities in themselves such that they show themselves in themselves, 
while 'phenomenon' in the second sense, i. e. as semblance is a Pretended self- 
shou-ing, a pretense to be manifest but not really being it. 
Therefore, the meaning of 'phenomenon' must sharply be distinguished from 
what is generally called 'appearance'. As Heidegger says: 
HCT, p. 8' 3. 
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What has been said above is the genuine sense of phenomenon employed by the Greeks. 
This has nothing to do with our term 'appearance' or still less 'mere appearance'. 
Appearances are themselves occurrences which refer back to other occurrences from which 
we can infer something else which does not make an appearance. Appearances are 
appearances of something which is not given as an appearance, something which refers to 
another entity. Appearance has the distinguishing feature of reference. 4 
Here we find a second meaning (in addition to Husserl's 'intentional object') which 
Heidegger is concerned to ward off. In this case, it is the Kantian understanding of 
phenomenon or 'appearance'. To illustrate this use of the word 'appearance', 
Heidegger refers to a German example: Krankheitserscheiungen, which means 
(. appearances of a disease', in English: symptoms. What is important here is to pay 
attention to the referential character of the 'appearance' which functions by 
indicating, announcing something or pointing at something. Here, unlike in the case 
of a phenomenon, where an entity, in one way or another ( i. e. genuinely or 
seemingly) presents itself, something is represented indirectly, that is mediately. As 
the appearance operates through reference and only refers to something with the aid 
ofphenomena, it could not itself be identified with a phenomenon. This is the basis 
of the distinction made between semblance and appearance. To understand this 
better, we shall take our cue from Heidegger: 
Semblance is a modification of the manifest, of something manifest which it pretends to be 
but is not. Semblance is not phenomenon in its privative sense; it has the characteristics of 
showing itself, but that which shows itself does not show itself as what it is. While 
appearance is precisely the representation of something which is essentially not really 
manifest. Semblance thus always goes back to something manifest and includes the idea of 
the manifest. An appearance, a symptom, can be what it is, namely reference to something 
else which does not show itself, through the self-showirig of that which appears 5 
Semblance, it is said above, 'includes the idea of the manifest', for it is itself a form 
of manifestation. But appearance is other than semblance because, in appearance, or 
in appearing, the represented something must necessarily make an appearance 
4 HCT, pp. 80-8 1. 
5 ibid. 
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through a seýf-showing entity, in order to appear in the first place. The appearance, 
therefore. ) intrinsically and already presupposes 
the original structure of phenomena: 
(self-showing'. This entails that the self-showing character of phenomena provides 
the necessary condition for the possibility of the appearance and constitutes the 
ground of the latter: 
The possibility of appearance as reference of something to something rests on having that 
something which does the referring show itself in itself. The possibility of appearance is 
founded in the authentic phenomenon. Something can be referential only as a self-showing 
something. 6 
The identification of appearance with phenomena, on the other hand, has led, 
Heidegger asserts, to a profound confusion in philosophy whereby it is assumed that 
behind the appearances there stands something else, that of which they are 
appearances. Here, the appearance and the referential connections are taken 
& ontically' and are presented 'as a relation of Being', as if there were two beings, one 
standing behind the other. Further, when that being which does not appear and 
remains in the background is given the distinction of 'real and true entity', the 
second entity is considered as a 'mere appearance'. Inevitably, from such an 
interpretation arises the idea that there should be a 'distinction in grades of Being', in 
which case, appearance as a 'degraded entity' becomes the name for 'an ontic 
connection of reference' between 'phenomenon and noumenon', between 
(appearance and essence': 
If we now take this degraded entity, the appearance versus the essence in this sense of mere 
appearance, then this mere appearance is called semblance. Confusion is then carried to 
extremes. But traditional epistemology and metaphysics lives off this confusion. 7 
Heidegger refers to these four understandings of phenomena respectively as: 
. phenomenon', 'semblance', 'appearance' and 'mere appearance' in order to show 
that the phenomenon, as that entity which shows-itself in itself, is the necessary and 
6 
ibid. 
7 ibid. 
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the primary condition 'for all the derivative kinds'. 8 In fact, one cannot ask, says 
Heidegger, 'for something behind the phenomenon at all, since what phenomenon 
gives is precisely that something in itself. 9 This claim, made almost casually by 
Heidegger, is of course of the utmost importance and it marks the point at which 
Heidegger remains committed to something like a 'phenomenological reduction', 
albeit not quite in Husserl's sense. 10 But like Husserl, Heidegger here rejects the 
Kantian and metaphysically realist notion of a 'thing in itself of which the 
phenomena might merely be 'symptoms' and which itself was not a phenomenon. " 
One could also put this by saying that, like Husserl, Heidegger rejects the idea that 
phenomena might in their essence or in truth be something radically other than what 
they show themselves as - either manifestly or as being covered up. Indeed, if we are 
to inquire about the real, contrastive, counter-concept of phenomenon, this should be 
carried out not in terms of appearance (Schein) or in terms of what appearances 
might be symptoms of, but in terms of 'being-covered-up', or 'concealment'. An 
inquiry of this kind will be conducted, for example, in Being and Time, as well as in 
later writings of Heidegger. Crucially, 'to be covered up' is a possibility and a 
modification belonging to phenomena themselves. In fact, in most cases, what can be 
a phenomenon is first partly or wholly covered up and known only tentatively, and 
8 CE Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the- World, p. 30. 
9 HCT, p. 86. 
10 There has been an extensive debate in the literature on whether the phenomenological reduction is 
operative in Heidegger's writings during this period. Some have maintained that there is nothing of the 
kind in Heidegger's work. See e. g. Richard Schacht, 'Husserlian and Heideggerian Phenomenology', 
Philosophical Studies 23 (1972), pp. 293-314. Many others have claimed to detect something like a 
phenomenological reduction in Heidegger. For one example, see Jacques Taminiaux, Le Regard et 
l'Exc9dent, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), pp. 66-71. In view of the criticisms of Husserl's 
reductions to be discussed later in this chapter, it is clear that Heidegger rejects them in their 
Husserlian form. This does not rule out the possibility that some aspects of Husserl's method, 
including some associated with the reductions, may remain valid for Heidegger. In view of the 
quotation above, this seems to be precisely the case. 
" In Husserl's case, this claim is often associated by interpreters with his later turn towards 
transcendental idealism. However, it could be argued that is implicit already in his early 
phenomenology, in particular in his idea that nothing can be merely thought (or 'emptily intended') by 
a consciousness which cannot be self-given to that consciousness (or 'intuitively fulfilled'). See LI V1, 
§ 14 b, p. 713: 'We must, however, note that the object, as it is in itseýf- in the only sense relevant and 
understandable in our context [ ... I is not wholly different from the object realized, however 
imperfectly, in perception'. See also H. Philipse, 'Transcendental Idealism', in: The Cambridge 
Companion to Husserl, ed. By B. Smith and D. W. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), pp. 272-278. 
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this may even be so for essential rather than 'accidental' reasons. Heidegger 
mentions two modes of concealment: 'the undiscovered pure and simple' and 'the 
buried and disguised. A phenomenon could, in the first instance, be covered up in 
the sense of being undiscovered in which case there would be no knowledge of its 
existence. An undiscovered entity might be regarded as a total concealment. In the 
second instance, a phenomenon could be said to be buried. Concealment, in the 
sense of 'being-buried', is not as same as 'total concealment' because what is 
covered up at present was once-uncovered and known. We shall leave a more in- 
depth analysis of the meaning and modes of concealment to later stages of our 
discussion. For the time being, it is enough for us to have indicated the difference 
between Heidegger's concept of phenomenon and both Husserl's and Kant's 
concepts, and to have thereby pointed to the basis of the famous dictum in Being and 
Time that 'only as phenomenology is ontology possible'. The truth of phenomena 
cannot be something which is not itself a phenomenon: 
There is no ontology alongside a phenomenology. Rather, scientific ontology is nothing but 
phenomenology. 12 
1.2 Logos and Phenomenology 
The extent to which the meaning of logos is elaborated by Heidegger varies in his 
writings according to the subject matter and the context of discussion. Aoyoý- in 
relation to logic and metaphysics, for instance, finds a full treatment in The 
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic where it stands for 'speech' in the sense of 
statements and predications - statements that determine something as something, 
that is, determining statements or determinations. This mode of determining is called 
thinking, and in this context Aoyoý- constitutes the subject matter of logic, or better, 
logic is 'the science of Aovog. (Science being understood in a broader sense of 
Greek c; ri7uz-r7, ui7 or German Wissenschaft and logic as an abbreviated form of 
'2 HCT, p. 72. 
14 
AO YUC77). 
13 We shall encounter another Greek sense of logos in Heidegger's later 
work Introduction to Metaphysics (see Chapter III). 
In The History of the Concept of Time, Heidegger explains the meaning of 
logos as a component of the term phenomenology with reference mainly to Aristotle. 
The term Aovoý- here is traced back to AeY, 61 v, i. e. discourse. 'To discourse' in the 
sense of Aevei v is in fact a particular mode of discoursing defined in relation to 
t5i7Aovv, 'making manifest'. Agyclv is a kind of discourse where, in Heidegger's 
words, 'what is manifest includes what the discourse is about and how it should be 
talked about'. Accordingly, discourse is an articulating speech whereby what is 
addressed is shown distinctly and clearly - the wording articulates or 'lays apart' (ex- 
pli-cates) the subject matter. The derivation of Aoroý- from Aeycl v and AcyEi v from 
&7Aovv finds a confirmation in Aristotle's definition of logos as airo0aica0al: 
'letting something be seen in itseýf and indeed - airo -from itself. 
14 
In speaking, for example, the voice operates on the basis of a7ro0alecy-Oal 
and lets something be seen. The voice in the vocal form of discoursing assumes the 
function of Oocovq pez-a Oav-raaiaý- whereby the intended content becomes visible 
and accessible to the listener. In fact, it is because of this essential element peculiar 
to the utterance, namely Oavracia, that what is said in the discourse, and as spoken, 
is meant and signified. Thus, says Heidegger, logos is in general Ocov77 o77, uavz-11c77, 
(something vocal which shows something in the sense of a signifying, which yields 
something understandable'. 15 
According to Aristotle, there is however a distinction between logos that 
ftmctions as m7pavriicoý- and logos in the sense of azooav-riKoq. Logos is called 
o-t7pavz-ucoq when Aeyetv signifies something but it does not necessarily assert 
something about something, or make a statement which determines something as 
something. For example, an exclamation, a wish, a prayer, a request, each as logos 
13 HCT, p. 84. 
14 It should be noted that our concern, at this stage, is to understand Heidegger's philosophical 
vocabulary and clarify the meanings he assigns to various terms. Therefore, what is important for us 
is not what Aristotle says but what Heidegger says that Aristotle and other authors say. 
15 HCT, p. 84. 
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c77pavriKoý- signify something but this kind of signifying does not involve the 
apprehension of something in the sense of Occop, 61 v, 'the theoretical apprehension' or 
judgment. Logos azooav-clicoý-, on the other hand, is Aoyoý- in the sense of a 
Occopeiv, 'discoursing in the sense of communicating the apprehension of a subject 
matter and only such a communication'. 16 These two modes of signifying as two 
aspects of logos form the basis of the distinction between Aoyoý- cyuavrucoý; and 
A oyoý- azooavrlicog- 
Logos, in its conjunctions with other terms, such as 'theo-logy', 'anthropo- 
logy' etc. is of course always logos azooavriKoý;. This applies also to the compound 
term 'phenomeno-logY' though with a subtle difference which denotes the essentially 
distinctive character of the latter compared to other sciences. Phenomenology, unlike 
the other sciences, does not study entities, but rather refers to the way in which all 
entities are encountered. Phenomenology, as the result of an intrinsic relationship 
between the meaning of phenomenon and logos (in the apophantic sense), stands for 
AL7ci v ra Oat vou. 6va = a7rooal vva0a, i'a Oat voueva - 'letting the manifest in 
itself be seen from it self. ' 17 Phenomenology aims to show the way or the how of the 
self-manifestation of phenomena. In this sense, phenomenology is a methodological 
term which expresses also the maxim of its research: 'to the matters themselves'. 
These 'matters' are no other than self-showing phenomena which have 'to be there 
18 through and for Aer, 61 v, for conceptual exposition and interpretation'. Accordingly, 
all objects ofphenomenological research must have the character ofphenomena. In 
deterrnining the character of a phenomenological encounter, Heidegger lists in 
particular three main achievements of phenomenological research as initiated and 
developed by Husserl. They are: 1) the concept of intentionality; 2) the idea of 
categorial intuition ; 3) the original sense of the apriori; In explicating Heidegger's 
interpretation of these achievements we hope to understand his own point of 
departure. In fact, as we shall see, this interpretation is far from a mere paraphrase of 
16 HCT, p. 85. 
17 
ibid. 
18 
ibid. 
16 
Husserlian doctrines. It already contains quite distinctive emphases in which we can 
detect the germs of Heidegger's disagreements with Husserl, to which we shall turn 
subsequently. 
2. The Achievements of Husserlian Phenomenology 
2.1 Intentionality 
Literally speaking intentio means 'directing itself toward' and according to Brentano 
the term was already known to Aristotle and the Scholastics. But it was only when 
Brentano himself spoke of 'the intentional inexistence of the object' that expressions 
intentio, intentional and intentionality became important terminology in modem 
philosophy. 19 What concerned Brentano most was the characterization of the psychic 
phenomena. To this end, he considered the actual elements just as they were or were 
given in this field, and attempted to arrange them in such a way that this order would 
include the formation of basic concepts drawn from the essence of the psychic itseýf 
He thus argued that the main difference between physical phenomena and psychic 
ones is that there is something 'objective' inherent in all psychic phenomena. This 
basic structure of the psychic, whereby something 'objective' 'inheres' in each lived 
experience, is viewed by Brentano as intentional inexistence, where the term 
'intentionality' is employed to classify the totality of psychic phenomena as 
involving 'seýfldirectness-toward. Brentano proposes three classes of psychic 
comportment: representing, judging and interest (the latter is also called love, 
emotion, and comprises all psychic manifestations that could not be fit into the two 
other classes). 
This brief outline of Brentano's position may suffice to give the philosophical 
background to the use of the expression 'intentionality'. Heidegger, on the other 
hand, recalling Husserl's maxim 'back to the matters themselves ,, attempts to 
account for the basic constitution of intentionality and its structural coherence 
19 Franz Brentano, Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint, (London: Routledge, 1970) First 
published 1879. 
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without drawing on such previously formed realistic or idealistic theories of 
consciousness. This,, for Heidegger, requires a process of purification, first 
programmatically demanded by Husserl, whereby all those theoretical prejudices that 
cover and obscure the data as such must be held at bay. 20 Intentionality, viewed on 
the basis of an apprehension of the data and the matters themselves, refers to 'a 
structure of lived experiences as such, and not a coordination relative to other 
realities, something added to the experiences taken as psychic states'. 21 These lived 
experiences are as such intentional because comportment itself is, in its very 
structure, a directing-itself-toward. In fact, it is because the very Being of comporting 
is a directing-itself-toward that relations between comportments are of an intentional 
character. Hence, 'we must come to see that all the relations of life are intrinsically 
defined by this structure'. 22 The idea that intentionality is the structure found in 
comportments -a structure of lived experiences and not just a supplementary 
relation, is Husserl's central insight: 
By intentionality we do not mean an objective relation which occasionally and subsequently 
takes place between a physical thing and a psychic process, but the structure of a 
comportment as comporting to, directing itself toward. [] All theories about the psychic, 
consciousness, person, and the like must be held in abeyance. 23 
We can see in these fon-nulations both Heidegger's commitment to some of 
Husserl's insights and his subtle distancing himself from Husserl's own 
interpretations of them. Husserl's breakthrough consisted in seeing that 'lived 
experience' is directed towards the world itself, and not towards 'inner' images, 
ideas, or representations of it, as most 'critical' modem epistemologists since 
Descartes had assumed. Self-transcendence, or directedness-towards the world (what 
Husserl called 'matters themselves') is essential to what lived experiences are - they 
cannot intelligibly be characterized independently of it. Yet while Husserl ascribed 
LI, 'Introduction", § 7. See also our discussion of the phenomenological reductions in Section 3.2 
below. 
21 HCT, p. 29. 
22 HCT, p. 36. 
23 HCT, pp. 36-7. 
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this directedness-towards to 'intentional experiences' or 'acts' as modifications of 
4 consciousness", Heidegger clearly already sees in this an unwarranted theoretical 
interpretation . Quite consistently, therefore, 
he replaces these Husserlian terms by a 
less theoretically loaded terminology of 'comportments' (Verhalten). Directedness- 
towards the world, self-transcendence, is the essential character - not of 'acts of 
consciousness', but - of 'comportments'. 
But the basic structure of intentionality is not exhaustively described by 
reference to 'intentional experiences' (or comportments) and the entities they are 
directed towards. Every comportment essentially intends what it is directed towards 
under a certain aspect or in a certain respect. No comportment can, so to speak, direct 
itself to an entity simpliciter - the entity is, rather essentially encountered as 
something or other. Husserl refers to this third component of the intentional structure 
as the Sinn - the 'sense' in which something is encountered. Heidegger often glosses 
this as the 'entity in the How of its being intended': 
Only with the how of the being-intended belonging to every intentio as such does the basic 
constitution of intentionality come into view at all, even though only provisionally. [] 
Intentionality is fully determined only when it is seen as this belonging together of intentio 
and intentum. 24 
Intentio, we said earlier, means 'directing-itself-toward'. The intentum, on the other 
hand, refers to the intended entity in the How of its being intended. These moments 
are not juxtaposed or extrinsically related but connected internally on the basis of a 
relationship inherent in the structure of intentionality. That is to say that, there is an 
internal relation between (intentio) directing-itseýfltoward, and the entity intended as 
it is intended (intentum): 
We thus have an inherent affinity between the way something is intended, the intentio, and 
the intentum, whereby intentum, the intended, is to be understood [not in the sense ofl the 
perceived entity as an entity, but the entity in the how of its being-perceived, the intentum in 
the how of its being-intended. 
25 
24 HCT, p. 45. 
25 ibid. 
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According to this, not only are all entities essentially phenomena (as we saw in the 
preceding Section), but they essentially manifest themselves in comportments as 
something or other. Neither of the three components of this triad - comportment, 
entity (phenomenon), and sense, can coherently be abstracted from the others. This 
implies, for instance, that a 'third realm' of self-subsistent, 'Platonic', senses would 
be meaningless for Husserlian phenomenology. 
In phenomenology, Heidegger remarks, intentio has also been understood as 
'the act of presuming' or noesis. In fact, throughout HCT, Heidegger presents 
Husserl's ideas, even when paraphrasing the early Logical Investigation, by using 
Husserl's later terminology. While Husserl had distinguished, in Logical 
Investigations, between an intentional act having a certain 'quality' (e. g. perceiving, 
imagining, wishing), the object of that act, and the intentional 'matter' of the act (the 
way in which the object is given/intended in the act), he later came to use 'noesis' for 
the act and 'noema' for what he earlier called 'matter'. 
Heidegger gives an extended analysis and interpretation of Husserl's account 
of a particular type of intentional comportment: perception. This has its motivation 
in the pivotal role played by perception in Husserl's theory of intentionality. In being 
perceived, the intended entity presents itself in its bodily-being. In perceivedness, 
accordingly, the entity is not only given as itself but, as itseýf in its bodily presence 
(leibhaftige Gegenwart)26: 
When we start from simple perception, let us reaffirm that the authentic moment in the 
perceivedness of the perceived is that in perception the perceived entity is bodily there. 27 
To grasp the full significance of this, we may first consider the following difference 
in mode of givenness: being bodily-given and being seýflgiven. As an example of a 
case of a (merely) se4f-given entity Heidegger cites the following: 'I can now 
26 The expression leibhaftige Gegenwart could also be translated as 'presence in person' or 'living 
presence 
27 HCT, p. 4-3). 
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envisage the Weidenhauser bridge; I place myself before it, as it were. Thus the 
bridge is itself given. I intend the bridge itself and not an image of it, no fantasy, but 
it itself And yet it is not bodily given to me 9.28 The bridge could only be bodily- 
given if I did actually go to the bridge and stand before it, seeing or touching it. Thus, 
the self-givenness of an entity is necessarily included in the mode of its being bodily- 
given, but not vice versa because, when I go to the bridge, for example, the bridge is 
present to me or is given to me, both bodily (in person) and itself Accordingly, 
'bodily presence is a superlative mode of the seýflgivenness of an entity ,. 29 
Heidegger, here again following Husserl, distinguishes self-givenness (either 
in imagination or in perception) from several other modes of representing such as 
empty intending and the perception of a picture. Empty intending denotes a mode of 
representation where something is intended through thinking by way of symbols or 
signs without having been 'seen' either itself (as self-given) or by means of a 
resemblance of it. For example, in a conversation about a particular object, let us 
assume we are speaking about a bridge, though what is intended is the bridge itself, it 
is not for this reason also given in its actual physical appearance. The bridge is, 
rather., intended in an 'empty' (but perhaps no less definite) way. Hence, the 
expression 4 empty intending'. Husserl also calls this kind of thinking 'inauthentic 
thinking'. In fact, in most of our conversations, despite the fact that in speaking of 
something we really mean the object itself (not images or representations of it), the 
object is not given intuitively. In empty (or symbolic, or signitive) intending, 
therefore, the intended object is itself directly intended - i. e. it is not the case that we 
are referring to it mediately through intervening mental images or the like - but 
because it is devoid of any intuitive fulfillment the intention is merely 'empty'. 
When an entity is given to us by way of a picture, by contrast, we perceive 
2' ibid. Heidegger's presentation of Husserl's views here departs from Husserl's early position in 
Logical Investigations, according to which imaginatively given entities are given by way of images or 
pictures of them, i. e. not self-given. (Cf. Ll V1, § 37, p. 761). Heidegger takes account of Husserl's 
revision of this view in Ideas 1, where imagination is said to give the object itse4f (not an image or 
picture of it), by way of a peculiar modification of its perceptual, bodily, givenness. See Id 1, p. 93 and 
pp. 244-245. 
29 HCT, p. 4 1. 
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something which presents itself to us, or is taken by us, as resembling what it 
pictures. Here, we intend an entity A which is not self-given through another entity B 
which is present in person (bodily-present) and is apprehended with the sense 
"resembling A'. When an entity is either self-given (in imagination or perception) or 
intended by resemblance, our intention of it is not 'empty' but (partly or wholly) 
'intuitively fulfilled'. 
As we shall see below,, all the modes of intending in which the intended 
entity is not leibhaftig gegenwdrtig are defined by Husserl in essential relation to 
those modes in which they are bodily-present. Husserl's account of what entities 
(phenomena) are is an account of what they present themselves as when (fully) 
bodily-present. But in order to understand this adequately, we first need to grasp the 
significance of the fact that bodily presence is mostly only partial. 
Husserl more than any other philosopher before him was struck by the fact 
that when we perceive, for example, a thing in space, we do not perceive merely a 
side of it, but perceive the thing in its being-all-together, in its totality. This should 
really be very surprising because 
[W]hen I see a sensibly perceptible object, this familiar chair here, I always see - understood 
as a particular way of seeing - only one particular side and one aspect. I see, for example, 
the upper part of the seat but not the lower surface. And yet, when I see the chair in this way 
or see only the legs, I do not think that the chair has its legs sawed off. 30 
This is to say that, though in walking around the chair we are always bound to have 
new aspects of the object, we are nevertheless intent upon seeing the chair itself and 
not just an aspect of it. In Husserl's language: every side that is actually thematically 
seen has a non-thematic horizon of the co-intended parts of the chair, and it is only 
through this horizonal consciousness that perception can intend the whole chair. 
Hence, 
[the chair's aspects] can change continually with the multiplicity of aspects being offered to 
me. But the bodily selfsameness of the perceived persists throughout my circling of the 
30HCT, p. 4'). 
') 1) 
thing. []I have no other perception in the sense of something else 
' 
perceived. The content 
of perception is different, but the perceived is presumed as the same. j I 
How is this possible? Husserl's explanation is that each perception contains 
perspectival foreshortenings or adumbrations of some of the sides not 'fully' present, 
and these figure as the bearers of signitive intentions, pointing towards what is, in a 
certain sense, absent. Without these 'signs' we would not be able to perceive the 
thing in its totality, but would instead always take ourselves to be perceiving, not a 
thing, but a thing-surface. Most perceptions are such complexions of aspects which 
are ' authentically' perceived and components which are only perceived 
adumbrationally and which act as bearers of further signitive intentions referring to 
absent parts or aspects of the thing. Even intuitively fulfilled intentional experiences, 
therefore, are often only partially fulfilled - they are presences suffused with 
n V., absences. Before moving on to some of the implications of this with respect to 
Husserl's understanding of truth and of Being, it may be useful to linger over some 
of the points made by Heidegger in connection with Husserl's account of perception 
because here,, again, we can detect certain subtle but important departures from the 
Husserlian position which point forward to Heidegger's own later analyses. 
Corresponding to the triadic structure of all intentional comportment outlined 
earlier, Heidegger discusses: (a) the perceived of perceiving: the entity in itseýf (e. g. 
environmental thing, natural thing, thinghood); (b) The how of being-intended (the 
perceivedness of the entity, the feature of bodily-there); (c) the basic mode of 
intentionality as the belonging-together of intentio and intentum. Having already 
addressed (b) and (c) sufficiently for our present purposes above, we shall focus on 
(a) in particular. 
(a) With regard to 'the entity in itself, perception, in the sense of natural or 
everyday perception, is explained by Heidegger through the example of a concrete 
chair 'that I find upon entering a room and push aside, since it stands in my way'. 
This occurrence is a 'natural perception' and as such, is not a detached observation 
1 HCT, p. 4-3 3. 
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but rather an absorption wherein I live. I move about in my world and deal with 'the 
matters at hand' in a practical way. In this, the natural mode of perceiving, says 
Heidegger, 'I do not perceive in order to perceive but in order to orient my self, to 
, 32 pave the way in dealing with something . The chair as an example of something 
that is perceived in this natural mode is, in the terminology of this text, a thing of the 
environing world, an environmental thing. 
On the other hand, the thing is also called 'natural' when what is said about 
the perceived something, the chair for instance, could also be said of any piece of 
wood. For this kind of assertion about the chair is not made about it qua chair-thing 
but qua a thing of 'nature' -a natural thing. Here, the fact that the perceived is a 
chair becomes of secondary importance. This distinction points at the same time to a 
connection between an environmental thing and a natural thing: 
The distinction between plant and flower, both of which can be said of the rose, is the 
distinction between natural and environmental thing. The rose as a flower is an 
environmental thing, the rose as a plant is a natural thing. 333 
The natural thing is the thing outside its practical envirom-nental context of use. The 
perceived is, therefore, both an environmental and a natural thing. However, it must 
be noticed that the specific structures belonging to a natural thing present 
themselves, first of all, in well-defined environmental characteristics. For in my 
everyday dealing with things, when I say, for instance, that the chair is hard or the 
rose is scented, I simply mean to say that the chair is uncomfortable and the rose 
smells pleasant. These everyday sayings about something, are not, however, 
irrelevant to the perceived itself, the features are, rather, constitutive of the 'thing 
itself. 'Hardness, material resistance, is itself present in the feature of discomfort 
and even only present in this way, and not just inferred from it or derived through it', 
32 HCT, p. 29. 
33 HCT, p. 38. 
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because 'the perceived gives itself in itself and not by virtue of points of view, say, 
which are brought to the things. 34 
Two points especially are significant about these remarks. Firstly, what the 
tradition calls value or use characteristics are constitutive of the entities themselves 
and are not, as the mainstream of modem philosophy since Hume has maintained, 
imposed or projected by the subject on a value-indifferent wordly substratum. 
Husserl had already argued that 'these value characteristics and practical 
characteristics belong constitutively to the vorhanden objects as such, whether I am 
turned towards them or the objects at all or not'. 35 But for Husserl, the grasping of 
those properties which according to the tradition constitute a material object qua 
material ob ect continue to have a certain priority, in that any comportment towards j 
the practical characteristics of 'natural things' presupposes a thematic grasp of their 
properties qua material ('natural') things. 36 Heidegger in this passage, secondly, 
suggests a reversal of this order of foundation: any encounter of 'natural properties' 
such as hardness presupposes the givenness of practical characteristics. Moreover, 
Heidegger raises the question, which will receive extended development in Being 
and Time, how the mode of access to the latter is to be understood. 
Heidegger in this passage implicitly criticizes Husserl's idea that we can 
understand the Being of 'natural' entities essentially as objects furnished with 
vanous strata or layers of properties, with the material stratum at the base and the 
(practical' and 'value' strata built, as it were, on top of them. Here as elsewhere in 
History of the Concept of Time, Heidegger's objection aims at the uncritical 
approach of Husserl and the other early phenomenologists to certain traditional 
concepts. Hence, he thinks that there is a host of metaphysically dogmatic assertions 
34 HCT, p. 38-39. 
35 Id 1, § 27, p. 533. 
Id 1, § 337, pp. 76-77. 
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built into the structure of Husserlian intentionality - assertions which phenomenology 
must call into question if it is genuinely to emancipate itself from the theoretical 
constructions handed down by the philosophical tradition. While, for example, 
intentionality is viewed as the structure of psychic phenomena, the meaning of the 
(psychic', just like that of consciousness, act, or person, is merely assumed on the 
basis of traditional conceptions. Likewise, when Husserl conceives intentionality as 
'the universal structure of reason' what is meant by reason, spirit, anima 'does not 
overcome the approach operative in these [traditional] theories'. 37 Intentionality, 
therefore,, should not be regarded as 
an ultimate explanation of the psychic but an initial approach toward overcoming the 
uncritical application of traditionally defined realities such as the psychic, consciousness, 
continuity of lived experience, reason. But if such a task is implicit in this basic concept of 
phenomenology, then 'intentionality' is not the very last word to be used as a 
phenomenological slogan. Quite the contrary, it identifies that whose disclosure would 
allow phenomenology to find itself in its possibilities. 38 
We shall see that another of the uncritical assumptions Heidegger will challenge is 
the very idea that the 'bodily' manifestation (leibhaftig) of a 'phenomenon' can 
always be regarded as its perceptual, and thus object-like, manifestation. 
22 Categorial Intuition 
The second great 'discovery' of Husserlian phenomenology in Heidegger's 
interpretation is the idea of categorial intuition or an intuition of 'categories'. 
Heidegger's presentation of this in History of the Concept of Time is highly 
condensed, although he emphasizes its fundamental importance, above all in 
widening the sense of what can constitute a possible objectivity, and thus in 
widening the sense of 'Being' vis-a-vis what had become the orthodox view 
concerning this in Gennan philosophy in the late 19 th century, under the influence of 
37 HCT, p. 46. 
38 HCT, p. 47. 
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empiricism and neo-Kantianism. According to this view, 'Being' is equated with 
4objective reality', and the latter is exhausted by what can become a possible object 
of sense perception (or of 'sensible intuition', in Kantian language). All components 
of logical form in our thought about the world are contributed by the 'subject", more 
precisely by various 'faculties' of the 'mind'. They are therefore 'subjective'. All 
logical form and conceptualization - including all 'general ideas' like colour, 
solidity, animality, etc - are a product of activities of the mind (Kant's 'spontaneity 
of the understanding') on the unstructured 'matter' of sensation. We gain our 
concepts of these logical form and universals by observing through 'inner sense' the 
mind's structuring operations; in Husserl's terminology, by reflecting on certain 
noeses. 
Heidegger's exposition of the phenomenological overcoming of this modem 
orthodoxy largely follows Husserl's discussion of categorial intuition in chapter 6 of 
the sixth Logical Investigation, yet, as before, his interpretation departs in subtle but 
significant ways from Husserl's position and therefore points the way beyond 
Husserl. Let us first recall what Husserl himself called his 'principle of principles': 
all meanings or senses ultimately rest on 'intuition', that is, on the perceptual or 
quasi-perceptual self-givenness of the entities or 'objectivities" 
(Gegensondlichkeiten) intended through them. I eannot understand what is meant by 
the verbal sign ('empty intending') 'gold' unless I have had some intuition of gold 
(either in sense perception or imagination) in which a sample of that metal has been 
self-given to me. 'Intuition' here means simply: apprehending something self-given 
as it shows itself. 
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Without intuition all sense would remain 'empty' and thus ultimately non- 
sense. But if this is so, the question poses itself: how can one intuit (perceive or 
imagine) not just, for example, this gold ring, but gold in general? And how can one 
intuit that 'gold is a yellow-ish metal' (Husserl's example)? 'Being' in the sense of 
the copula (the 'is of predication') means the congruence of subject and predicate, 
39 Cf HCT, p. 47. 
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the 'belonging' of the latter to the former: 'S is P' means T belongs to S'. But this 
'belonging' cannot be perceived through sense perception nor through any kind of 
reflection upon alleged structuring operations of the mind. I can perceive in sense 
perception this gold ring, but not that gold is a yellowish metal: 
I can see the colour, but not the being-coloured [ ... 
] Being is nothing in the object, not a 
part of it, not a moment inherent in it [... ] just as it is no real inner characteristic, so it is no 
real external characteristic,, and therefore it is in the sense of reality not a 'characteristic' at 
all. 40 
And what is true for the copula 'is' applies just as well to the other 'categorial 
forms' (or form words) in which states of affairs are expressed: this S is P; S is not 
P,, some S's are P, all S's are R, S is P and S is Q; S is P or S is Q; etc. Husserl now 
maintains that these complex expressions refer to complex objects which can come 
to self-givenness in acts of intuition which are themselves complex in the sense of 
being founded upon simple acts of intuition. And these founded acts of intuition are 
what he calls categorial intuitions. The most important kinds of categorial intuition, 
and those discussed by Heidegger, are two: acts of synthesis, in which states of 
affairs (Sachverhalte) come to self-givenness; and acts of ideation, in which general 
objects come to self-givenness. An example of an act of ideation would be my 
gaining the universal concept 'gold-(coloured)' by looking at a particular golden 
object and attending to its colour moment, not as this particular colour moment at 
this place at this moment, but as something that can be shared by many things. For 
Husserl, such acts of ideation are what furnish us with a grasp of universals and they 
are a necessary condition of logical thought as such, because without them we could 
not understand what any general predicates at all .41 Acts of synthesis 
in which states 
of affairs are self-given are more complex and difficult to analyse. Their elucidation 
requires distinction between straightforward or simple (schlicht) and founded 
intuitions. A straightforward intuition is defined as one whose object constitutes 
40 Ll VI, § 43, p. 780 (translation modified). 
" Ll VI, § 52. The doctine of eidetic intuition or ideation and its objects is first introduced and 
defended at greater length against empiricist and nominalist objections in LI II, especially §§ 2-4. 
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itself (that is to say, shows itself) at one stroke, without any acts of relating or 
connecting objects that, in turn, would have to be given in yet further, more basic, 
acts of intuition. The paradigm of straightforward intuition is the sensory perception 
of an object, for example a gold ring. The ring is given at one stroke, as a whole, 
while its parts and moments are given only implicitly and are not intended explicitly 
in separate acts. 42 But when I think, with intuitive fullness, that 'this ring is gold- 
coloured'. I focus my attention on one moment of the ring, its colour and perform an 
act of ideation concerning it. This separate intuition of the eidetic colour moment is 
then fused with the total perception of the ring, which has continued all the while, 
and fused with it in an act of (partial) identification. It is only when I do not merely 
perform or experience this identification, but rather attend to this identification and 
thematize the (partial) identity that is given in it, that the new objectivity 'this ring is 
gold-coloured' -a state of affairs -comes to intuitive self-givennness. So the 
intuition of a state of affairs 'S is P' is an act of synthesis, which is a founded act in 
the sense of presupposing, and being directed onto, the objects given in various 
other. ) more 
basic acts, including at the most basic level, acts of straightforward, 
sensory intuition. 
What,, from Heidegger's point of view, is the significance of Husserl's 
doctrine of categorical intuition? Here we need to distinguish between the 
achievements of Husserl's own analysis and Heidegger's implicit development of 
these analyses contained in his own interpretation of Husserl's theory. First and most 
importantly, the theory breaks with the idea, common to the empiricists, to Kant, and 
the neo-Kantianism dommant at the time (and still powerful today), that all 'genuine' 
objectivities are particular objects ('in' space and time and connected by causal laws 
according to the empiricists, but not even this according Kant), and that all the 
categonal fonns through which we are enabled to think these objects have their 
origin in the 'subject" and thus are not 'genuinely objective'. Husserl's theory does 
away with 
42 Ll VI, § 47, pp. 791-7922- 
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the old mythology of an intellect which glues and rigs together the world's matter with its 
own forms [ ... ] The categorial 
'forms' are not constructs of acts but objects which manifest 
themselves in these acts. They are not something made by the subject and even less 
something added to the real objects Rather, they actually present the entity more truly 
in its 'being-in-itself. 43 
Ultimately, what is perhaps most significant about the theory is not what was 
important about it for Husserl: namely that only on its basis was there any hope of 
actually demonstrating the categories by phenomenological methods and thus of 
eventually securing a rigorous and scientifically sound sense of apriority capable of 
constituting a solid foundation for all scientific research. To be sure, Heidegger 
acknowledges these aims and gives Husserl credit for having made great and 
fundamental advances towards them. 44 But more important, given his own 
philosophical concerns, was the broadening of the sphere of ob ective and worldly j 
Being accomplished by Husserl and the decisive overcoming and vanquishing of the 
empiricist and neo-Kantian orthodoxies. This might pave the way for an even more 
radical re-thinking of the Being of the world. 
We should not leave this important subject without giving due attention to 
Heidegger's subtle re-phrasings of and departures from Husserl's doctrine of 
categorial intuition. These are not immediately obvious and require a close and 
careful reading of both Heidegger and Husserl on this topic. Two of Heidegger's 
modifications are of special significance. They are, in fact, closely related. First, 
Heidegger denies, contrary to Husserl's doctrine in Logical Investigations, that there 
is a clear-cut distinction between straightforward and categorial intuition: 
Even simple [straightforward] perception, which is usually called sense perception, is 
already intrinsically pervaded by categorial intuition. 45 
Why is this so? One might argue that this claim is a consequence of Husserl's 
assertion - not acknowledged by Husserl himself - that all (! ) the parts and moments 
4 3, 
HCT, p. 70. 
44 HCT, pp. 71-72. 
45 HCT, p. 60. 
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of a real object are given 'implicitly' in straightforward sense perception. 46 If explicit 
articulation is merely ex-pli-cation of what is already 'implicitly' perceived, then it is 
difficult not to draw Heidegger's conclusion that there is, strictly speaking, no 
'simple', straightforward perception at all. Heidegger's second point in this 
connection is that what is implicit - what we see in 'straightforward' perception - is 
saturated by pre-existing signitive or expressive patterns: 
It is also a matter of fact that our simplest perceptions and constitutive states are already 
expressed, even more, are interpreted in a certain way. What is primary and original 
here? [ ... ] To put 
it more precisely: we do not say what we see, but rather the reverse, we 
see what one says about the matter. 47 
These genetic considerations are alien to Husserl's approach in Logical 
Investigations. 48 It is perhaps not entirely clear how far-reaching Heidegger's 
apparent criticism in this passage is: if he is remarking upon a 'matter of fact' this 
would signify a refusal to separate purely 'a priori' investigations from factual or 
4 genetic' ones, and thus a break with Husserl's methodological constraints. If 
Heidegger's point is about an essential meshing or interweaving of perception and 
signitive expression, this would call into question Husserl's very 'principle of 
principles: the priority of intuition over empty signitive intending. 
We are not in a position to resolve this issue here, since Heidegger's 
formulation permits both readings. For the moment, we may conclude this Section by 
noting how Heidegger's interpretation of the 'implicit' presence of being in the sense 
of the copula (the 'is' of predication) in 'straightforward' perception foreshadows or 
parallels the way in which Being, according to Being and Time, is prethernatically 
understood in pre-ontological, everyday comportment. 
46 LI V1, § 47, pp. 791-792 
47 HCT, p. 75. 
48 See especially the exclusion of all genetic considerations in the Introduction of Ll. Husserl does, 
however, make similar points about the influence of public, linguistic interpretedness on perception in 
his later'genetic' phenomenology. See especially Experience andJudgment, § 12. pp. 57-58. 
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2.3 The 'Original Sense of the ApriorP 
Husserlian 'phenomenology deals with intentionality in its apriori' and 'the 
structures of intentionality in its apriori are the phenomena ,. 49 The discovery of 
4 original sense of the apriori' is the third seminal achievement with which Heidegger 
credits Husserl. An elucidation of Heidegger's interpretation of this sense may, it is 
to be hoped, provide us with an initial clue for approaching the issue concerning time 
and Being in the next chapter. It is significant that Heidegger in this connection 
makes the brief but pregnant remark that the clarification of the sense of the apriori 
(really presupposes the understanding of what we are seeking: time'. 50 
As Heidegger emphasizes, the term 'apriori 'conveys almost naYvely the idea 
of a time sequence, the idea of a before and an after. Apriori, considered formally, 
stands for 'what from before, from earlier on already is'. 51 This formal definition is 
of course empty for it says nothing with respect to that which is and that which 
comes 'first' or 'before' this something. In the tradition, however, the term 'apriori' 
since Descartes and Kant has been understood always in connection with knowledge, 
with knowing and cognitive comportment. What is apriori is a form of knowledge 
that is 'independent' of the experience of the empirically 'real'. That is, a kind of 
knowledge which is not gained on the basis of an empirical inductive experience but 
(apriori', i. e. founded on the subject's non-empirical modes of knowing its object. 
Ap iori knowledge traditionally refers, therefore, to a subjective knowing which, as pr 
being immanent within and derived from the sphere of the self-enclosed subject, is 
also characterized as an inner knowing, an inner vision, that both transcends and 
precedes the sphere of the empirically given object: 
Underlying this classification of the sense of the apriori and aposteriori of knowledge is the 
thesis of the priority of the knowledge of subjectivity, a thesis which Descartes based on the 
cogito sum, res cogitans. 
52 
49 HCT, p. 86. 
50 HCT, p. 72. 
51 HCT, p. 73. This remark is strong evidence for interpreting the recurrent formulation 'always 
aready' in Being and Time as expressing Heidegger's structural equivalent to the apriori in Husserl. 
52 ibid. 
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The interpretation of the sense of apriori in relation to subjective knowing was 
further developed by Kant to the extent that subjectivity and the apriori could no 
longer be thought as disjoined. Since then, the relevance of the term 'apnori' and its 
sense becarne restricted to epistemological inquiries and related questions. Kant's 
central question, for instance, was whether and how 'synthetic apriori judgments', 
can have objective validity. In fact, the question of the apriori and its sense has been 
shaped throughout in the light of the modem preoccupation with the question of 
knowledge and the validation of the latter's ground: 
Even today, the apriori is still identified as the feature belonging specifically to the 
subjective sphere. [ ... 
] fn conjunction with this Kantian concept of the apriori, the attempt 
is now also being made to interpret the apriori in Plato in the same way. For Plato speaks of 
how the true Being of entities is known when the soul speaks to itself in the 
Aoyoý-VlvXqý-xpaavrqý-. The identification of VoXt7 in the Greek sense with 
consciousness and the subject now supports the view that already in Plato, the discoverer of 
the apriori, apriori knowledge means immanent knowledge. This interpretation of Plato is 
absurd. 53 
Heidegger, rather, maintains that for Plato and for Parmenides the sense of the 
apriori is connected and actually identical with the concept of Being. This 
understanding of the apriori is also the one that should be followed in 
phenomenology. Hence, despite all talk about the subject and consciousness, the 
sense of the apriori in phenomenology is not bound up with subjective knowledge 
and subjectivity. The apriori therefore, is neither something transcendent in the sense 
of an object, nor is it immanent. Heidegger sums up the phenomenological sense of 
the apriori in three points: 
1) The scope of the apriori is universal, that is, it is 'indifferent to subjectivity' 
in the sense of not being essentially restricted to, found in, or derived from, 
the subjective sphere (it is, in other words, not discovered by reflection on 
operations of the mind'). 
2) The apriori is not merely thought but given in originary intuition. (Heidegger, 
slightly misleadingly perhaps, says that it is given in 'straightforward' 
53 ibid. 
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intuition, although it is surely intuited in a categorial intuition - but we have 
seen that Heidegger has already questioned the strict tenability of this 
distinction). Heidegger regards the intuitive character of the apriori as a 
consequence of its universal scope and its being grounded in its respective 
domains of subject matter. But ultimately, its intuitive, rather than merely 
'thought' or inferred, character follows from Husserl's 'principle of 
principles': if the expression 'apriori' is meaningful at all, what it signifies 
must be intuitable, it must be capable of being demonstrated or shown in 
what manifests itself directly in the phenomena themselves. 54 
3) The apriori is a feature of the structural sequence in the Being of entities, in 
the ontological structure of Being. Heidegger stresses the point by 
emphasizing once more that 'the "earlier" is not a feature in the ordered 
sequence of knowing, but it is also not a feature in the sequential order of 
entities, more precisely in the sequential order of the emergence of an entity 
from an entity'. 
55 For the apriori does not refer to comportment but to Being: 
56 'it is not a title for comportment but a title for Being' . This is a crucial point 
which again marks a departure from anything actually said explicitly by 
Husserl. 
The consequence of these observations is that, according to them, phenomenology is 
concerned with what is 'prior' in the sense of 'before', that it therefore involves an 
essential reference to time; and that it concerns neither entities nor knowing, but the 
Being of entities. It should be noted that both the reference to the Being of entities, 
and the essential connection with time, cannot be found in Husserl and mark 
Heidegger's re-interpretation of Husserl in an effort to show the implicit trajectory of 
phenomenology conceived as ongoing research to point inexorably to the question of 
Being and to time as the horizon within which this question must be posed. 
54 Cf Husserl's explicit statement that 'the [apriori] laws of the categories [ ... ] which abstract 
from all 
the matter of sensibility [ ... ] all of this is not merely meant, but seen, it is given in the ftillest 
adequacy' (LI VI, § 9, p 83 1; translation modified). 
55HCT, p. 74. 
56 
ibid. 
2.4 Husserl on Truth and Being 
We have already encountered Husserl's distinction between different modes of 
intending the same intentum (that is, the same entity as it is intended, or: the same 
entity given in the same sense). For example, I can intend 'the frontal faqade of the 
National Gallery' merely symbolically, through linguistic signs, or by way of a 
picture resembling it, or it can be self-given in an imaginative act, which in turn is a 
peculiar modification of actually perceiving the fagade. All of these modes of 
intending count, to a greater or lesser extent, as intuitively fulfilling the 'empty 
intention' of merely signitive or symbolic meaning. But all of them can be seen as 
having their ultimate aim in actual perception or originary intuition, in which the 
object is bodily present or 'present in person' (leibhaftig gegenwdrtig). The life of 
consciousness. ) 
for Husserl, of itself tends towards or aims at the bodily presence of 
the phenomena it intends, and we cannot understand either signs (language), or 
phantasy/imagination, or mimetic picturing, without being aware of the essential 
dependence of these modes of intending something on the object's bodily self- 
givenness in originary intuition (i. e. perception). Perception is distinguished as what 
fulfills empty intendings in the emphatic sense. Only perception can fulfill empty 
intentions 'adequately', that is, completely (although this is not possible in principle 
with regard to some kinds of intentions, for example those which are directed at 
material ob ects). j 
What is of central importance for Heidegger about this hierarchy of modes of 
intending is that it constitutes the basis of Husserl's understanding of truth and of 
Being. At the heart of this understanding is the idea of a synthesis of identification 
which can take place when what has been emptily intended is subsequently given in 
an intuitively fulfilled manner in originary intuition. When I think that the National 
Gallery is fronted by a row of columns, and I subsequently perceive the front of the 
National Gallery as actually being fronted a row of columns, I experience a 
congruence or an identity (often partial) of what I had emptily intended (in 
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symbolic, signitive thought) and what I subsequently perceive. This experience of 
identity between what is thought in the absence of the object and what is then bodily 
self-given in originary intuition, where the object is characterized as present 'in 
person', lies at the basis of the concepts of knowledge and truth and, ultimately. of 
Being for Husserl. We might say that the difference between presence and absence is 
what is presupposed by the possibility of truth. Only because something can be 
meant while being absent, and the same thing can also be, at least partially, present 
just as it was meant when absent, does the talk of truth have any sense. 
When the noetic quality of an empty intention is one of belief, in other words, 
when the intention is a positing act, we speak of the perception which fulfills it as 
confirming it. 57 But such confirmation has many possible grades and levels. It is 
possible to think of an originary intuition (perception) in which the intended object is 
completely bodily-given, in which no partial intention in what was originally meant 
remains unfulfilled. There are no components in what is perceived - that is, in the 
noematic correlate of the act of perception - which point towards yet further 
fulfillments; in other words there are no adumbrational signitive components in what 
is perceived. Husserl calls the act in which we experience the complete congruence 
of what was meant as it was meant with what is thus completely or adequately given 
'in person' seýflevidence (Evidenz). That is to say, self-evidence is an act in which 
we live through the experience of the complete adequacy of what is perceived to 
what was meant. Such experiences of congruence, or acts of identification, are, for 
Husserl, primitive phenomenological facts not capable of ftirther explication: 
Self-evidence is itself ] ... ] the act of synthesis of the most complete congruence. Like every identification it is an objectifying act; its objective correlate is called being in the sense of 
truth or simply truth. 58 
He goes on, however, to distinguish more precisely between Being and truth: 'the 
concepts of truth [ ... 
] should relate to the side of the acts themselves [ ... 
] [while] 
57 Ll VI, § 38, p. 765. 
58 ibid. (translation modified). 
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the concepts of being (being-in-truth) should relate to their objective correlates'. 59 
Husserl proposes two concepts of Being and, correlatively, two concepts of truth 
(although he initially discusses all four as senses of 'truth'): (1) the first concept of 
Being, which is the one Heidegger will focus on is defined as follows: 
the truth [i. e. being-in-truth] is, as the correlate of an act of identification, a state of affairs, 
and as correlate of an identification of congruence an identity: the complete co-inciding 
between what has been meant and what is given as such. This co-inciding is experienced in 
[the act ofl self-evidence, in so far as the self-evidence is the actual performance of the 
adequate identification. 60 
A second sense of being-in truth is obtained, (2) when we focus on the objective 
correlate, the object that is bodily-given just as it was meant. As Heidegger 
paraphrases Husserl's point: 
The true can also be understood in terms of the very object which is [e. g. a state of 
affairs] [ ... ] Here, the true amounts to that which makes knowledge true. Truth here comes 
down to being-real. 61 
It is important to realize that this sense of truth/Being is, when taken on its own, an 
abstraction. It is essentially derivative of the first sense in which the truth is given 
(experienced): 
The concept of truth as adaequatio can be taken in a double sense, as it always has been in 
history: on the one hand as the correlate of identification [ ... ] and on the other as [ ... ] this 
very act of bringing into co-incidence. [ ... ] Both conceptions try to direct the concept of 
truth to one side and so are incomplete. Neither the one directed toward the state of affairs 
nor the one oriented toward the act captures the original sense of truth. 62 
It is clear from this that for Heidegger, although not - at least not explicitly - for 
Husserl, what Husserl is trying to articulate in his first formulation is the 'original 
sense of truth',, and all others are derived and abstracted from it. This is obviously 
the case with the two concepts of truth which focus on the side of the act (or of 
59 Ll V1, p. 768 (translation modified). 
60 Ll VI, § 39, p. 765 (translation modified). 
61 HCT, p. 53. 
62 ibid. 
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'knowing'). We can define truth (3) as the ideal relation of bringing-into-congruence, 
or, in other words, the ideal essence of the act of self-evidence: the 'idea of absolute 
adequation as such' . 
63 For Heidegger, this definition is not only one-sided; since it 
deals with an ideal or eidetic relationship, it must be 'founded' on individual 
happenings or performances of identification in which the truth is actually 
experienced. The same can be said about (4) the last concept of truth as the 
correctness of ajudgment, in other words, as the adequacy of its intentional matter in 
specie to the object. Here, finally, we have arrived at the 'traditional' concept of 
truth. Just as with the third concept, it is clear that this is a 'founded', non-basic 
concept which presupposes the first concept of truth/Being. 
Husserl's concept of truth constitutes, according to Heldegger, an important 
advance over traditional approaches, primarily in two respects. First, Husserl 
significantly widens the concept of truth. Truth is for him 'originally' not a 'property' 
of a 'judgment'. In fact, even nominal (that is, non-propositional) acts can enter into 
the truth relation with simple, straightforward perceptions: 
Phenomenology returns to the broad concept of truth whereby the Greeks (Aristotle) could 
call true even perception as such and the simple perception of something. 64 
Of course., if straightforward perceptions are themselves implicitly categorial, as 
Heidegger has argued, then this departure from the tradition may be less fundamental 
than it looks at first. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, Husserl's first and 
C original' sense of truth/Being is the concept of a happening and it can readily be 
interpreted as the concept of an emergence of entities from absence ('empty 
intending') to 'presence'. 'Truth' in Husserl's 'original' sense refers to an event-like 
dynamic relation between what is absent and what is present, and it cannot be 
reduced merely to one pole of this duality (for example, merely to what is present). 
There is, in fact, much greater ambiguity in Husserl"s formulation of the first 
concept than may have appeared so far from Heidegger's interpretation of it. For 
63 Ll VI, § 39, p. 766. 
(" HCT, p. 55. 
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Husserl describes being-in-truth as both a 'state of affairs' and as something 
4 experienced' in the 'performance' of an identification. But a state of affairs is an 
ideal objecl in Husserl's ontology, the objective correlate of a judgment. So it is not 
fully clear whether, for Husserl, the first sense of truth/Being really applies to 
something that corresponds to, and is adequately given, in the performance (Vollzug) 
of the act of identification, in which case one could indeed speak of truth/Being as a 
dynamic happening. Alternatively, Husserl may be claiming that the identity of the 
meant content and the intuited content is only adequately given in a thernatizing 
perception of the identity, which previously was experienced unthematically, 
'through a separate act of objectifying apprehension, through a special looking at the 
present truth... a priori the possibility exists at any time to look at the congruence 
and to bring it to intentional consciousness in an adequate perception'. 65 According 
to this interpretation, being-in-truth is an object, namely the thematically objectified 
congruence (identity) between the meant and the perceived content, which is 
unthematically experienced, but not itself adequately given, in the act which Husserl 
calls Evidenz. What speaks for this interpretation is that Husserl explicitly calls 
being-in-truth a 'state of affairs', and, secondly, that he later elucidates 'being in the 
66 
sense of truth' as 'the adequately perceivable[! ] in general'. Now, Heidegger seems 
explicitly to reject this interpretation when he says that 
[fln the coming into coincidence of the presumed [meant] with the intuited, I am solely and 
primarily directed toward the subject matter itself. [ .... ] The correlation is peculiar in that 
something is experienced but not grasped [erfasst]. So it is really only in grasping the object 
as such, which amounts to not grasping the identity [! ], that this identity is experienced. 
[... ][T]his intentionality, itself unthernatic in its performance, is immediately and 
transparently experienced as true. 67 
As a result of this reading he is able to present a 'charitable' interpretation and 
development of Husserl's ambiguously articulated 'original' concept of being-in- 
truth as the concept of a dynamic happening in the way we have outlined above. If 
65 LI VI, § 339, p. 766 (translation modified). 
66 LI VI, p. 768. 
67 HCT, p. 52. 
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Heidegger is aware that Husserl himself might have tended towards the objectifying 
interpretation of the concept, this is at least not explicitly said in the text. But 
Heidegger makes it clear that any such interpretation would be questionable : 
We shall later raise the fundamental question of the sense of Being and thus come to face 
the question of whether the concept of Being can really be originally drawn in this context 
of being-true and the corresponding being-real, and whether truth is a phenomenon which is 
originally conceived in the context of assertions or, in the broader sense, of objectifying 
acts. 68 
2.5 Husserl's Mature Methodology: 
the Phenomenological Reductions 
In Husserl's first main work,, Logical Investigations, on which Heidegger's 
interpretation of Husserl - and our own interpretation of this interpretation - up to 
this point has concentrated, the methodological basis of phenomenology had not yet 
been clearly worked out. To be sure, Husserl states in the 'Introduction' that 
phenomenology is concerned with the descriptive elucidation or clarification 
(Aujkldrung) of the essences of intentional experiences; that it must make no claims 
which are not based on adequate intuitions of such essences on the basis of 
individual samples; that it must use no theoretical (in particular no metaphysical and 
scientific) presuppositions; and that it makes no claims about 'real Being' but only 
about ideal possibilities and essential relations. 69 Yet the intentional acts themselves 
whose essences are to be 'elucidated' are taken as individual acts occurring within 
"streams of consciousness' 'in' nature (although their 'reality' is a matter of no 
concern to the phenomenologist). It is only later, in Ideas I (1913), that Husserl 
attempts to develop a secure methodological foundation for phenomenology in the 
form of what he came to call the phenomenological reduction. At its origin is the 
. suspension' of our natural attitude to the world that takes the world in general in its 
68 FICT, p. 54. 
69 LI, 'Introduction', §§ 6-7. 
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entirety as vorhanden in the sense of 'being real' . 
70 Husserl calls this suspension or 
'bracketing' of the Generalthesis of the reality of the world ezoXi7. What 
ezoXq means in the phenomenological analysis of acts is that the analysis 'does not 
really go along with the act', but approaches the object of the act and thernatizes it in 
terms of how it is understood in the intention. In other words,, the givenness in the act 
and of its objective correlate becomes the theme of the analysis, entailing that any 
object is not 'directly presumed as such, but in the how of its Being'. " The 'how of 
an entity's Being' means that the entity is viewed entirely, i. e. exclusively, to the 
extent that it is the object of intentionality. This 'bracketing' of the reality of the 
world, Heidegger points out, does not purport that 'the entity is not", but attempts to 
make 'the mode of Being of the entity' thematic. In fact, in Heidegger's 
interpretation, the sole function of this phenomenological 'suspension of the 
transcendent thesis' is to make the entity 'present in regard to its Being': 72 
The term 'suspension' is thus always misunderstood when it is thought that in suspending 
the thesis of existence and by doing so, phenomenological reflection simply has nothing 
more to do with the entity. Quite the contrary: in an extreme and unique way, what really is 
at issue now is the determination of the Being of the very entity. 73 
It is to be noted that Husserl himself does not speak of the reduction as making 
thematically present the mode of Being of the intended entity, but rather its mode of 
givenness, or rather, the entity as it is given. 74 But, as we saw in Section 1.1, for 
Heidegger it is senseless to speak of an entity in abstraction from its showing or 
manifesting itself There is no being 'behind' or radically separate from what shows 
itself (including what shows itself 'as hidden'). In this respect also, Heidegger 
arguably draws explicitly a conclusion which is implied by Husserl's own claims, but 
which is not actually developed by Husserl. 
70 Id 1, §§ 30-3 1. For discussion of Husserl's various 'paths' towards the phenomenological reduction. 
see R. Bernet, 1. Kem, and E. Marbach, An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1995), pp. 65-75. 
7 'HCT, p-99- 
72 ibid. 
73 ibid. 
7.1 
Id 1, § 87. 
41 
The c; roX77 can in principle be carried out with respect to any comportment of 
consciousness - i. e. any individual acts of perceiving, imagining, wishing, 
deliberating and the like. In performing the eiroX77, consciousness is envisaged in 
such a manner that I do not go along with the positing of the object in perceiving or 
in deliberating: I do not posit the object as real. I rather, thematize the acts and their 
objects according to the how of their givenness. On the basis of this 'not going along 
with any transcendent thesis', we arrive to the initial sense of reduction as 
transcendental reduction. What remains and endures after this reduction, that is,, 
after the concrete experiential continuity of my life is reduced, is the field of my 
stream of consciousness and its noematic correlates. This field may be called 
transcendental consciousness, since it is not (considered as) a part or residue of 
nature - unlike Descartes' cogito that remains as a residue of the actuat, real world 
throughout Descartes' procedure of systematic doubt - but is the condition of 
possiblity of all object-like structures and entities. Transcendental consciousness, we 
may say, is not apart of the world, but is a necessary correlate and condition of the 
world - hence the relation between it and what is 'constituted by' it (i. e. what 
manifests itself to it) can never be a causal relation; it is rather an essential 
correlation. 75 But the transcendental reduction made possible by the vzqX77 is only 
the first step of Husserl's mature philosophical method. A second reduction called 
eidetic reduction suspends also this individual stream of experience as individual 
1 
. 
76 
and focuses on the unity of the stream of experience ideative Y After this step the 
acts and their objects are no longer regarded as concrete individuations of my 
concrete being (as this stream of experience) but the concretely lived experience 
(noesis) is considered as the universal structure that belongs to a perception, 
representation or judgment as such, and the various particular moments of the 
correlated entities-as-intended (noemata) are regarded, in each case, as instantiating 
75 Id 1, § 53. For Husserl, unlike Descartes, what is suspended is 'the entire world, including ourselves 
and all our cogitare' (Id 1, § 33, p. 63, my emphasis). It is therefore quite wrong to accuse Husserl of 
any obvious or straightforward 'Cartesianism' . This does not rule out the possibility that certain 
Cartesian assumptions of a less obvious kind may persist in Husserl's phenomenology. 
76 Id 1, §§ 69-7 1. 
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universal essences. This means that in eidetic reduction the questions of when and 
where a perceiving, judging, wishing, etc, take place and whether this perceiving 
and the like are mine or not are of no importance. Consciousness is here neither 
concrete nor individual. In Husserl's terminology the field to which we arrive 
through transcendental and eidetic reduction is called the field of pure 
consciousness. 
We have almost reached the crucial point of our analysis. For, as Heidegger 
emphasizes, in Husserlian phenomenology pure consciousness occupies the position 
of absolute Being - pure consciousness is absolute Being. The significance of this 
claim and its consequences constitute the basis of Heidegger's critique of Husserl 
and previous phenomenological research in general. To understand why the reduced 
consciousness is absolute we need to recall that for Husserl. the transcendent world 
does not belong to the immanently real whole of the stream of experience and hence 
that the reality of the thing is other than the reality of the stream of consciousness. 
'The chair is not a lived experience or an experiential thing. Its kind of Being is 
totally different from that of lived experience'. 77 Meanwhile, 'everything objective in 
what is called immanent perception [i. e. reflection] is identified by the same kind of 
78 being as immanent perception itself . Husserl speaks of the stream of lived 
experiences as 'a region of being which constitutes a sphere of absolute position'. 
79 This is because 'the object of immanent perception is absolutely given' . WUle 
transcendent perception - the perception of what is not reell inunanent in the stream 
of consciousness - apprehends every perceived thing in its bodily character, an 
, apparently perceived thing might still not be: our 'perception' might turn out to have 
been delusory. By contrast, all entities that are given in the reflection upon the acts 
i. e. immanent perception) have an existence which 'cannot in principle be denied'. 80 
77 FICT, p. 100. 
78 ibid. 
79 ibid. 
80 ibid. Cf Id 1, p. 102: 'Anything physical which is given "in person" can be non-existent, but no 
experience which is given "in person" can be non-existent'. 
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Hence, the distinguishing feature of inunanence lies in its mode of givenness (for 
Heidegger that means: mode of Being) that is absolute: 
We now see that the sphere of pure consciousness is obtained by way of transcendental and 
eidetic reductions is distinguished by the character of being absolutely given. Pure 
consciousness is thus for Husserl the sphere of absolute Being. Nothing is altered in the 
absolute Being of lived experiences by the contingency of the world of things. Indeed, these 
experiences are always presupposed for all of that. 81 
At this point the question arises whether there is a fundamental difference between 
Husserl's position and that of Descartes. For Heidegger the kinship between 
Descartes and Husserl is indeed closer than we might have thought: 
The transcendent world, whose exemplary index for Husserl as well is to be found in the 
basic stratum of the material world of things, is what Descartes characterizes as res extensa. 
Husserl himself at the point where he observes that the reflection has come to a climax, 
refers to Descartes. He says that what comes to a head is simply what Descartes thought in 
the Meditations, to be sure with another method and another philosophical goal. 82 
Heidegger refers in this connection to Husserl's statement about the 'fundamental 
83 detachability of the entire natural world from the domain of consciousness' . But it 
is questionable whether Husserl actually meant by this that thought, representation, 
and self-consciousness can in principle be detached from the world of material 
things. We shall discuss this issue below in Section 3.1.3. In any case, Heidegger's 
essential point in this connection is that the question of the Being of intentionality, 
the Being of consciousness, is not examined nor raised as an issue, but assumed. For, 
if pure consciousness, as Husserl. maintains, is indeed the sphere of absolute Being, 
what does 'absolute Being' mean here? And what meaning does 'Being' assume in 
speaking of the 'relative' Being of the transcendent world or the reality of things? 
8' HCT, p. 10 1. 
82 ibid. 
83 Cf FICT, p. 105: The idea that consciousness can in principle exist on its own is 'a consideration 
which, as is well-known, Descartes had already employed'. 
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3. Critique of Husserlian Phenomenology 
The time has now come to turn to Heidegger's critique of Husserl's version of 
phenomenological research. We have seen that Heidegger gives Husserl great 
acclaim for his ground-breaking 'discoveries', but in paragraphs 10 - 13 of History of 
the Concept of Time he turns towards an equally fundamental critique of Husserl's 
enterprise and of the basic direction of phenomenological research envisaged by him. 
We shall seek to understand the direction of Heidegger's critical questioning under 
three headings; (1) the Being of consciousness; (2) the phenomenological reductions; 
(3) the natural attitude. 
3.1 The Being of Consciousness 
At the opening of his critical discussion of phenomenology Heidegger raises the 
following question: Does the elaboration of intentionality, as the thematic field of 
phenomenology, address the question of the Being of this field, that is, the Being of 
consciousness? Prima facie this seems to be the case. Husserl after all gives various 
specifications or 'detenninations' of what consciousness is and how it is. Heidegger 
addresses four interdependent characteristics accorded to the Being of consciousness 
by Husserl and brings to attention the problematic aspects of each of these 
determinations. 
3.1.1 Consciousness as Immanent Being 
Husserl claims that the Being of consciousness is 'immanent' Being as opposed to 
'transcendent' Being of real and also of ideal objects (essences). Heidegger argues 
that immanence, which from a formal point of view implies 'to be in another', 
characterizes here the field of consciousness and lived experiences or that of acts 
apprehending them, the acts of reflection. It thus refers to a relation between lived 
experiences, between the reflecting act and the reflected. hmnanence, as this relation 
of real inclusion in another, being in another, is affirmed of lived experiences to the 
extent that they are objects of apprehension through reflection. When I reflect on an 
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experience, the reflected-upon experience is immanent in the reflecting experience, 
while no real object can in principle be immanent in an experience. However, 
immanence, Heidegger points out, cannot be a determination of the entity in itse4f 
(with regard to its Being), but only a relation between several entities. Hence, what is 
determined here, is not the Being of the entity as such (consciousness or experience) 
but a relationship 'of Being' between entities. For, 'this relation is characterized as a 
reell in-one-another, but nothing is actually said about the Being of this being-in- 
one-another, about the "immanent reality", about the entity for the whole of this 
region'. 84 Another way of formulating this point would be to say that this 
determination remains silent about what a lived experience is independently of being 
reflected upon and thus independently of becoming contained in - 'immanent' in - 
another experience. 
3.1.2 Consciousness as Being Given Absolutely 
In the case of the second determination there is a similar problem. For lived 
experiences are called absolute because they are experienced in themselves or give 
themselves directly to reflection without adumbrations or profiles, again unlike real 
objects. Lived experiences are, therefore, called 'absolute' because of this absolute 
givenness in reflection. 85 But, the determination 'absolutely given' refers again 
merely to the 'relation of a lived experience as an object for another lived 
expenencei,. 86 That is to say, because the lived experience is actually considered by 
Husserl as 'adequately given' in reflection, i. e. in its particular mode of 'being-an- 
object', one lived experience becomes an object for another such entity. But unlike a 
real object, it is given adequately and, in this sense, absolutely. Again, Heidegger 
observes, 'the entity in itseýf does not become a theme. What does become thematic 
is the entity insofar as it is a possible object of reflection'. 87 
84 HCT, p. 103 - 85 Id 1, § 44, pp. 95-96. 
86 HCT, p. 104. 
87 ibid. My emphases. 
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3.1.3 Consciousness as Absolute, in the Sense of Independent Being 
The third determination defines consciousness in accordance with the traditional 
sense of substance, i. e. as that which 'it needs no res in order to be". 88 Here. the 
characterization of consciousness as absolute means that consciousness is 'the 
presupposition of Being on the basis of which reality can manifest itself at all' . 
89 To 
see Heidegger's point, it suffices to recall Husserl's first determination of 
consciousness as immanent Being. As we have seen, in the case of the first 
determination, transcendent Being or reality is the object of intentionality because 
lived experiences are 'immanently' given while everything else, if it is at all, must 
manifest itself to consciousness. Consciousness therefore does not need the external 
world or the Being of transcendent reality in order to maintain its continuity. In fact, 
'real being can be otherwise or even not be at all, while consciousness is capable of 
displaying in itself a closed continuity of being'. 90 Accordingly, consciousness is 
self-constituting Being in the sense that it 'for its part is not constituted once again in 
another consciousness but [ ... ] 
in constituting itself, itself constitutes every possible 
reality -) . 
91 
Consciousness, immanent and absolutely given Being, is that in which every other possible 
entity is constituted, in which it truly 'is' what it is. Constituting Being is absolute. All other 
Being, as reality, is only in relation to consciousness, that is, relative to it. 92 
The point is indeed made quite explictilly by Husserl in Ideas I, where he says: 
The common way of talking about being is thus reversed. The being which for us is the first 
is itself the second, that is, it is what it is only in 'relation' to the first. 93 
The outcome of Husserl's identification of what comes 'first' with consciousness, 
leads, in Heidegger's analysis, to the subordination of reality (the Being of the 
18 HCT, p. 103. Res is here understood 'in the narrower sense of reality, transcendent Being, that is, 
any entity which is not consciousness'. 
89HCT, p. 104. 
90 ibid. 
9' HCT, p. 105. 
92 ibid. 
911 Id 1, § 50, p. 112. 
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external world') to the Being of consciousness. Reality, therefore, becomes relative 
to and dependent upon the consciousness. Heidegger's criticism is twofold. First, he 
questions whether such a determination of Being is at all original; whether 
phenomenology makes any contribution, any advance on the tradition in this respect. 
For, if there is something only in so far as consciousness is, then consciousness is the 
apriori in the sense of Descartes and Kant. Doesn't this imply 'the priority of 
subjectivity over every objectivity' ? 94 Isn't this a conception of consciousness where 
'idealism in the sense of neo-Kantianism,, enters into phenomenology' ? 95 Now, it 
could be argued that Husserl's position here is less traditional than it seems in 
Heidegger's interpretation. For to say that consciousness might in principle persist in 
its own continuity without a world of transcendent objects does not necessarily mean 
that representational consciousness and seýf-consciousness might be thus 
independent of any 'reality'. This was arguably Descartes' view, but Husserl's 
position may only be that something like a 'conscious' experiencing might 
conceivably remain after the 'annihilation' of the world of natural objects (but not 
vice versa), although this consciousness might not be able to represent a world of 
objects and to be explicitly self-conscious (i. e. capable of thinking 'I think 9 ). 96 
Heidegger's second, and perhaps less controversial, criticism is that this 
detennination of the Being of consciousness is again only relational and does not 
characterize 'the entity in its Being'. 97 For it merely says that, in the order of 
constitution, consciousness comes first, or is 'prior', while transcendent Being 
('reality') is derivative or 'posterior'. But what or how this entity which comes first 
in the order of constitution is in itseýf remains again unaddressed. 
94 HCT, p. 105. 
95 HCT, p. 106. 
96 Husserl speaks of the possibility of a consciousness remaining after the world has been 
'annihilated' in the (in)famous § 49 of Ideas I. The interpretation suggested above recommends itself 
especially in the light of Husserl's claims in Ideas II about the essential constitutive role of the body. 
Heidegger, significantly, ignores these analyses, although he acknowledges his acquaintance with 
them. See HCT, p. 121. 
97 HCT, p. 105. 
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3.1.4 Consciousness as Pure Being 
Consciousness is characterized as pure 'in the sense of being the essence, the ideal 
Being of lived experiences'. 98 In this regard, which focuses on what remains after the 
eidetic reduction has been performed, consciousness figures no longer as concrete 
and individuat, as actual and mine, as a particular living being, but purely in its 
essential content. Consciousness is therefore pure to the extent that it excludes every 
individualized actuality and presents itself as ideal Being. What is at issue in the 
fourth determination is not, in Heidegger's words, 'the concretion of lived 
experiences but their essential structure, not the real Being of lived experience but 
the ideal essential Being of consciousness itself, the apriori of lived experiences in 
the sense of the generic universal which in each case defines a class of lived 
experience or its structural contexture'. 99 Thus, the concrete manifestation of 
consciousness is supposed to be abstracted from. Therefore the ontological character 
of lived intentionality remains, yet again, indeterminate. 
None of the four determinations, Heidegger maintains, are drawn from the 
entity itself Therefore, none of the determining characteristics of consciousness, of 
lived experiences, are properly phenomenological: 
The determinations of Being are not derived by considering the intentional in its very Being, 
but to the extent that it is placed under scrutiny as [respectively] apprehended, given [in 
reflective thematization], constituting, and ideatively taken as an essence. It is from such 
perspectives, which in the first instance are alien to consciousness[! ], that these 
determinations of Being are derived. '00 
Heidegger's explanation for Husserl's failure to address the question of the Being of 
consciousness is that the horizon of Husserl's work remains ultimately a very 
traditional one: it is the idea of an absolute science, and his guiding question remains 
98 HCT, p. 103. 
99 HCT, p. 106. 
'00 HCT, pp. 106-107. 
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throughout, how can consciousness become the possible object of an absolute 
science? But has not modem philosophy, ever since Descartes, occupied itself with 
this same idea? 
The elaboration of consciousness as the thematic field of phenomenology is not derived 
phenomenologically by going back to the matters themselves but by going back to a 
traditional idea of philosophy. 101 
While Heidegger perhaps ignores, or at least downplays, the ways in which Husserl's 
analyses move beyond the conception of consciousness as an object of scientific 
study, especially in his Ideas II and in the Lectures on the Phenomenology of the 
Consciousness of Internal Time, he is arguably correct about Husserl's self- 
understanding. 102 Husserl never explicitly revokes the position expressed in Ideas I 
that lived experiences are only 'adequately' or 'completely' self-given in thematic 
reflection on them. 103 Bearing in mind his definition of being as 'the totality of what 
can be adequately perceived', 104 this implies that the Being of lived experiences 
continues to be considered by him as the Being of objects of thematic observation, as 
Heidegger claims. Hence, in this respect, Heidegger's criticism seems justified. But 
if this criticism is relevant, it is of a very fundamental nature. For we need to 
remember that for Heidegger, as (in theory) for Husserl, what is, is essentially what 
shows itself Jr-om itseýf But if the very ontological condition of any such self- 
showing or self-manifesting remains unaddressed, phenomenology has, in a very 
obvious sense, a void at its centre. 
10' ibid. 
102 See Section 3.4 of this chapter for a discussion of some of these developments of Husserl's thought 
ignored by Heidegger. 
103 Id 1, § 44, p. 97. 
'04LI VI, § 39, p. 768. 
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3.2 Critique of the Phenomenological Reductions 
Let us now turn to Heidegger's objections to the methodological basis of Husserl's 
mature phenomenology: the phenomenological reductions. We recall that these 
consist in a two-step procedure whereby, first, the 'reality' of what is given in the 
natural attitude as 'the actual world' is suspended or 'bracketed'. Secondly, the 
phenomenological residue - what is given in its mode of givenness (or: what is given 
in so far as it is given) - is subjected to an ideative regard, such that the given is no 
longer considered as, for example, 'this A', but as 'A-ness'. The first step is often 
called the transcendental reduction, while the second step goes by the name of 
eidetic reduction. Heidegger has fundamental objections to both of these components 
of Husserl's method. Since his criticism of the eidetic reduction is a continuation of 
what was discussed above in Section 3.1.4, we shall consider it first. 
From Heidegger's point of view, the eidetic consideration of the given to the 
extent that it manifests itself in pure consciousness, can never reach the Being of the 
intentional in any genuine sense. For, the eidetic reduction precisely disregards any 
particular individuation of lived experiences (the particular acts) as mine, and 
concerns itself exclusively with the structure of the acts and their correlates, i. e. their 
what-content. As the focus of the eidetic reduction remains on the what question, it 
simply fails to thematize the mode of Being of the acts, their Being an act as such. 
Thus, what comes to be discussed is merely the what-content of the structure of the 
intentional rather then the essence of its Being qua individuated. 
What is really at issue here is the relation between essence and existence 
which is brought out more clearly in the following example: 
when I seek to distinguish the essence of color from that of sound, this distinction can be 
made without my asking about the manner of Being of these two objects. This means that in 
determining the essentia. (the essence of color and sound) I disregard their existentia, their 
particular individuation, whether the color is the color of a thing, in this or that illumination. 
I look only to what pertains to every color as color, regardless of whether it exists or not. I 
disregard its existence. and so all the more the essence of its existence. ' 105 
105 HCT, p. 110. 
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Why can I distinguish the essence of colour from that of sound without asking about 
the manner of Being of these entities? Because in both cases we are dealing with 
entities with the same manner of Being: colours and sounds are both genera within 
the regional ontology of material nature. Now, if, on the basis of this example, we 
view Husserl's analysis of intentionality, we notice that he proceeds according to the 
same principle -a methodology that brings into evidence the what-content (essentia),, 
but not the Being of the acts (their 'existentia'). Yet, 
[flrom the what I never experience anything about the sense and the manner of the that - at 
any rate, only that an entity of this what-content (extensio, for example) can have a certain 
manner of Being. What this manner of Being is, is not thereby made clear. Merely looking 
at the what-content means seeing the what as apprehended, given, constituted. 106 
Every what-content is an ideal object, hence an entity grasped' 07 and constituted by 
something other than itself, namely by consciousness. The eidetic reduction, 
therefore, could be judged successful only if it is believed that the mode of access to 
consciousness is the same as to an entity with the manner of Being of an ideal object. 
But even if it were possible to consider other entities in such a manner, we have good 
reasons - including those given by Husserl himself - to wonder whether the 
intentional is an entity just like any other entity. What if, as Heidegger asks, 'there 
were an entity whose what is precisely to be and nothing but to be, then the ideative 
regard for such an entity would be the most ftindamental of misunderstanding'. 108 
Heidegger's rhetorical question suggests that the Being of the intentional can only be 
understood in its own Being through 'existentia', never through any essentia. The 
whole of Being and Time is of course an extended argument for this claim, and for 
the further claim that the meaning of existentia is itself modified fundamentally when 
it is no longer interpreted within the horizon of essentia. We shall have to consider 
106ibid. 
107 1 shall use the translation 'gasp' for Husserl's erfassen, rather than 'apprehend', which is used by 
many translators. The problem with this translation is that it invites confusion with auffassen, 
Husserl's term for how hyletic data are 'taken up' or 'interpreted' as having a certain sense. Erfassen 
is to thernatize, to objectify. Auffassen is to interpret, apprehend, or to 'take' something in some way 
or other. The two meanings are obviously related, but they are not the same. 
108 HCT, p. I 10. 
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these points in the context of Being and Time, as well as of Heidegger's later 
thinking on metaphysics (see especially chapter VI. 3). For the moment. we cannot 
simply assume their truth, in which case Husserl's whole procedure would of course 
be manifestly misguided. But even according to Husserl's own analysis, the Being of 
consciousness is radically different from the Being of any act-transcendent object., 
including any ideal object. Hence Heidegger is surely correct to argue that it can 
never be given in its own mode of Being as the objective correlate of any ideative 
acts. But perhaps Husserl might reply that eidetic insights may still function as 
necessary pointers or indicators towards the mode of Being of individualized acts. 
Otherwise we could receive no illumination about consciousness at all through 
judgements using general predicates. In other words, it might still be the case that we 
can only understand the mode of Being of the intentional on the basis of performing 
eidetic reduction,, while also conceding that any conscious act given in the eidetic 
reduction has its mode of Being modified thereby. The question to ask Heidegger at 
this point is perhaps: even if the intrinsic mode of Being of the intentional can only 
be disclosed through actually existing and never through reflective and ideative 
grasping of it as an object, could its mode of 'existence' be disclosed at all if part of 
the essentia of existing did not consist in representing and objectifying, through 
ideative acts,, other entities and also itseýf In this case, self-objectification would not 
be merely 'alien to consciousness', 109 but would actually belong to its own (hence 
non-alienated) manner of Being. 
Heidegger's second criticism concerns the original 'suspension' of the reality 
of the world,, and also of the cogitations, in the transcendental reduction. As we have 
already seen, Husserl arrived at pure consciousness by starting, in the first place, with 
the concrete consciousness as is given in the natural attitude and then 'suspending' 
the reality (in the wider sense) of this factual consciousness. Heidegger accordingly 
seems correct to observe that 'the sense of the reduction is precisely to make no use 
of the reality of the intentional': 
109 HCT, p. 106. 
In its methodological sense as a disregarding, then, the reduction is in principle 
inappropriate for determining the Being of consciousness positively. The sense of the 
reduction involves precisely giving up the ground upon which alone the question of the 
Being of the intentional could be based. 
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But does the reduction really consist in 'disregarding' the 'reality of the intentional"? 
This is not as clear as it may seem at first sight. Husserl says that in the 6; rqXi7 we 
suspend every positing judgement about what appears. When we study the 
perception of an apple tree, we are not interested in whether there really is an apple 
tree, or whether we are hallucinating. All that is of interest is the apple tree that 
appears as really, percepually, given. But we are not concerned with whether this 
appearance as real is veridical or whether we are, for example, suffering from a 
perceptual illusion (a quasi-perception). 111 Analogously, when we 
phenomenologically study an experience of anger that is given as real anger, we do 
not need to 'suspend' the anger's being given as real. This is not what c; rqXt7 means 
for Husserl. Does this mean that Heidegger has misunderstood Husserl's doctrine of 
'bracketing the world"? Perhaps not. Heidegger's discussion of reflection implies 
that he interprets the eirqXq as essentially involving a reflective attitude. If this is so, 
it may turn out that Heidegger believes Husserl's position to imply a necessary 
abstaining from any concern with the Being of the intentional, although this may not 
be Husserl's intention. 
Heidegger elucidates reflection as follows. When we perceive a thing and 
reflect upon this we are directed toward a particular act or experience such that we 
are thematically focused upon the perception and not upon the perceived. When we 
have the perception itself as the theme, the perceived (the object of perception) is co- 
apprehended, but we no longer 'live directly in the perception', but rather 'live 
thematically in the apprehension of the perceptual act and of what is perceived in 
112 t. But in considering reflection in this way, says Heidegger: 
110 HCT, p. 109. 
"' Id 1, § 88, pp. 213-216. 
112 HCT, p-99- 
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I do not really live in the perception of the chair but in the attitude of the immanent 
reflective apprehension of perceiving the chair, not in the thesis of the material world but in 
the thematic positing of the act apprehending the perception and of its object as it is there in 
the act. 113 
This 'not living in the perception of the chair' means that in thematic reflective 
consideration of the perception I do 'not go along with' the concrete perception, I 
rather, in a sense, abstain or refrain: 'This [ ... ] is called czoX77'. 
114 Heidegger's here 
identifies one of the great ambiguities in Husserl's philosophy. Often Husserl 
presents phenomenology as essentially a method that consists in reflection on 
experiences. 1 15 At other times he either denies this or at least recognizes the 
problematic nature of such an approach. ' 16 But it is clear that Husserl believes that 
phenomenology consists in obyectijyjing manners of givenness (senses), and that, in 
the case of experiences (noeses as opposed to noemata), such objectifying involves 
reflection. Yet he also insists that what reflection discovers - the experience - was 
already present pre-reflectively, and necessarily so. 117 If this is the case, Heidegger's 
criticism of the transcendental reduction would in effect be a re-iteration of the point 
he has made regarding the first two determinations of consciousness: they determine 
consciousness as it is grasped or objectified in reflection, but not as it is 'in itself, 
that is, pre-reflectively. Similarly, the transcendental reduction qua reflection on acts 
would be in principle unable to reach the Being of pre-reflective consciousness. 
For Heidegger, the whole purpose of the reduction and the demarcation of the 
region of pure consciousness as absolute Being is, yet again, to provide a scientific 
basis for specifying the reality of the real. All entities are recognized in Husserlian 
phenomenology to the extent that they manifest themselves in pure consciousness, 
which is no other than the region to which we arrive through phenomenological 
reduction. The 'reality' of the intentional is no different. That is to say, its actuality is 
113 ibid. 
114 ibid. 
115 E. g. ld 1, § 50, p. 114. 
116 In Id 1, § 108, pp. 256-257 'we grasp [noematic predicates] in the object that appears In no 
manner do we reflect on the act in this'. (Translation modified). 
117 Id 1, § 45, p. 99. Also PCIT, appendix LX, pp. 122-12-33. 
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likewise constituted in consciousness. " 8 The intentional, for Husserl, ultimately is 'a 
being for a consciousness, [ ... 
]a being which consciousness posits in its 
experiences'. 
119 
3.3 Critique of the 'Natural Attitude' 
But does not the reduction,, in any case, start from consciousness, as yet unmodified, 
but rather,, as given in the 'natural attitude"? And does it not follow from Heidegger's 
criticism that the originary mode of access to the 'reality' of consciousness as it is in 
itself would have to be from within the natural attitude? Indeed, but the question is, 
to what extent is the Being of the intentional really experienced and interrogated in 
what Husserl regards as the natural attitude. To what extent is this experience real 
and genuine? What Being is attributed here to the intentional, to the Being of the 
acts? According to Heidegger, it is 
that of real occurrences in the world, living beings which are ob ectively on hand, which in i 
accord with their Being are inserted into the 'fundamental layer' of all reality, into material 
thingness. The Being of the intentional, the Being of acts, the Being of the psychic is thus 
fixed as a real worldly occurrence just like any natural process. 120 
Heidegger's second question is: how is the I given in the natural attitude? For 
Husserl, in this attitude: 
I am "a real object like others in the natural world, " that is, like houses, tables, trees, 
mountains. Human beings thus occur realiter in the world, among them I myself I perform 
acts (cogitationes). These acts belong to the "human subject, " hence are "occurrences of the 
same natural reality. " The totality of such a continuity of lived experiences in the human or 
animal subject can be called an individual stream of lived experiences. The experiences are 
themselves 'real occurrences in the world' 'in animal beings'. 121 
In the natural attitude, I direct myself toward real objects, for I am a real object like 
others in the natural world. I can also direct myself toward myself, i. e. toward my 
118 HCT, p. 112 
119 [bid. 
120 HCT, p. 1 11. 
12 'HCT, p. 96. 
Heidegger is here citing from Id 1, § 49. 
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own experiential continuity. In thus directing myself toward my own experiential 
continuity (considered as real occurrences), I perform an act called (natural, or 
mundane) reflection. In this performance, acts themselves are an object just like any 
other object, except that the 'object and the way of apprehending it belong to the 
same stream of experience' 122 , 
individuated through its 'attachment' to the same 
animal organism. The stream of experiences as a whole is, however, a self-contained 
totality that rejects or excludes the things and real objects comprising the entire 
material world, for the reasons we discussed in Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3. Hence, 
Heidegger says, 'over against the region of lived experiences, the material world is 
alien, other'. 123 But at the same time, because the stream of experience is also a real 
occurrence in material nature,, it must as such be somehow conjoined with the real 
world in order to form a concrete togetherness, that is, the unity of psycho-physical 
animal things. In fact, Husserl says: 
the psychic is not a world for itself, it is given as an ego or ego-experience and this 
turns out to be empirically tied to certain physical things called organisms. 124 
Now the question is, how can consciousness, as a part of the animal unity, be at once 
conjoined with material nature in the concretion of every factual living being (man), 
and be also radically other in its Being from all real objects? What is revealed 
through this question is a double involvement of consciousness or the experiential 
totality in the structure of reality. For Heidegger, this double status of consciousness, 
as united with and separate from the real world, means on the one hand that there are 
two ontologically 'co-ordinated' spheres of Being, neither of which, due to their very 
conjunction, can be prior to the other: the immanent sphere of lived experience and 
the transcendent sphere of the material world. But on the other hand, the objectivity 
of the material world is for Husserl only possible on the basis of the immanent 
sphere, it is after all constituted by it: 
122 ibid. 
123 HCT, p. 9.7. 
124 ibid. Heideg , ger cites 
from Husserl's Thilosophie als strenge Wissenschaft', Logos I, pp. 298f iv 
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Now this separation into two spheres of Being is remarkable precisely because the sphere of 
immanence, the sphere of lived experience, establishes the possibility within which the 
transcendent world, separated from it by a gulf, can become objective at all. 125 
If there is a 'gulf between the immanent sphere of consciousness, of lived 
experiences and the transcendent sphere constituted by the material world, and if the 
material world gains its objectivity on the basis of such an independent region, how 
can the individual 'streams of consciousness' of which this region consists also turn 
out to have a location in the sphere of material and animal nature supposedly 
constituted by it? Heidegger does not further pursue the question after raising it, 
which suggests that he regards Husserl's position on this fundamental matter as 
clearly incoherent. But even if there was a way of deflecting Heidegger's criticism, 
the question would remain: how are we to understand the 'conjunction' of two 
radically heterogeneous domains of Being? What, phenomenologically, does it 
mean? Clearly, what would be required for this would be a phenomenology of 
embodied consciousness which yet preserves Husserl's claims regarding the 
'independence' and heterogeneity of consciousness. Husserl arguably attempted this 
task in the second volume of Ideas, but again Heidegger barely mentions Husserl's 
phenomenology of the body in that work. 
We may find an explanation for this in another, perhaps more fundamental, 
objection of Heidegger's to Husserl's 'natural attitude'. In fact, what passes itself as 
(natural' here is a certain scientific attitude which assumes that humans are given 
'naturally' to themselves as living beings, as a zoological objects. But is it man's 
'natural' mode of self-givenness to experience himself as ý; coovQ As a living being in 
the broadest sense and an object of nature which occurs in the world? Heidegger 
replies: 
It is an experience which is totally unnatural. For it includes a well-defined theoretical 
position, in which every entity is taken a priori as a lawfully regulated flow of occurrences 
in the spatio-temporal exteriority of the world. Even if the 'thing of nature called man' is 
125 HCT, p. 98. 
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experienced as the ý; wov occurring in the world and his mode of Being and his reality are 
determined, this does not mean that his comportments, the intentional in its Being, are 
examined and defined. 126 
What is defined in the process that begins with the natural attitude and returns to 
reality via the reductions, is, in Heidegger's analysis, merely the determination of 
the intentional as 'a being on hand, as a thing to which comportments are perhaps 
added as "appendages" but [these] are not really relevant for determining the 
character of the Being of this entity and do not constitute its way of Being'. 127 As 
'Being' obtains its sense here from the reality of nature, so the Being of acts finds its 
definition in advance, i. e. theoretically and dogmatically. This analysis leads 
Heidegger to reiterate that the question of Being itself is left undiscussed and 
phenomenological research has proceeded in a fundamental neglect of that which 
must be its theme: 'intentional comportment and all that is given with it'. We shall 
return to the justness or otherwise of these Heideggerian criticisms of the natural 
attitude in Section 3.4 below. 
3.4 Husserl's Development: The Personalistic Attitude and Time 
Consciousness 
Heidegger's interpretation and criticism of Husserlian phenomenology in HCT is 
based largely on Husserl's works up to 1913, especially on Logical Investigations 
(1901) and on Ideas 1 (1913). But it is well known that Husserl's views developed 
significantly in his later thinking. This is especially true for some of the issues - such 
as the description of the natural attitude, and the view of consciousness as an object 
of reflection - which are central to Heidegger's criticism. Does this mean that 
Heidegger's criticisms are not relevant to Husserl's later thought? To judge this 
issue, we have to consider, first of all, whether Heiedgger was aware of these 
developments. There seems little doubt that he was, since in HCT he actually refers 
to some of them, especially to Husserl's acknowledgement of what he calls the 
'26 HCT, p. 1133 
'2'ibid. 
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personalistic attitude in the Logos essay and in Ideas H, the manuscripts of which 
Husserl had sent to Heidegger. 128 With regard to the analysis of absolute subjectivity 
contained in the lectures on time consciousness, Husserl had given seminars to 
advanced students on this during the winter semester of 1920/21, at a time of very 
close proximity between Husserl and Heidegger at Freiburg, when Husserl, already 
thinking of Heidegger as a favoured pupil and potential intellectual heir, took great 
pains to familiarize Heidegger with all the fruits of his own research. It is, for this 
reason alone,, highly unlikely that Heidegger remained unaware of the material on 
time consciousness. 129 But there is evidence in HCT itself that Heidegger was aware 
of these analyses. He briefly announces a discussion of Husserl on time 'under the 
caption "Stream of Lived Experience and Absolute Time-Consciousness"', 130 but 
this discussion then in fact never takes place. 
In our context, the important question is not the historical issue of influence 
or neglect, but rather the question of whether Husserl's ideas on the personalistic 
attitude and time consciousness render Heidegger's criticisms obsolete. With respect 
to the personalistic attitude, this is first elaborated in chapter I of the third Section of 
Ideas H, with the title 'Contrast between the Naturalistic and the Personalistic 
World'. In this text, written for the most part between 1912 and 1917, Husserl 
acknowledges that the 'natural' attitude in which we live most of the time does not 
apprehend others or ourselves as animalia, bodies equipped with 'streams of 
consciousnes', that is, as psycho-physical organisms, as 'natural objects, themes for 
the respective natural sciences'. Rather, our natural (in the sense of ordinary, 
prevailing, everyday) attitude is a personalistic one, in which others are given as 
persons, for example as friends or enemies, as members of the same club or town or 
128 HCT, pp. 119-126. 
129 Some commentators have therefore explained Heidegger's silence on this material in FICT 
precisely on the grounds that some of the reflections in it converge quite closely with his own analysis 
of temporality as the sense of being- in-the-world. See Thomas Prufer, 'Heidegger, Early and Late, and 
Aquinas', in Edmund Husserl and the Phenomenological Tradition, ed. R. Sokolowski (Washington, 
D. C.: Cath. University of America Press, 1989), pp. 197-215. For details on Heidegger's role in 
editing Husserl's lectures on time consciousness, see Edmund Husserl, Psychological and 
Transcendental Phenomenology and the Conftontation with Heidegger (1927-1931), eds. T. Sheehan 
and R. Palmer (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997). 
130 FICT, p. 124. 
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church, as neighbours or strangers, and so forth. We share with some of these 
persons an enviromnent (Umwelt) which contains 
not mere things , but objects of use 
(clothes, home equipment, weapons, tools), works of art, 
literary products, the means for religious and legal actions and it contains not only 
individual persons: the persons are rather members of communities which have [ ... ] their 
own ethical and legal orders [ ... ] The members of the community, of the marriage or family [ ... ] 'know' themselves as 
its members, they find themselves dependent on it in their 
consciousness... 131 
For the later Husserl, as Heidegger recognizes, 'the naturalistic is subordinated to the 
personalistic [attitude]. 132 What is definitive of it is that the Umwelt shows up in 
terms of characteristics offamiliarity, and of practical and evaluative characteristics. 
Yet Husserl's analysis of 'personal Being' in terms of immersion in an Umwelt, for 
Heidegger, does not constitute a significant advance over Husserl's earlier 
investigations in the crucial respects. We can isolate primarily two reasons for this 
negative judgement of Heidegger's. 
First, if we enquire about the positive sense of this personal Being, 'we are 
again referred back to the immanent structure of consciousness - the immanent 
reflection of the acts and lived experiences, without these acts on their part being 
actually defined'. 133 What we get is a characterization of experience as an inner 
inspection of itself, or as the ego of intentionality. The ego considered, as subject of 
cogitationes, shows yet again, according to Heidegger, the extent to which Husserl's 
thinking draws from that of Descartes: 
The very expression here already reminds us quite clearly of Descartes. Every such ego at 
once has its nature side as the underground of subjectivity. Mind is not an abstract ego but 
the full personality. Ego, man, subject as person cannot dissolve into nature, for then what 
gives sense to nature would be missing. 134 
131 Id 11, p. 19 1. (Translation modified). 
132 HCT, p. 122. 
13 3, HCT, p. 120. 
134 FICT, p. 122. 
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For Husserl,, the appropriate mode of access to the person remains on the basis of an 
immanent reflection on acts, that is, of the inner inspection of oneself ( inspectio 
SUj). 135 'Only now the theme is not the pure consciousness and pure ego but instead 
the isolated individual consciousness and ego'. 136 No doubt, the isolation is 
conditioned by the body and therefore, the experiential context is here an embodied, 
particular ego-subject that finds itself in a personalistic Umwelt, but nothing has 
changed about the fundamental position that the Being of consciousness is to be 
determined on the basis of what reveals itself in objectifying reflection. 
Heidegger's second critical consideration relates to Husserl's views about the 
order of constitution involved in personal Being. That Being 'is ordered according to 
the sequence in which the matters of the real themselves stand'. That is to say, 'the 
fundamental stratum is still the naturally real, upon which the psychic is built, and 
upon the psychic the spiritual'. 137 Therefore, with view to the constitution of the 
spiritual world, despite there being an emphasis on the genuinely 'natural' character 
of the personalistic attitude, nature, understood as the object of scientific 
investigation continues to occupy nevertheless a primary and fundamental position in 
the multi-layered constitutional hierarchy. The result is that the person as such, i. e. 
the Being of the person, is not thematized in a primordial manner: 
[ ... ]even if the Being of acts and the unity of the experiential stream were determined in 
their Being, the question of the Being of the full concrete man would still remain. Can this 
Being be, so to speak, assembled from the Being of the material substrate, of the body, and 
fon-n the soul and the spirit? Is the Being of the person the product of the kinds of Being of 
these layers of Being? 138 
The approach that operates via 'prior division and subsequent composition' and 
views the person as a 'multi-layered thing of the world' cannot grasp the sense of this 
being called man. The personalistic attitude, through its division of man and ordering 
of acts, of the intentional, into the layered scheme of the physical, body, soul, spirit, 
135 Id 11, § 54, pp. 223-226. 
136 HCT, p. 124. 
137 ibid. 
138 HCT, p. 125. 
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is still guided by the same reflection that conducted the elaboration of pure 
consciousness. For, although the personalistic attitude does not consider man as a 
reality of nature, man nevertheless is a reality of the world conceived in this stratified 
manner. Ultimately, this stratification shows that Husserl remains committed to a 
prior definition of man as rational animal, consisting of a level of rationality built 
upon a level of animality which in turn is built upon a stratum of merely physical 
nature. This definition, Heidegger observes, is not drawn from experience but taken 
for granted from tradition and left unchallenged by Husserlian phenomenology. For 
the personalistic attitude shows us that 
In the background of all questions about the intentional, the psychic, about the 
consciousness, lived experience, life, man, reason, spirit, person, ego, subject, there stands 
the old definition of man as animal rationale. But is this definition drawn from experiences 
which aim at a primary experience of the Being of man? Or does it not come from the 
experience of man as an occurrent [vorhanden] thing of the world - animal - which has 
reason - rational - as an intrinsic property? 
139 
In fact, there are two important issues which Heidegger's criticism raises together. 
First, whether it is legitimate to give a constitutional analysis of the Being of the 
person which makes reference to a level or moment of this Being which is the Being 
of an 'occurrent thing'. Heidegger seems to be suggesting that any such moment 
would have to be alien to the Being of the person, while Husserl (like later Merleau- 
Ponty) argues that, for personal Being to be possible it is necessary that the entity 
which 'is' in this manner of Being should also and with equal primordiality be able 
to see itself as an object - in other words, that object-being is one moment or 'side' 
of personal Being (while not exhausting it). We shall need to return to this issue in 
the context of the analysis of Dasein in Being and Time. Secondly, granted the 
legitimacy of such an ontological 'compositionalism', is it acceptable to regard the 
fundamental constitutional level, in which all others are founded, as the level of 
material nature with its sensory 'thing'-properties. Husserl continues to hold this 
view, which he already expressed in Ideas L also in the Second Book of Ideas. 140 
139 HCT, p. 125-126. 
140 Id ll, § -50, p. 
196. 
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Heidegger, as we shall see,, explicitly and extensively argues against it in Being and 
Time. 
With regard to Heidegger's criticism that Husserl always considers the Being 
of the person within the horizon of reflective self-thernatization in the inspectio sui, 
Husserlians sometimes point to the Lectures on the Phenomenology of the 
Consciousness ofInternal Time to dispute this. In the later parts of these lectures and 
in the appendices Husserl analyses what he calls 'absolute subjectivity', the flow of 
lived experience in which all objects become constituted - i. e. in which they 
manifest themselves - and which therefore cannot itself be an object, since this 
would require another consciousness in which the first could manifest itself This 
absolute subjectivity is 'timeless' in the sense of not being 'in' sequential time: 
sub ective time constitutes itself in the absolute timeless consciousness which is not 4j 
an object" . 
141 It is not a series of now-points, but has an 'ecstatic' structure, 
comprising the necessary togetherness of retention, now-phase, and protention. 142 
Since there is nothing enduring (no temporal object) in it, it is a pure 'flow', but with 
the peculiarity that there is nothing in it that flows, and that, therefore could flow 
faster or more slowly: 
143 
It is absolute subjectivity and has the absolute properties of something to be metaphorically 
designated as a 'flow'[ ... ] For all this we lack names. 
144 
This 'flow' can only be objectified through reflection (inspectio sui) in its elapsed, 
retentive phases, hence absolute consciousness is in its now-phase in principle not 
accessible to objectification. 145 Does not all of this show that Husserl does offer an 
analysis of the Being of consciousness which is both contentful and not conducted in 
terms of the Being of an object of reflection and, more generally, of the Being of an 
occurrent object? This may be so, but it is unclear whether Husserl himself was fully 
141 PC IT, appendix VI, p. 117. 
142 PCIT, § 39, pp. 87-88. 
143 PC IT, appendix VI, p. 118. 
'44PCIT, § 36, p. 79. 
145 PCIT, appendix IX, p. 123. 
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aware of the implications of these analyses. That he was not thus aware is also 
suggested by the fact that, alongside the passages mentioned above, we find others in 
which experiences are said to be immanent objects. 146 It seems to remain true, then, 
that Husserl did not systematically move beyond the horizon of questioning 
constituted by the guiding idea of experiences as 'adequately given' in reflection, and 
this is Heidegger's central criticism we have discussed in this chapter. 
In following Heidegger's analysis, we have aimed to bring to the fore those 
implicit limitations that are, in one way or other, connected with the neglect of the 
question of Being and its sense. The fact that, the interrogation of the sense of 
Being, and of the Being of the intentional in particular, is necessary rather then 
optional, should, if our interpretations of Heidegger's analyses are adequate, be by 
now evident. If whatever is manifests itself in intentionality, then an analysis of the 
Being of intentionality is a presupposition of the analysis of Being tout court. It 
should also be evident that classical phenomenology operates in the neglect of 
explicitly posing this question and often follows in an uncritical manner certain 
traditional assumptions, especially when it comes to the most primordial 
determination of the theme most proper to it, intentionality. In defining its thematic 
subject matter, not out of the matters themselves, but out of an old traditional 
prejudgment of it, phenomenology comes to contradict the maxim of its own 
philosophical research and becomes 'unphenomenological, that is to say, purportedly 
147 
phenomenological' . For, whenever the question of the Being of an entity 
is raised, 
Husserlian phenomenology tends to take up determinations of Being and categories 
which can be found already in Plato or Aristotle. The problem with recurring to the 
traditional definitions of Being does not mean that those determinations are 
worthless; on the contrary, the point of Heidegger's objection is that classical 
phenomenology merely uses these definitions without taking any trouble to actually 
bring the question of Being into an interrogative experience. He says: 
146 E. I*f PCIT, § 37. 
147 HCT, p. 12 8. 
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The question posed by Plato in the Sophist, 'what then do you mean when you use [the 
word] 'Being'? In short, what does 'Being' mean? This question is vigorously posed, so full 
of life. But ever since Aristotle it has grown mute, so mute in fact that we have continually 
dealt with Being in the deten-ninations and perspectives handed down by the Greeks. So 
muted is this question that we think we are raising it without actually coming within its 
reach at all, without seeing that the mere application of old concepts, whether these be the 
expressly conscious and most traditional concepts or the even more abundant unconscious 
and self-evident concepts, does not yet and does not really include the question of Being. 148 
We have reached the end of our initial discussion of phenomenology. The principal 
task that we had set ourselves was to understand the context through which 
Heidegger came to formulate the question of Being. With this aim in mind, the text 
we have mainly analysed has shown at once Heidegger's affiliation with 
phenomenology, but also his reasons for his breakaway from Husserl and traditional 
phenomenology. In the course of this chapter, we have made an attempt to clarify his 
understanding of phenomenology, its meaning, its method of inquiry and his 
criticism of phenomenological research. Whether Heidegger remains a 
phenomenologist throughout his career is a question that we leave open. In the next 
chapter we shall look at Heidegger's approach to the question of Being in the context 
of Being and Time and consider the implications of his analysis with regard to the 
question of nothing. 
148 HCT, p. 129. 
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Chapter 11 
The Nothingness of Being-in-the-World 
Heidegger's critique of Husserl enables us to see to what extent the question of 
Being and, indeed, the sense of Being as such, are relevant to phenomenological 
enquiry. ' In fact, it was a reflection upon the neglect of the question of the Being of 
the intentional -a kind of immanent critique of Husserlian phenomenology - that 
showed the continuing but unacknowledged, 'forgotten' relevance and urgency of the 
problematic of Being in general. In Being and Time, considered by many his magnum 
opus and first published in 1927, Heidegger takes up the question and attempts to 
work out the sense of Being by considering the Being of the entities themselves. He 
does this by shifting the focus of discussion, for reasons which will emerge, from the 
Being of intentionality or 'consciousness' to the Being of the privileged entity named 
'Dasein', but also addressing - to a much lesser extent - the kinds of entities 
characterized in their mode of Being as 'ready-to-hand' and 'present-at-hand. The 
analysis of Dasein constitutes the main content of Being and Time and in elucidating 
the method and design of his investigation, Heidegger speaks of the ontological 
analytic of Dasein as uncovering the ground for an understanding of the meaning of 
Being in general. 
As we shall see in the course of our analysis, Heidegger asserts an 
equivalence of Being and meaning, so that any attempt to conceive the two terms 
apart amounts to 'non-sense'. This point is of paramount importance in relation to 
our concern with Being. For to the extent that Being is meaning or significance, we 
may understand its converse (that is, 'Nothing', in traditional terminology) as the 
collapse of significance, or meaninglessness. But such an interpretation, even if 
correct, would be no more than an empty claim if we fail to bring into evidence the 
'' Penomeno logical questioning in its innermost tendency itself leads to the question of the Being of 
the intentional and before anything else to the question of the sense of Being as such'. (HCT, p. 136). 
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why and the how of this equation and neglect Heidegger's discussion of those 
structures and significances that belong to Being. 
In this chapter, we shall therefore give a detailed interpretation of central 
strands in Heidegger's 'fundamental ontology' of Being and Time, the work in which 
Heidegger resurrects the question of Being from the neglect into which it has fallen, 
as he had argued in History of The Concept of Time. No understanding of 
Heidegger's philosophy of Being, either in the 'earlier' or the 'later' phases of his 
path of thinking, is possible, we believe, without an adequate interpretation of the 
ground-breaking argument of Being and Time. However, since this thesis is not 
entirely about Being and Time, we have found it necessary to be selective. We have 
focused in greater detail on those aspects of Heidegger's argument which we regard 
as central to the issue of primary interest to us: Being and its relation to Nothing. Our 
trajectory in this chapter will therefore begin (in Sections I to 4) with an examination 
of the methodological points addressed by Heidegger in the Introduction: the idea of 
a phenomenological approach to ontology, and the priority of human being (Dasein). 
For Heidegger, the path towards an understanding of Being in general must lead 
through an understanding of the essentially individualized Being of one particular 
kind of entity: Dasein. We shall not attempt to assess this claim in advance of having 
followed through its implications and ramifications in Heidegger's existential 
analytic, but we shall return to an assessment of the reasons for it at the end of our 
path through Being and Time (in Section 11). Once it is accepted that an adequate 
approach to the question of Being needs to proceed via an elucidation of the mode of 
Being of Dasein, it becomes necessary to unravel the complex web of structural 
moments which constitute the Being of this entity: consequently we shall need to 
explicate Dasein's structure as being-in-the-world and its various structural 
moments. This task will have to include an analysis of the world as environment 
(Sections 5 and 6), and of being-in as the ecstatic structure of projection, 
affectedness, and falling (Section 7). It is only on the basis of this understanding of :n 
the fimdamental structure of everyday being-in-the-world that we can grasp the 
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significance of Heidegger's analysis of authentic being-in-the-world as resolvedness 
and its structural moments: anxiety (Section 8), anticipatory being-towards-death 
(Section 9), and the call of conscience (Section 10). In authentic being-in-the-world 
Dasein becomes transparent to itself in its own Being, and this transparency, as we 
shall see, reveals to Dasein its Being as essentially co-constituted by not-ness 
(Nichtigkeit). It is here that Heidegger's profound analysis of the essential identity- 
in-difference of Being and Nothing will first make its appearance, albeit within the 
restricted context of an analysis of the Being of the entity he calls Dasein. Since, as 
Heidegger insists, authenticity is only an existential modification of inauthentic 
being-in-the-world, it essentially presupposes the earlier analysis of average 
everydayness, which is therefore far from indispensable and cannot simply be left 
behind. 
) 
if what Heidegger means by 'authenticity' is to be understood aright. The 
analysis of authentic resolvedness - that is, of the pre-judgemental self-transparency 
of Dasein as constituted in its Being by Nichtigkeit - is in its turn not superseded, but 
rather presupposed by Heidegger's later approach towards the question of Being (and 
Nothing) 'as such', which will occupy us from chapter III onwards. 
Being and Time is of course a extraordinarily complex text and our focus on the 
central issue of Being in its relation to Nothing has forced us to neglect some aspects 
of the argument presented in it. Among the areas we have (relatively) neglected are 
Heidegger's analysis of everyday being-with-others (das Man), and his analysis of 
discourse as an existentiale. More controversially, perhaps, we shall not examine in 
detail Heidegger's interpretation of the structure of being-in-the-world in tenns of 
temporality in Division Two of Being and Time, although we shall briefly indicate 
the kind of approach to this aspect of the work which seems to us most fruitful (see 
Section 7). It is perhaps arguable that Heidegger's analysis of care in Division One 
does more to illuminate the later analyses on temporality in Division Two than vice 
versa. Some influential commentators have even argued that the reluctance of many 
interpreters to engage in detail with the analysis of temporality has its ground in 
deep-seated problems in this analysis itself, and that little is lost through this relative 
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neglect of it. 2 But we need not take a position on these debates here. It may suffice 
to say that, in the context of our question, the detailed analysis of temporality is less 
central than other aspects of Being and Time, and we have therefore focused on the 
latter. As regards the important question of history, which comes into view in chapter 
5 of Division Two of Being and Time, we shall leave this question for consideration 
in the context of later works by Heidegger (see chapters III to V of this thesis). 
1. Heidegger's Approach to Ontology in Being and Time 
Heidegger, in outlining the details of his procedure, announces as a necessary 
preliminary task needing to be performed the task of destroying the traditional 
content of ancient ontology. The destruction of the history of ontology, despite 
sounding negative, is not so in its aim ('to bury the past in nullity is not the purpose 
of this destruction' 3). Quite the contrary, Heidegger argues that by loosening up the 
hardened traditions we might dismantle certain concealments and thus arrive 'at 
those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the 
nature of Being'. 4 And as all understandings and interpretations of Being are carried 
out within the horizon of time, an adequate interpretation of Being depends on 
whether or not our conception of time is genuine in the first place. For 'time has long 
functioned as an ontological - or rather an ontical. - criterion for naYvely 
discriminating various realms of entities'. 5 Here, of course, Heidegger alludes to the 
traditional procedure of dividing entities into 'temporal', 'a-temporal' and 'supra- 
temporal' where 'timeless' or 'eternal' meanings are contrasted with meanings that 
are 'temporal' in the sense of 'being in time'. 
2 This thesis is especially associated with the controversial claims made by Margot Fleischer, Die 
Zeitanalysen in Heideggers 'Sein und Zeit', (Wflrzburg: Konigshausen und Neumann, 1991). 1 am 
grateftil for this reference to my supervisor, Dr. Peter Poellner. 
' Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1967), p. 44. Henceforth cited as BT. 
4 ibid. 
5 BT, p. 39. 
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Hitherto no one has asked or troubled to investigate how time has come to have this 
distinctive ontological function, or with what right anything like time functions as such a 
criterion; nor has anyone asked whether the authentic ontological relevance which is 
possible for it, gets expressed when 'time' is used in so naYvely ontological a manner. Time 
has acquired this 'self-evident' ontological function 'of its own accord' so to speak; indeed 
it has done so within the horizon of the way it is ordinarily understood. 6 
In considering the basis of ancient ontology in the light of the problematic of 
temporality, Heidegger's main objective is to show that the Greeks gained an 
understanding of Being in terrns of time, i. e. in terms of7rapoucia or ouo7ta which 
means 'presence'(in an ontologico-temporal sense). Accordingly, the Greeks 
comprehended entities in their Being as 'presence' and this means that the entities 
were grasped 'with regard to a definite mode of time - the 'present'. 
7 Since 
Aristotle's essay on time, Heidegger says, all interpretations of this phenomenon, be 
it that of Kant or that of Bergson, have remained essentially Greek, that is, 
Aristotelian in their basic ontological orientation, consequently in their treatment of 
the phenomenon of time. Heidegger, in thus arguing for the historical significance of 
the intricate relation between time and the meaning of Being, sees the task of 
destroying traditional ontology as an inevitable process on the way to elucidating the 
meaning of Being: 'the question of Being does not achieve its true concretness until 
we have carried through the process of destroying the ontological tradition'. 8 
Phenomenology in Heidegger's understanding means, as we recall from 
chapter 1, azo0alvea0at z-a Oaivoucva - 'to let that which shows itself be seen 
from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself .9 But, what 
is it that 
phenomenology is to let us see and what is it that it calls a 'phenomenon' in a 
distinctive sense? It is what proximally and for the most part does not manifestly 
show itself 
6 ibid. 
7 BT, p. 47. 
8 BT, p. 48. 
9 BT, p. 58- 
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It is something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part 
shows itself-, but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows itself and 
it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground. ' 0 
But as we saw in chapter 1, the 'hidden' (i. e. that which is replaced, covered up or 
disguised) which phenomenology cares about is not this or that entity but the Being 
of entities. And because this Being can be covered up, hence hidden to such an extent 
that it could be completely forgotten, phenomenology seeks to work out ways in 
which Being can become a phenomenon in terms of its ownmost content. In other 
words, because 'covered-up-ness' is a modification of 'phenomenon"' and because 
the phenomena are often not given (in the sense of manifestly showing themselves as 
themselves), there is a need for phenomenology and indeed a phenomenological 
method of description as interpretation or hermeneutic. Phenomenology, therefore, 
becomes the mode of access to what is to be the theme of ontology. In fact, 
Heidegger maintains 'only as phenomenology, is ontology possible' 12 , and adds: 
(. with regard to its subject-matter, phenomenology is the science of the Being of 
entities - ontology'. 
13 
[O]ntology and phenomenology are not two distinct philosophical disciplines among others. 
These terms characterize philosophy itself with regard to its object and its way of treating 
that object. Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, and takes its departure 
from the hermeneutic of Dasein,, which, as an analytic of existence, has made fast the 
guiding-line for all philosophical enquiry at the point where it arises and to which it 
returns. 14 
2. The Formulation of the Question of Being 
The enquiry on Being begins, characteristically, via a reflection upon the formal 
structure of an enquiry (that is, any enquiry) where Heidegger makes a number of 
remarks on what essentially belongs to any question whatsoever and how enquiry 
'o BT, p. 59. 
" BT, p. 60. 
12 ibid. 
13 BT, p. 61- 
14 BT, p. 62. 
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operates. He argues that an enquiry, as a kind of seeking, must be guided in advance 
by what is sought, i. e. it must contain 'that which is asked about' and 'that which is 
interrogated'. That is to say, the 'object' of the enquiry must already be present in the 
question. In other words, 'in what is asked about there lies also that which is to be 
found out by the asking'. 
15 
Now if the asking is about Being, the question becomes a peculiar one. For, 
when we enquire about something, we take no notice of the 'is' that we use 
constantly in order to fon-nulate our questions. In fact, in an ordinary enquiry, the 'is' 
has no other sense than that of highlighting the intended object. But, as soon as we 
focus the attention upon the 'is' itself and ask, for example, 'what is is? ', the enquiry 
appears to lose its sense altogether as we fail to grasp the 'object' of the question. 
This indicates to what extent Being, as that which is interrogated, is unlike any other 
object of enquiry and to what extent it requires an approach other than ones we are 
accustomed to. Hence Heidegger argues, in order to succeed in an investigation that 
is about Being, the question of Being must be formulated with special care. And in 
order to formulate the question adequately we must know about the structural 
characteristics of an enquiry and be able to see what the question could ask for and 
what information, or sight, it might already contain. 
Heidegger, from the very beginning, renders clear that what should be at issue 
with regard to Being, is the sense or the meaning of Being. The question, therefore, 
does not ask, 'what is Being? ', or whether there is anything like Being at all. It, 
rather, asks what is the sense o Being? "at is understood and what is meant by ýf 
'Being'? 16 As the question becomes specific, the enquirer assumes a particular 
position with regard to Being. For, the question of Being, thus fonnulated, reveals in 
advance several factors both about Being and the questioner of Being. What does the 
question reveal? To begin with, the questionability of the sense of Being shows that 
Being may lay its meaning open or make itseýf accessible to the questioner. It also 
15 BT, p. 24. 
16 Heidegger's reason for formulatIng the question thus will be analysed in Section II of this chapter. 
3 
shows that the questioner already knows of Being or has a certain understanding of 
Being - an understanding which despite being vague and indeterminate is 
nevertheless of prime importance. 
Out of this understanding arise both the explicit question of the meaning of Being and the 
tendency that leads us towards its conception. We do not know what 'Being' means. But 
even if we ask, 'What is "Being"T, we keep within an understanding of the 'is', though we 
are unable to fix conceptually what that 'is' signifies. We do not even know the horizon in 
terms of which that meaning is to be grasped and fixed. But this average understanding of 
Being is still afact. 17 
Furthen-nore, the question shows that Being must be presupposed at the beginning of 
the enquiry. For even if, as Heidegger points out, 'such "presupposing" has nothing 
to do with laying down an axiom from which a sequence of propositions is 
deductively derived'18, the question nonetheless affirms in advance that Being is 
necessarily meaningful. This seems to imply somehow ambiguously that, whatever 
'Being' might mean, this meaning belongs to Being itself 
Hence, the formulation of the question, we may say, conditions and guides 
the enquiry in a certain specific fashion. For if, as the question suggests, Being is 
meaning, or, to be is to mean something, and if this meaning should belong to Being 
itself, then the task of bringing forward the meaning of Being, could not entail giving 
meaning to the latter but, rather, revealing those meanings that belong to Being itself. 
These are meanings that are either hidden from us, or were once revealed but have 
now become forgotten, buried over or distorted by misunderstandings throughout 
history. In fact, it is, in part, due to these historical distortions, that Heidegger insists 
upon raising the question of Being anew. For, as we saw in our discussion of 
Husserl, without raising this question explicity, philosophical enquiries as well as the 
endeavours of the positive sciences operate within a naYve and limited frame of 
presuppositions taken over uncritically from the tradition. 19 
17 BT, p. 25. 
18 BT p. 28. 
19 Heidegger maintains that scientists and philosophers alike have forgotten the question of Being and 
have, rather, grown complacent in their interrogative attitude with regard to the meaning of Being. 
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Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it 
has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first 
adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its 
fundamental task. 20 
In examining the structure of the question of Being, we notice that the question, 
'what does "Being" meanT, despite its precise formulation, still contains 
perplexities. To say the least, the question announces two enquiries at once, namely: 
What does 'Being' mean in the case of this and that entity? What does 'Being' mean 
in general? Here, the twofold character of the question engenders a certain 
uncertainty as to with which one of these questions the enquiry on Being must begin. 
For, if we start by considering the former question first, then we would run 
immediately into the following difficulty: we say the chair is just as much as honesty 
is, justice is - the wind is just as much as man is, the world is, god is. Now, how 
should we be able to enquire about the meaning of 'is' in relation to each entity, 
without already knowing what 'is' means in the first instance? For, how are we to 
know whether or not the 'is' maintains always one and the same meaning in all the 
above mentioned examples, without having yet answered the question of the 
meaning of Being in general? But, if we make the enquiry into the meaning of Being- 
as-such our prior task, where or in which direction do we have to look in order to 
discern the meaning of Being in general yet remain faithful to the principle of 
phenomenological research, that is, without running into total abstraction. 
Conceding that there are two questions within the very same enquiry and 
perhaps a quasi circularity2l within the formulation of the question of Being, it might 
Hence, he asks, how come that today we are not even bothered by the very question that troubled the 
mind of thinkers such as Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle? And what does this neglect, this omission of 
the question of Being reveal? It reveals the history of our own Being which has become one of 
decadence: 'That this neglect is possible and reigns in this manner for thousands of years manifests a 
particular mode of Being of Dasein, a specific tendency towards decadence [ Verfalfl. This means that 
Dasein in this mode of Being of falling [Verfallen], from which it does not escape, first really comes 
to its Being when it rebels against this tendency'. (HCT, pp. 129-130). This historical dimension in the 
neglect of the question of Being is taken up in much greater detail in Heidegger's later works. See esp. our 
discussion in chapters III to V. 20 BT, p. 3 L 
Heidegger is, of course, aware of the charge that his approach to the question of Being is a circular 
one. But he rejects such criticisms by saying that 'factically there is no circle at all in formulating our 
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nevertheless be helpful to recall that Being, for Heidegger, is (in Being and Time as it 
was in the History of the Concept of Time) always the Being of entities themselves - 
entities that are and are in their Being as they are. 22 Hence, in speaking of 'Being in 
general', the latter should not be understood as yet another being, that is, another 
entity. For, Being is and always remains the Being of the entities themselves. In 
Heidegger's words, Being is that 'which determines entities as entities, that on the 
23 basis of which entities are already understood'. For, 'everything we have in view, 
everything towards which we comport ourselves in any way, is Being, what we are is 
Being, and so is how we are. Being lies in the fact that something is, and in its being 
as it is'. 24 If" in accordance with Heidegger's elucidation, we say that Being 
encompasses all that is, then it follows that Being is not a mere moment in the 
process of thinking; but that which is itself the primordial source of thinking; that 
which provokes and calls for thinking. But does such an account of Being make the 
task of finding a right beginning any easier? If Being 'penneates' everything which 
entity should be considered first as to its Being? 
3. The Priority of Dasein 
In Heidegger's view, the only way to make a beginning is to choose one entity first 
and aim to render this entity transparent in its own Being. To justify the choice that is 
to be made, Heidegger points to the fact that 'the questioning is itself an entity which 
is given with the question of the Being of an entity in the act of carrying out the 
question as we have described. One can determine the nature of entities in their Being without 
necessarily having the explicit concept of the meaning of Being at one's disposal. Otherwise there 
could have been no ontological knowledge heretofore. Of course "Being" has been presupposed in all 
ontology up till now, but not as a concept at one's disposal - not as the sort of thing we are seeking. 
This "presupposing" of Being has rather the character of taking a look at it beforehand, so that in the 
light of it the entities presented to us get provisionally articulated in their Being. This guiding activity 
of taking a look at Being arises from the average understanding of Being in which we always operate 
and which in the end belongs to the essential constitution of Dasein itself. (BT, pp. 27-28). 
22 In this respect, Heidegger's approach in BT corresponds to one element of metaphysical philosophy 
as characterized later by him (e. g. in the essay 'Nihilism as Determined by the History of Being'). 
Metaphysics does not question Being as such, but rather enquires about the Being of entities. Where 
the approach of BT differs from any metaphysical approach is in the recognition that there is an entity 
(Dasein) who is not defined by an essentia or whatness, but whose 'essence' is to exist. 
23 BT, pp. 25-26. 
24 ibid. 
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questioning-). 25 This indicates that the entity from which we must take our departure 
could neither be optional nor chosen arbitrarily. Rather, it must be that entity for 
which the very question of Being is an issue. The entity that questions, that seeks to 
discern, to determine Being, and has all these behaviors as constitutive modes of its 
Being, is no other than we ourselves, the questioners. Heidegger denotes this entity 
(which each of us is himself and which includes enquiring as one of the possibilities 
of its Being', 26 by the term Dasein. Hence, the exposition of the constitution of 
Dasein and the analysis of its meaning become the substantial theme of Being and 
Time. 27 
Heidegger, however, renders explicit that the elaboration of the 'existential 
analytic of Dasein', which earlier was defined in terms of 'the phenomenology of 
Dasein 28 , 
does not originate from a special kind of interest in the psychology of man 
or from a particular interest in anthropology. Rather, the decision springs from the 
fact that Dasein, as the questioner of Being, shows a distinct relatedness towards 
Being as it continually renders this very question an issue for itself As we shall see, 
implicit in Heidegger's approach is the idea that Being can only be understood in 
relation to that which understands it - i. e. Being is intrinsically and essentially 
meaning/sense and therefore we need to investigate what 'making sense' or 
(significance' means and how it characterizes itself. That is to say, Dasein in being 
25 HCT, p. 147. 
26 BT, p. 26. 
27 In our previous discussion (in chapter 1), the position assigned to intentionality by Husserl might 
have provided us already with an idea as to what entity constitutes the real theme of phenomenology. 
One might, accordingly, view Heidegger's almost exclusive elaboration of Dasein, as a subtle 
continuity between the former theme of phenomenology (intentionality), and the present theme of 
Being and Time (Dasein). But this would in some ways be misleading. As Dreyfus, among others, 
stresses, Dasein, which in colloquial German can mean 'everyday human existence', is not a conscious 
subject, though 'many interpreters make just this mistake. They see Heidegger as an "existential 
phenomenologist", which means to them an edifýýg elaboration of Husserl. The most famous version 
of this mistake is Sartre's brilliant but misguided reformulation of Being and Time into a theory of 
consciousness in Being and Nothingness. The best way to understand what Heidegger means by 
Dasein is to think of our term "human being", which can refer to a way of Being that is characteristic 
of people or to a specific person -a human being. The challenge is to do justice to the fact that Dasein 
names beings like you and me, while at the same time preserving the strategy of Being and Time, 
which is to reverse the Cartesian tradition by making the individual subject somehow dependent upon 
shared social practices'. See Hubert Dreyfus, Being-in-the- World, pp. 13 -14. 28 HCT, p. 14 8. 
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as it is, always comports itself 'freely' or 'spontaneously' towards Being, for Being 
always means something to it. Hence, the fact that the question of the meaning of 
Dasein assumes priority in the enquiry concerning the meaning of Being in general, 
does not assert an evaluative or a chronological priority of Dasein over above Sein 
(Being). But because Dasein shows to have a special relation towards Being, 
Heidegger seeks to work out the meaning of Being by considering first the sense of 
Dasein - that is, the sense of its 'being-there', because Dasein somehow understands 
itself in its Being. 
There is some way in which Dasein understands itself in its Being, and that to some degree 
it does so explicitly. It is peculiar to this entity that with and through its Being, this Being is 
disclosed to it. Understanding of Being is itse4f a definite characteristic of Dasein'S Being. 
Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological. 29 
Considering the question of Dasein's priority in a historical context, Heidegger turns 
his attention particularly to Aristotle and Aquinas. He argues that despite their failure 
to grasp Dasein's genuine ontological structure, its ontico-ontological priority was 
nevertheless pointed out by them quite early. Aristotle, for instance, with regard to 
the question of 'what makes the Being of man' talks about man's soul in terms of 
entities (q ýpvXq ra o v-ra zcoq cmri v). He says, 'the soul which makes up the Being 
of man' has many ways of being among which atcrOt7mq and voquiq are those in 
which the soul discovers always entities in their Being (both in the fact that they are, 
and in their being as they are). In following Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas employs 
29 BT, p. 32. In this connection we need to recall the sense of ra ovra and Aoyoq, discussed 
previously, in order to gain a clue as to what Heidegger means by terms such as 'ontical' and 
'ontological'. We need, however, to explicate their senses ftirther. The expression 'ontic' is often 
used by Heidegger in order to designate beings a in mere apophantic sense. So terms such as 'ontic' 
and 'ontical' concerns beings (ra ovra) in their emergence as 'this' and 'that'. (See Dreyfus, Being- 
in-the-World, p. 20) Of course, Dasein like other entities is also an ontic being except that Dasein in 
being ontical is, at the same time, onto-logical because it has an interpretation of Being. Dasein being 
ontico-onto logical, therefore, means that this ontic being has, so to speak, always a 'Ao; voý' of Being. 
Here, Aoyoý- stands for an un-theoretical understanding or, if we like, an interpretation that is not yet 
developed in any explicit way. But if, Heidegger adds, 'we should reserve the term "ontology" for that 
theoretical enquiry which is explicitly devoted to the meaning of entities, then what we had in mind 'in 
speaking of Dasein's "be ing-onto logical" is to be designated as something "pre-ontologicar'. ' (BT, p. 
32). 
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Aristotle's notion of the soul to discuss those characters of Being that transcend 
every possible classification in the sense of some generic kind of subject-matter. 
Thus engaged in the task of deriving the 'transcendentia', Aquinas aims to 
demonstrate 'that the verum is such a transcendens'. 30 To this end he refers to an 
entity whose way of Being is most appropriate to 'come together with' entities of 
other kinds. 'This distinctive entity, the ens quod natum est convenire cum omni ente, 
is the soul (anima). Here the priority of "Dasein" over all other entities emerges, 
although it has not been ontologically clarified. This priority has obviously nothing 
in common with a vicious subjectivizing of the totality of entities i, . 
31 
The point of this discussion ties in Heidegger's aim to establish a historical 
precedent for the ontico-ontological priority of Dasein in order to provide a grounded 
demonstration that could clarify the necessity forfundamental ontology. By the term 
'fundamental ontology' Heidegger means to distinguish the ontological enquiry that 
seeks for the meaning of Being through the existential analytic of Dasein, from 
ontologies pursued otherwise. For he says, 'fundamental ontology, from which alone 
all other ontologies can take their rise, must be sought in the existential analytic of 
Dasein'. 32 It is clear that what renders this ontology 'fundamental' is Dasein's 
ontico-ontological priority over all other entities. This, in the case of any ontology 
that has for its theme entities whose character of Being is other than that of Dasein, 
means that the very possibility for having such ontologies is founded upon Dasein's 
ontical structure, 'in which a pre-ontological understanding of Being is comprised as 
a definite characteristic'. 33 Dasein, for instance, has the possibility of understanding 
the ways of Being which are not necessarily that of its own. Sciences, we may say, 
are ways in which Dasein comports itself towards various entities. 
Dasein then revealed itself as that entity which must first be worked out in an ontologically 
adequate manner, if the enquiry is to become a transparent one. But now it has been shown 
30 BT, p. 34- 
31 ibid. 
32 ibid. 
3, BT, p. 3-33- 
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that the ontological analytic of Dasein in general is what makes up the fundamental 
ontology, so that Dasein functions as that entity which in principle is to be interrogated 
beforehand as to its Being. 34 
The first step, in carrying out the task of fundamental ontology, consists of 
understanding and interpreting Dasein as this entity which is accessible to us. To 
avoid misunderstandings of Dasein's ontico-ontological priority, Heidegger adds: 
In demonstrating that Dasein is ontico-ontologically prior, we may have misled the reader 
into supposing that this entity must also be what is given as ontico-onto logically primary not 
only in the sense that it can itself be grasped 'immediately', but also in that the kind of 
Being which it possesses is presented just as 'immediately'. Ontically, of course, Dasein is 
not only close to us - even that which is closest: we are it, each of us, we ourselves. In spite 
of this, or rather for just this reason, it is ontologically that which is the farthest. To be sure, 
its ownmost Being is such that it has an understanding of that Being, and already maintains 
itself in each case as if its Being has been interpreted in some manner. 35 
Certainly, by saying that 'Dasein's own Being is thus interpreted pre-ontologically in 
the way which lies closest', 36 Heidegger does not mean to say that such pre- 
ontological interpretation of oneself provides an appropriate guidance when 
considering one's ownmost state of Being as an ontological theme. He rather points 
out that., though ontically Dasein is 'closest' to itself, and pre-ontologically it is 
(surely not a stranger', ontologically, however, Dasein is 'farthest' to itself. 
37 
Summarizing the reasons why Dasein should be the entity which must first be 
interrogated ontologically, we may say that the first priority is an ontical one: 
38 'Dasein is an entity whose Being has the determinate character of existence' . The 
second priority, following from this, is Dasein's ontological character: 'Dasein is in 
itself "ontological", because existence is thus determinative for it. But with equal 
primordiality Dasein also possesses - as constitutive for its understanding of 
existence - an understanding of the Being of all entities of a character other than its 
34 BT, p. 35. 35 ibid. 
36 ibid. 
37 BT, p. 36. 
38 BT, p. 334. 
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own'. 39 On the basis of the first and second characterization, Dasein gains a third 
priority, i. e. it provides the ontico-ontological condition for the possibility of other 
ontologies. 
Heidegger's explanation of why any interrogation of Being must begin with 
the Being of Dasein is thus a development and modification of the earlier 
phenomenological idea, to be found in Husserl above all, that any elucidation of the 
'sense' of entities presupposes a phenomenological analysis of that through which 
any such sense is 'constituted', which for him was of course intentional experiences 
or transcendental 'consciousness'. Since, as we saw earlier, for Husserl there could 
not be any entities which did not manifest themselves by way of some kind of sense 
- that is, in some mode of givenness - this implied, as Heidegger understood clearly, 
that any phenomenological analysis of the very Being of entities requires from the 
outset an analysis of the mode of Being and the structure of 'intentionality'. 
4. Dasein's Existence 
In the vocabulary of Being and Time, the mode of Being in terms of which Dasein 
always understands itself and towards which it can always, in one way or other, 
comport itself is called 'existence' (Existenz). Just as the term 'Dasein' serves to 
bring into evidence the distinctiveness of this entity, so the term 'existence' serves to 
highlight the way through which Dasein is and is 'as' it is rather than 'what' it is. So 
the designation of this entity in tenns of 'Dasein' does not expresses its 'what' but 
points to its being-(there). Thus because Dasein's essence cannot be defined by 
(citing a "what" of the kind that pertains to a subject-matter', 40 Heidegger declares 
'Dasein'S essence lies in its existence',, that is, in the fact that Dasein exists and has, 
as its own, its existence to be. Therefore, 'its being-what-it-is (essentia) must, so far 
, 41 
as we can speak of it at all, be conceived in terms of its Being (existentia) . 
39 ibid. 
40 BE p. 32. 
" BT, p. 67. 
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But the meaning of term 'existence' must be distinguished from the 
ontological signification of the traditional term 'existentia' because the latter term, 
ontologically speaking, amounts to a mode of Being which is essentially 
inappropriate to an entity such as Dasein. That is to say, because all elucidations of 
Dasein are obtained by considering Dasein's existence-structure, or because the 
characters of its Being are defined in tenns of existentiality, Heidegger calls these 
"existentialia' rather than 'categories'. Accordingly, Dasein's characteristics should 
never be understood as properties, for Dasein 'is never to be taken ontologically as 
an instance or special case of some genus of entities'. 42 This means thatl the 
existentialia and categories are fundamentally distinct from one another and the 
entities which correspond to them require different kinds of primary interrogation. In 
Heidegger's words, 'an entity is either a "who" (existence) or a "what" (presence-at- 
hand in the broadest sense)'. 
43 
To avoid getting bewildered, we shall always use the interpretative expression 'presence-at- 
hand' for the tenn 'existentia', while the term 6existence', as a designation of Being, will be 
allotted solely to Dasein. 44 
Hence, we may say, for example, Dasein exists, but not gravity and light exist, 
because these entities have no understanding of what it is to be. To entities such as 
these., their Being is 'a matter of indifference; or more precisely, they "are" such that 
their Being can be neither a matter of indifference to them, nor the opposite'. 45 
Heidegger introduces a further distinction between 'existentiell' and 
'existential' understanding. The expression 'existentiell' denotes individual Dasein's 
understanding of itself in terms of its own existence. Such understanding does not 
require a theoretical perspicuousness of the ontological structure of existence. 
Rather, Dasein's pre-ontological understanding of Being suffices in providing it with 
42 
ibid. 
43 BT, p. 7 1. 
44BT, P. 67. 
45 ibid. 
82 
a web of meanings or possibilities in relation to which each individual Dasein makes 
sense of its own existence. Heidegger says: 
The question of existence never gets straightened out except through existing itself. The 
understanding of oneself which leads along this way we call 'existentiell'. The question of 
existence is one of Dasein's ontical 'affairs'. This does not require that the ontological 
structure of existence should be theoretically transparent. 46 
Meanwhile, questions regarding the structure of existence and enquiries concerned 
with the constitution of existence have an analytic where the character of 
understanding is not existentiell but existential. Thus by 'existentiality' Heidegger 
means the mode of Being that is constitutive only for those entities which can exist, 
namely: Dasein. 
5. Being-in-the-World 
'Being-in-the-world' constitutes the most fundamental structural characteristic of 
Dasein -a structure which as Heidegger says, is not pieced together from parts 
conceivably being prior to it, but is 'a priori', primordially a whole. Indeed, the 
compound expression 'being-in-the-world' seeks to emphasize the unitary aspect of 
this phenomenon where the sense of 'in' differs from that which designates the kind 
of Being which one entity has when it is spatially contained 'in' another one. For 
when we say, the water is 'in' the glass, or the garment is 'in' the cupboard, the 'in' 
denotes a relationship between two entities that are extended 'in' space and are 'at' a 
location in the same way. 
The analysis of the sense of being-in leads to a clearer distinction among the 
modes of Being of entities and a classification of these into ontological (rather than 
ontic) 'kinds'. 47 One such kind is being-present-at-hand (vorhanden) which applies, 
among others, to entities that can be in one another because their way of Being (in 
the world) could be characterized through a mere location 'in' space (or time), or as 
46 BT, p. 333. 
47 This classification corresponds to a certain extent to Husserl's distinction between ontological 
6regions' - although Heidegger of course regards the Husserlian distinctions as not fundamental 
enough, remaining within the horizon of object-Being (presence-at-hand). 
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occurrences: 4all entities whose Being "in" one another can thus be described have 
the same kind of Being - that of being-present-at-hand - as things occuiTing "within" 
the world' . 
48 The term vorhanden, translated usually as present-at-hand, but 
sometimes as 'extant' or 'occurrent', is not defined very clearly by Heidegger in 
Being and Time, but it is arguably intended to denote object-being in a broadly 
Husserlian sense. An object (a present-at-hand entity) is self-given 'in person' in 
perception ('looking') and has been individuated in such a way that it can be referred 
to as the same in different contexts. Thus a present-at-hand entity is essentially 
abstracted or abstractable from the original context of encounter. This implies that 
presence-at-hand is the mode of Being not only of spatio-temporal objects, but also 
of Husserl's ideal objectivities. 
Now, because Dasein's way of Being is unique, the sense of its 'being-in' (- 
the-world) cannot be the same as the water's being in the glass; for even if one is to 
consider Dasein as something extended and located in space, this will not be in the 
same way as water or other such entities. In fact, the 'in', according to Heidegger's 
analysis of Dasein'S mode of being-in, takes its sense from 'innan' which means 'to 
reside', 'to dwell'. Here, 'an' signifies 'I am accustomed', 'I am familiar with', 'I 
look after something 49 and 'I am% in this connection, means 'I reside', 'I dwell 
alongside' the familiar world. Hence, 'being-in' as a characteristic of Dasein's mode 
of Being, is an existential or existentiale which refers not to a special 'in-one- 
another-ness' of things present-at-hand, but to 'being alongside' the world. And this, 
Heidegger emphasizes, 'never means anything like the being-present-at-hand- 
together of things that occur' just as 'there is no such thing as the "side-by-side-ness" 
50 
of an entity called "Dasein" with another entity called "world" . 
Of course, Dasein 
is not 'worldless' and to the extent that it is spatially 'in' the world like other present- 
at-hand entities Dasein can be (within certain limits and in certain circumstances) 
viewed as merely present-at-hand. But. this in fact requires the viewer to ignore 
48 BT, p. 79. 
49 ibid. 
50 BT, p. 80- 
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completely the existential state of 'being-in' as the very characteristic of Dasein's 
mode of Being. Heidegger says, 'by delimiting being-in we are not denying every 
kind of "spatiality" to Dasein. On the contrary, Dasein itself has a "being-in-space" 
of its own; but this in turn is possible only on the basis of being- in-the-world in 
general'. 
51 
The consideration of Dasein as something that is just present-at-hand is 
certainly erroneous, but there is a certain analogue of the 'present-at-hand' that 
belongs solely to Dasein or is Dasein's own. For though Dasein can and does 
understand its ownmost Being as a kind of 'factual being present-at-hand', this, i. e. 
thefactuality of the fact of one's own Dasein, its 'that it is', is ontologically different 
from the factual occurrence of some kind of, let us say, minerals. Dasein is, 
factically, in-a-world: 'Insideness', as we saw, could be a contingent property among 
other properties of two things present-at-hand, but Dasein's 'being-in' can never be 
such a property - 'a "property" which it sometimes has and sometimes does not have, 
and without which it could be just as well as it could with it. 52 Dasein is never 
"proximally" an entity which is, so to speak, free from 'being-in'-the-world, but 
53 
which sometimes has the inclination to take up a "relationship" towards the world' . 
Now in order to gain any understanding of the nature of such a 'relationship' we 
need to know what 'the world' means in this context. Evidently there is no 
straightforward answer to this complex and historically loaded question and 
Heidegger's highly elaborate discussion of the topic is not always transparent. We 
will, however, attempt to clarify some of the most relevant points by considering first 
the question of how 'the world' should be approached. 
One way of approaching the world as a phenomenon would be to describe 
what shows itself in entities within the world and give an account of occurrences in 
them. But given that such accounts confine themselves to ontical descriptions of 
things 'in' the world and are so evidently pre-phenomenological in their approach, 
51 BT, p. 82. 
52 Cf. BT, p. 174. 
53, BT, p. 84.. 
85 
they are of no relevance to Heidegger's concern for the meaning of 'world'. Another 
way, which is no less problematic, is a kind of phenomenological account of the 
world such as Husserl's that aims to exhibit the Being of entities considered as 
present-at-hand, and attempts to fix it in categorial concepts. But, as was highlighted 
in chapter 1, there is a problem here regarding the supposedly fundamental 
thinghood of 'things of nature' and the everyday 'things invested with value' which 
are according to Husserl and most of the tradition founded upon the former. That is 
to say, given that the thinghood of things 'invested with value' is ultimately based 
upon the thinghood of nature, all concern for the Being of the world must ultimately 
turn into and be founded on an investigation concerned with the Being of nature. And 
this in turn must become an enquiry into substances and substantiality. Now this 
manner of knowing the world is, as Heidegger sees it, not just limited but profoundly 
deficient. For to conceive the world as nature in ontologico-categorial terms is 
precisely to deprive the world of its worldhood. Hence 'neither the ontical depiction 
of entities within-the-world nor the ontological interpretation of their Being is such 
as to reach the phenomenon of the "world", 54 for in both cases the world has already 
been presupposed. In fact, 'nature as the categorial aggregate of those structures of 
Being which a definite entity encountered within-the-world may possess, can never 
make worldhood intelligible' 55 because 'worldhood' is a fundamental-ontological 
concept and not a categorial one. In other words, 'worldhood' stands for the structure 
of one of the constitutive moments of being-in-the-world, and because being-in-the- 
world is a way that defines Dasein's character existentially, worldhood is itself an 
existentiale. Accordingly, when the world is considered ontologically, the enquiry 
cannot proceed by a mere identification of entities 'in' the world by categorial 
characteristics totally different from those of Dasein. Rather an ontological enquiry 
about the world must be carried out within the confines of the analytic of Dasein. 
54 BT, p. 9 I. 
55 B T, p 9-3- 
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This means to consider the world as a characteristic of Dasein itseýf and understand 
it as the 'wherein' a factical Dasein as such resides. 
6. The World in terms of Dasein's Average Everydayness: 
Environment 
According to Heidegger the method by which the phenomenon of the world is to be 
met must involve a study of everyday being-in-the-world. This average everydayness 
encounters the world as the environment: 
From this existential character of average being- in-the-world, our investigation will take its 
course towards the idea of worldhood in general. We shall seek the worldhood of the 
environment by going through an ontological interpretation of those entities within-the- 
environment which we encounter as closest to us. 56 
The term 'environment' though it might suggest an idea of spatiality - the 'environ' 
understood as 'around' and 'about' or circa - does not necessarily refer to space. 
Heidegger argues that, conversely, the spatiality suggested by the expression 
ýenvironment' can only become intelligible in terms of the structure of worldhood. 
The error made by traditional ontology consists, in fact, in beginning with spatiality 
and ending up consequently with an interpretation of the Being of the world as res 
extensa. 57 Meanwhile, a phenomenological exhibition of the entities encountered in 
the environment - of what constitutes the environment,, in other words - requires 
precisely not a bare perceptual cognition, but an examination of the everyday 
'attitude' where the entities are not considered as objects of a theoretical knowledge 
but are taken as what gets used, what gets produced, what gets disfunctional and so 
forth. In other words, at issue here is, or should be, a certain kind of concern 
(Besorgen) that manipulates things and puts them to use. For 'this is the way in 
56 BT, p. 94. 
57 Heidegger's reference is, of course, to Descartes' idea of the world as res extensa and its 
counterpart res cogitans which. as Heidegger points out, 'does not coincide with Dasein either 
ontically or ontological K". ibid. 
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which everyday Dasein always is: when I open the door, I use the latch' . Things 
such as 'the door', 'the latel' and all other entities that one encounters in one's 
concernful dealings are often referred to as equipment in order to avoid the term 
'things' (res) and therefore to prevent any prejudgment on behalf of the character of 
thinghood. 
However, as Heidegger points out, there 'is', strictly speaking, no such thincy L- 
as an equipment but a totality of equipment to which any 'piece' of equipment 
essentially belongs. Such a totality is constituted by various modes of the 'in-order- 
to', such as manipulability, usability, serviceability and so forth. That is to say, 
equipment is by virtue of belonging to other equipment. Hence, the 'in-order-to' is a 
structure which contains an assignment or reference of something to something: 
fnk-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room. These 
'things' never show themselves proximally as they are for themselves, so as to add up to a 
sum of realia and fill up a room. What we encounter as closest to us is the room; and we 
encounter it not as something 'between four walls' in a geometrical spatial sense, but as 
equipment for residing. 59 
An equipment, therefore, can show itself as an individual item only because of such 
(. arrangement', that is, only if a totality of equipment has already been met, i. e. 
discovered. Now the kind of Being that belongs to environmental equipment, that 
Being in which equipment manifests itself in its own right, is what Heidegger calls 
Wadiness-to-hand' (Ahandenheit). An entity of this kind could certainly not be 
grasped thematically (as if it was an occurring thing), but can only be understood 
when it is used and dealt with. When hammering with a hanuner, for example, or in 
other such dealings whereby something gets used, the 'in-order-to', or instrumental 
character, which is constitutive for the equipment we are using, is unthernatic 
background, being subordinated to our concern. In fact, 'the less we just stare at 
[thematically perceive] the hammer-thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use 
it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more uriveiledly is 
58 BT, p. 96. (My emphasis). 
59BT, pp. 97-98. 
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it encountered as that which it is - as equipment. ). 
60 Heidegger means to say that the 
kind of manipulability specific to the hammer is essentially uncovered through the 
hammering itself and not through looking at it ('intuiting it') in a detached 
objectifying manner. But the manipulation and the use that we make of equipment is 
not merely a 'blind' activity. Implicitly drawing a contrast with the classical (and 
Husserlian) idea of adequate understanding as intuitus, Heidegger says that the use of 
environmental equipment is rather guided by having a 'sight' of their own kind -a 
sight which he calls circumspection. Here, the distinction between 'practical' and 
'theoretical' does not consist of acting blindly in one case and detached observing in 
the other, as if an act without theoretical cognition must be sightless. Rather, just as 
'non-circumspective' observation is not a rule free looking, absorbed skillful 
Besorgen, Heidegger maintains, does require 'observation' but such observation is 
not of the detached theoretical kind. 61 
The work that one finds or encounters in one's concernful dealings, that is, 
when one is working on something, as when hammering with the harnmer or sewing 
with the needle, is the work to be produced as the 'towards-which' of equipment 
such as the hammer and the needle. As the work itself has a peculiar usability which 
belongs to it essentially, the kind of Being proper to it is, therefore, that of 
equipment. In this usability 'it [the work] lets us encounter already the "towards- 
which" for which it is usable. A work that someone has ordered is only by reason of 
its use and the assign-ment-context of entities which is discovered in using it'. 62 
But what precisely is revealed along with equipment that we use? Heidegger 
says, as the 'environment' is discovered, 'nature' is encountered too. This is the 
60 ibid. 
61 There has been some debate on how this 'sight' of circumspection is to be understood. Given 
Heidegger's emphasis on the 'inconspicuousness' and 'withdrawal' of the 'with-which', the 'in-order- 
to' and the 'werein' of everyday Besorgen, it seems most appropriate to interpret circumspection as a 
mode of unthernatic ('background') awareness. See e. g. Hubert Dreyfus, Being- in-the- World, pp. 64- 
69. Others have questioned, however, whether such skillful everyday coping can be adequately 
elucidated as involving only unthernatic awareness. See e. g. Theodore Schatzki, 'Coping with Others 
with Folk Psychology', in: M. Wrathall and J. Malpas (eds. ), Heidegger, Coping, and Cognitive 
Science, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000), especially pp. 35-3 8. 
62 BT, p. 99. 
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"nature' which we find in what he calls natural products (presumably products made 
from natural materials) and which should neither be understood as 'the power of 
nature' nor as mere presence-at-hand. For when nature becomes a present-at-hand 
decontextualized object, 'the nature which "stirs and strives", which assails us and 
enthralls us as landscape, remains hidden'. 63 In any case, readiness-to-hand is the 
kind of Being that pertains to environing nature: 
In roads, bridges, buildings, our concern discovers nature as having some definite direction. 
A covered railway platform takes account of bad weather; an installation for public lighting 
takes account of the darkness, or rather of specific changes in the presence or absence of 
daylight - 'the position of the sun'. In a clock, account is taken of some definite 
constellation in the world-system. When we make use of the clock-equipment, which is 
proximally and inconspicuously ready-to-hand, the environing nature is ready-to-hand along 
with it. 
64 
It must be pointed out that Heidegger, despite a certain ambivalence, does not intend 
to say that because of our concemful dealing with things, these entities which are in 
themselves present-at-hand are for us ready-to-hand. For this would mean that the 
Being of the entities 'in-and-for-itself is one thing while this Being for Dasein is 
quite another. And this arnounts to saying that readiness-to-hand is one of Dasein's 
idiosyncratic (subjective) modes of determining entities. But, being-ready-to-hand, in 
Heidegger's account, is not merely one possible way of looking at the entities 
encountered., nor is it a way of delineating some of their aspects. Readiness-to-hand, 
rather, defines entities as they are in themselves, that is, ontologico-categorially. Of 
course, in the process of dealings and work, whereby the entities are encountered and 
discovered, the person is always there along with the work that comes forth. And 
because the work which is produced has an assignment to the person who is to use it, 
there will always be along the ready-to-hand entities also that entity for which the 
product is ready-to-hand, namely Dasein. In other words: there is a reciprocal 
dependency here. Just as the mode of Being of Dasein can only be elucidated 
63 BT p. 100. In this passage, however, Heidegger seems to be talking about nature as an aesthetic 
'object', a mode of Being not fitting neatly into the dichotomy of readiness-to-hand and presence-at- 
hand. 
64BT, pp. 100- 10 1 
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concretely with reference to its involvement with environmental equipment, so the 
ready-to-hand equipment can only be elucidated in its Being with reference to 
Dasein. The possible interpretation of this view as a kind of Daseins-perspectivism 
(all Being is relative to Dasein) will be discussed in Section II below. 
What precisely does 'assigm-nent' mean? It means for something to have an 
involvement in something else. The 'with' (something) and the 'in' (something) 
indicate a relationship which Heidegger calls 'assignment' or 'reference': 'When an 
entity within-the-world has already been proximally freed for its Being, that Being is 
its "involvement"'. This a priori letting-something-be involved is, accordingly, the 
condition of the possibility of encountering anything ready-to-hand: 
To say that the Being of ready-to-hand has the structure of assignment or reference means 
that it has in itself the character of having been assigned or referred. An entity is discovered 
when it has been assigned or referred to something, and referred as that entity which it is. 
With any such entity there is an involvement which it has in something. The character of 
Being which belongs to the ready-to-hand is just such an involvement. 65 
Any entity that shows itself in its Being to concern is not 'proximally' a 'world-stuff 
i. e. just something present-at-hand, but is already something environmentally ready- 
to-hand. So an involvement comes forth and shows itself because a totality of 
involvement has already been discovered and it is here that, as Heidegger puts it 
somewhat quaintly, 'lurks an ontological relationship to the world'. For in order to 
let entities be involved in such a way that they are 'set free' for a totality of 
involvements,, we must have disclosed beforehand whatever that is for which they 
have thus been 'freed'. That is to say, discoveredness belongs solely to Dasein as the 
possibility of its Being. Indeed, Heidegger says, only because an understanding of 
Being belongs to Dasein's Being, do entities become accessible within-the-world. 
An equipmental whole, then, involves the following structural moments 
which are essentially a totality, in that they refer to each other. There is a 'wherein', 
that is, a practical context, in which Dasein assigns itself, usually non-deliberately, to 
65 BT, p. 114. 
91 
executing some task with piece of equipment (the 'with-which'), which is defined 
by its 'in-order-to' (its instrumental character); Dasein assigns itself thus on the way 
'towards' some goal (not thematically envisaged), which in turn has its place in 
virtue of some 'for-the-sake-of-which' (a final point or overall project Dasein 
understands itself in term of). The 'wherein' of this structure constitutes the 
phenomenon of the world. 66 
What makes up the worldhood of the world is the structure of that to which 
Dasein enviromnentally assigns itself The world, as that wherein Dasein 
understands itself in this way, is always something primordially familiar to Dasein. 
Does such familiarity require those relations which are constitutive for the world as 
world to be theoretically transparent? Not necessarily; but the very possibility of 
interpreting these relations in an explicit ontologico-existential way is grounded in 
such a familiarity with the world. This familiarity is in turn constitutive for Dasein 
and its understanding of Being: 
In the act of understanding the relations indicated above must have been previously 
disclosed; the act of understanding holds them in this disclosedness. It holds itself in them 
with familiarity; and in so doing, it holds them before itself, for it is in these that its 
assignment operates. 67 
These relationships of assigning have, Heidegger says, the character of signijyjing and 
Dasein in its familiarity with these relationships signifies to itself, i. e. it gains its 
Being and its ability-to-be in a primordial fashion. Hence, what Heidegger calls 
4significance' is, we may say, the relational totality of this signifying which 
constitutes the structure of the world and that of the 'wherein' Dasein as such 
already is. The worldhood of the world is this structure ofsignificance. 
Dasein's familiaritY with significance provides it with an ontical condition of 
the possibility of discovering entities. These are of course entities that Dasein 
66We may perhaps illustrate this structure with a modified example from Dreyfus: Someone is writing 
on a blackboard in a classroom situation ('wherein'), with a piece of chalk ('with-which'), that shows 
up for him as something in order to write, as a step towards explaining Heidegger ('towards which'). 
for the sake of being a good teacher. (Cf. Hubert Dreyfus, Being- in-the- World, p. 92). 
67 BT, p. 120. 
92 
encounters in a world with involvement, entities that have readiness-to-hand as their 
kind of Being and can make themselves known as such, i. e. as they are in 
themselves. Significance is an existential characteristic of Dasein's being-in-the- 
world. A certain kind of concern belonging to the everydayness of being-in-the-world 
allows the entities with which we concern ourselves to be encountered in such a way 
that the worldly character of all that is within-the-world comes to the fore (i. e. 
becomes thematic). 
As Heidegger argues, one such type of occasion arises when, for example, an 
equipmental tool gets damaged or broken. When this happens, i. e. when we handle a 
tool that is broken, we thematically discover its usability. This is the reason why 
Heidegger insists upon the illegitimacy of certain theoretical approaches to entities 
and their Being, for: 
The ready-to-hand is not grasped theoretically at all, nor is itself the sort of thing that 
circumspection takes proximally as a circurnspective theme. The peculiarity of what is 
proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw in 
order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically. 68 
The broken tool, which just lies there being useless, now reveals that as well as 
having been something ready-to-hand it has always also been present-at-hand, i. e. 
has been in the sense of extension (res extensa) or quality and other such 
categories. 
69 
Heidegger analyses two other kinds of case, obtrusiveness (missing 
equipment) and obstinacy (something standing in the way of concern) in which, 
together with the case of conspicuousness just discussed, the ready-to-hand can 
partly lose its readiness-to-hand and as this happens, the mode of Being of presence- 
at-hand (the Being of a de-contextualized object in Husserl's sense) in what is ready- 
to-hand emerges. It is, however, important to note that in none of these cases 
68 BT, p. 99. 
69 For a discussion of this emergence of the present-at-hand, see Joseph Rouse, 'Science and the 
"Theoretical" Discovery of the Present-at-Hand', in D. lhde and H. J. Silverman (eds. ), Descriptions, 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1985), pp. 200-2 10. 
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(unusable thing, missing thing, and thing for which one's concern has no time) the 
readiness-to-hand itself - which has been understood while dealing with the ready-to- 
hand - disappears completely, to be replaced by presence-at-hand. Rather, readiness- 
to-hand 'takes its fare well, as it were, in the conspicuousness of the unusable'. 70 
And it is because readiness-to-hand still shows itself that the worldly character of the 
ready-to-hand continues to show itself as well. It seems to be implicit in this analysis 
of Heidegger's that in the complete absence of concernful dealing with the ready-to- 
hand, the world would vanish too. Since the world is a constitutive moment of the 
Being of Dasein, this case would appear to be impossible for as long as Dasein 
exists. 
If we now contrast Heidegger's treatment of the everyday world with 
Husserl's analysis of the 'environment' and its role in his later writings, we can 
perhaps note the following fimdamental differences. Husserl recognized that we 
mostly do not encounter 'natural things' but things 'invested with (practical) value', 
which are often given as use-things or instruments. But, firstly, he thought that we 
could only be aware of them as use-things in so far as we also grasp them 
thematically as natural things (being of such and such a size, shape, weight, colour, 
etc). In this sense, all Being of equipment remained for him founded in 'natural' 
Being, understood in this traditional way. But natural objects as understood by the 
tradition are essentially atomic: they are what they are by themselves and (in 
principle) independently of each other. Moreover, Husserl did not give a detailed 
phenomenological description of how use-things are disclosed to us, implying that 
the 'use' character (the in-order-to) of something may in principle be 'perceived' in 
the way that its colour is perceived. Heidegger departs quite radically from Husserl in 
all these respects. He recognizes that the Being of equipment cannot be 'adequately 
given' as what it is in 'perception', but only in using it. In using equipment, it is not 
I given' in terms of 'natural' characteristics which would allow it to be detached from 
70 BT, p. 105. 
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its context of use (its 'wherein'). Hence equipment is not an object at all and has a 
different mode of Being from objects: its Being is readiness-to-hand, which is 
holistic, for it only is what it is in the whole context of assignments and references 
that constitute it. Moreover, the Being of objects is founded in the readiness-to-hand 
of equipment. 71 Heidegger thus reverses the order of foundation asserted by Husserl. 
Readiness-to-hand thus is a fundamental and irreducible mode of Being essentially 
distinct from the Being of objects (presence-at-hand) and presupposed by it. But 
there remains a limited affinity with earlier phenomenology. Just as for Husserl, the 
Being of consciousness could not be understood without recourse to the objects 
which it directs itself towards, so for Heidegger the Being of Dasein cannot be 
understood without recourse to the ontic transcendence of coping with ready-to-hand 
equipment. 
We have seen that whereas the structure of the Being of the ready-to-hand is 
determined by references and assignments, that of the world is understood in terms 
of involvement and significance. On the basis of this, Heidegger argues that entities 
are thematically disclosed 'in their Being' only when our concern is interrupted. In 
concern we cannot observe the assignments themselves but they are, nevertheless, 
'there' as we concernfully submit ourselves to them. But as soon as something 
becomes unusable and no longer serves a purpose, the assignment itself becomes 
explicit or thematic. And this lets us to see the 'towards-this' itself and everything 
related to it. Here the context of equipment, as a totality always implicitly 'sighted' 
beforehand in circumspection, lights up before us and only with this the world comes 
explictly into view. As our circumspection comes face to face, as it were, with 
emptiness, we can see for the first time what the missing thing was ready-to-hand 
with and for. That is, we see the whole or the totality of involvements as this 
signifiJ., ing in which Dasein has its being-in-the-world. 
1 BT, p. 88. 
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Now the question that Heidegger puts to his own argument is this: 'if we have 
thus determined that the Being of the ready-to-hand (involvement) is definable as a 
context of assignments or references, and that even worldhood may so be defined, 
then has not the "substantial Being" of entities within-the-world been volatilized into 
a system of relations? And inasmuch as relations are always "something thought", 
has not the Being of entities within-the-world been dissolved into "pure thinking"'? 72 
In setting himself to answer this question, Heidegger reminds us of the need to keep 
distinct different dimensions of ontological problematics, namely: (a) the Being of 
readiness-to-hand; (b) the Being of presence-at-hand and (c) the worldhood of the 
world (or the Being of that ontical condition which makes it possible for entities 
within-the-world to be discovered at all). The first two concepts of Being are 
categorical (pertaining to entities whose Being is other than that of Dasein), while 
the third kind of Being is an existential structural moment of being-in-the-world, i. e. 
of Dasein. The context of references or assigmuents, which, as significance, is 
constitutive for worldhood could of course formally be considered as a system of 
relations. But, given that in such formalizations the phenomena are leveled off, they 
lose their real phenomenal content. In any case, the phenomenal content of these 
4 relations' and 'relata' (the 'in-order-to', the 'for-the-sake-of, and the 'with-which' 
of an involvement) are not merely something thought, something first posited in an 
'act of thinking'. They are rather pre-predicative relationships of Being wherein 
concernful circumspection as such already resides. Hence, Heidegger says 
This 'system of relations', as something constitutive for worldhood, is so far from volatizing 
the Being of the ready-to-hand within-the-world, that the worldhood of the world provides 
the basis on which such entities can for the first time be discovered as they are 
4substantially' 'in themselves'. And only if entities within-the-world can be encountered at 
all, is it possible, in the field of such entities, to make accessible what is just present-at-hand 
and no more. 73 
72 BT, p. 12 1. 
73 BT, p. 122. 
96 
7. Projection, Affectedness, Failing: The Ecstases of Being-There 
Heidegger returns to a comprehensive analysis of being-in - one of the structural 
moments of being-in-the-world - in chapter 5 of his work. This suggests that the 
foregoing analysis of concernful dealing with equipment has abstracted from certain 
essential aspects of it. The structure of being-in in its totality Heidegger will 
eventually call care: Dasein, unlike a stone, is essentially such that its Being consists 
in things mattering to it. Initially, Heidegger implies that being-in has three 
constitutive moments: affectedness, understanding, and discourse - and he proceeds 
to discuss each of these. But he revises this later,, when he says in § 68 that 
When the 'there' has been completely disclosed, its disclosedness is constituted by 
understanding, affectedness, and falling; and this disclosedness becomes articulated by 
discourse. 74 
This suggests that the structure of being-in is actually threefold and is necessarily 
articulated in discourse. This schema seems indeed to be the one Heidegger 
ultimately has in mind, because it will be interpreted in Division Two in terms of the 
three ecstases of original temporality, as follows: 75 
Affectedness --- Falling --- Understanding 
III 
Pastness --- Presencing --- Futurity 
Let us start our interpretation of being-in with the moment which enjoys a certain 
priority over the others, namely understanding (Verstehen). Heidegger has already 
argued that the essence of Dasein is its existence; that is, the fact that its Being is an 
issue for it. This 'being an issue for it' is to be understood as Dasein's essentially 
projecting itseýf towards possibilities to be. This discussion is now taken up more 
explicitly in §31. Heidegger argues that Dasein is what it understands itself as. We 
could gloss this by saying that Dasein is essentially its self-interpretation. But this 
self-understanding is not originally a Husserlian inspectio sui, expressed in 
74 BT, p. 400. 
75 Cf. William Blattner, Heidegger's Temporal Idealism, pp. 39-68, and pp. 102f 
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statements about oneself as a senes of 'experiences' or inner objects, but a 
comportment towards some possibility-to-be: 
When we are talking ontically we sometimes use the expression 'understanding something' 
with the signification of 'being able to manage something', 'being a match for it', 'being 
able to do something'. In understanding as an existentiale, that which we have such an 
ability for is not a 'what', but Being as existing. The kind of Being which Dasein has, as 
ability-to-be, lies existentially in understanding. Dasein is not something present-at-hand 
which has the added extra that it is able-to, it is primarily being-possible. 76 
Thus the 'essence' of Dasein is Dasein's interpreting itself in and through its 
comportment, in its ability to be in some way or other, or, as we could also say, in its 
projecting itself. Dasein's primary way of being its project (Entwurj) is to project 
itself towards something, not to thematize the project. The latter can only be 
secondary because it takes away the character of possibility from the project which is 
essential to it. Hence, Dasein is possibility rather than actuality, and ontically this 
possibility means something like 'ability in action'. Dasein is constitutively ahead- 
of-itself, projecting itself in terms of some for-the-sake-of-which. 
But Dasein cannot project itself towards just anything at all. Its possibility is 
not, as Heidegger puts it, 'free-floating'. For Dasein also has something analogous 
to the sheer factuality of the properties of an occurrent thing. Heidegger calls this 
Dasein's facticity or thrownness, and it is disclosed in affectedness (Befindlichkeit). 77 
'Affectedness' as an existentiale means how things matter to Dasein already: it 
manifests itself ontically as the mood (or att-unedness: Stimmung) Dasein at any time 
'finds itself in: 
76 BT, p. 183. Translation modified. We have chosen the translation ability-to-be' for Seink6nnen in 
order to highlight the connection which Heidegger stresses here with competence or ability. The 
Macquarrie-Robinson translation as 'potentiality-for Being' is misleading because it insinuates the 
traditional Aristotelian understanding of possibility as 'potentiality', a lesser mode of Being than 
'actuality'. The Being of Dasein as possibility is to be sharply distinguished from such categories 
applicable to the present-at-hand (ibid. ) 
77 We have followed Dreyfus (among others) in translating Befindlichkeit as 'affectedness', partly 
because it retains the central 'feel ing'-connotation of the German term, and partly because it does not 
have the mentalistic overtones of the Macquarrie-Robinson translation as 'state-of-mind'. 
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The expression 'thrownness' is meant to suggest the facticity of its being delivered over. 
The 'that it is and has to be' [ ... ] 
is disclosed in Dasein's affectedness'. 
It is crucial for Heidegger's understanding of affectedness (and mood) that it reveals 
something about the world. It is not primarily given in 'reflection, but can only be 
adequately understood in ten-ns of how the world appears through it. Mood co- 
discloses the world by allowing it to 'touch' (affect) us. As such, it is beyond 
4willing' and for this reason reveals our thrownrines or facticity. Thrownness consists 
in how things already matter to me prior to any willing of mine. My abilities-to-be 
(i. e. my understanding) depend on this affective self-disclosure. We shall not analyse 
affectedness further here, since the privileged mood of anxiety will be discussed in 
some detail below. 
The third moment of the structure of being-in is designated by Heidegger as falling 
(Verfallen). This expression denotes Dasein's being absorbed (benommen) by and 
busy with the intrawordly in familiarity. Heidegger discusses two modes of falling in 
particular. Firstly, Dasein's non-self-conscious irnrnersion in the world in coping 
with the ready-to-hand; and, secondly, Dasein's choiceless 'falling in with' the 
public world and its 'norms' in everyday being-with. The first of these modes seems 
to en . oy a certain priority, since according to Heidegger, the Being of Others as i 
being-there-with is primarily and mostly disclosed through the concernful dealing 
with equipment in the work world: 'one' is what 'one' does. 78 
The moments of projection, affectedness, and falling are equiprimordial and 
in their unity constitute being-in. The detailed interpretation of this structure in terms 
of temporality in Division Two of Being and Time is beyond the purview of this 
investigation, but we may briefly indicate Heidegger's approach concerning this 
issue. Husserl had interpreted the most fundamental sense of time as 'absolute 
subjectivity', the pre-objective flow of 'consciousness' constituted by the necessary 
togetherness of the three moments of retention - primal impression (now-phase) - 
78 See e. g. BT, pp. 15-3 3- 154, and p. 16 1. 
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protention. 79 This structure is 'ecstatic' in that every phase of the 'flow' of absolute 
(pre-reflective) consciousness is essentially characterized by thus pointing back and 
pointing forward, this 'pointing' constituting necessarily the most basic self- 
givenness of pastness and futurity, according to Husserl. Heidegger, as we have seen, 
replaces Husserl's conception of intentionality as consciousness with being-in(-the- 
world). The fundamental mode of the 'givenness' (i. e. disclosedness) of the past thus 
becomes Dasein's self-disclosednes as 'determined' in thrownness (affectedness), 
while the fundamental disclosedness of the future is Dasein's unthematic being- 
ahead-of-itself in understanding, i. e. projection. Correspondingly, the 'present' 
(Husserl's 'now-phase') is disclosed first and usually in Dasein'S rendering-present 
in its concernful immersion in the world in environmental coping. 80 Hence 
Heidegger can say: 
Future, the character of having been, and the present, show the phenomenal characteristics 
of 'towards oneself, 'back to', and letting encounter'. The phenomena of 'towards... ', 
'back to... ', 'alongside... ', make temporality manifest as the E: K(TrccTtKov pure and 
simple. 81 
After these brief indications concerning Heidegger's subsequent temporal 
interpretation of the threefold structure of being-in, we return to our main theme. 
79 One is tempted to say that absolute consciousness has this structure 'at any moment', but this would 
be to interpret the primary and most fundamental sense of 'time' in terms of a secondary and 
derivative one, namely in terms the series of now-points 'in' which experiences can be situated after 
objectifying reflection and with the help of secondary memory (recollection). But absolute subjectivity 
is not given as 'in time' in this way, hence it is, in one sense, 'timeless'. See our discussion in chapter 
1, Section 3.4. 
80 Cf. Thomas Sheehan, 'Heidegger's New Aspect: On In-Sein, Zeitlichkeit, and The Genesis of Being 
and Time'. in: Research in Phenomenology 25 (1995), pp. 21 If 
81 BT, p. 376-377. 
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8. Anxiety and the Closure of Beings: 
The 'Nothingness' of Being (-in-the-World) 
The interpretation of anxiety assumes central importance in the existential analytic 
because Heidegger argues that the Being of Dasein as a structural whole can neither 
be grasped by our immanent perception of experiences - that is, reflection in 
Husserl's sense - nor can it be disclosed on the basis of our everyday environmental 
experiencing. But what reveals the Being of Dasein in its totality and brings it before 
itself in such a way that it becomes perspicuous to itself is, rather, a distinctive and 
rare attunedness called anxiety. Thus, it is in anxiety that Dasein is first disclosed to 
itself as care. To see Heidegger's point and to judge its sustainability, we shall start 
by discussing the phenomenon of anxiety - its characteristics and its effects upon 
Dasein. 
Heidegger's first statement with regard to anxiety is that it is a mode of 
affectivity and as such it is a fundamental existentiale which, seen from an ontical 
point of view, is one of the most familiar phenomena known to us as 'mood' or 
'attunement'. Considered ontologically, 'mood' is a primordial mode of Being, in 
which Dasein is disclosed to itself prior to all cognition and volition, and beyond 
their range of disclosure. This means that any possibility of encountering entities 
within-the-world is grounded upon prior disclosedness of the world which is 
constituted, in part, by one's affectedness. Letting something be encountered, as we 
have mentioned in other occasions, has not the character of staring at it, but implies a 
4 circurnspective concern'. But to be affected in any way or by anything as useful, 
unserviceable, resistant, or threatening is only possible if being-in as such has already 
been determined existentially in such a way that what it encounters within-the-world 
can 4 matter' to it, or as Heidegger says, Dasein's openness to the world is made 
essentially by the attunement of affectivity. 
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Existentially, affectivity implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can 
encounter something that matters to us. Indeed ftom the ontological point of view we must 
as a general principle leave the primary discovery of the world to 'bare mood'. 82 
Now to understand the phenomenon of anxiety and the ways in which it manifests 
itself it is crucial to reckon that states-of-mind are in general not reflected upon. 
Hence,, to have a mood is not related to the psychical, at least not in the first instance, 
nor is it 'an inner condition which then reaches forth in an enigmatical way and puts 
its mark on things and persons'. 83 The mood of anxiety, therefore, should not be 
mistaken with psychological pathos, extreme depression or any other similar state 
that might arise due to some malfunction in the brain or because one's ontic affairs 
do not proceed according to one's plans and desires. Anxiety can assail anyone and 
in any given moment for no apparent reason. Its distinguishing characteristic lies in 
this, that it refers to nothing in particular and comes ftom nowhere in the world. In a 
comparison between fear and anxiety Heidegger remarks that in fearing we fear 
something in particular and sense a menace coming from somewhere definite. But, 
when a mood such as anxiety invades us we feel threatened, but threatened by 
nothing specific, nor can we point to any definite 'place' from where it might have 
come. Indeed, that in the face of which anxiety arises is so indefinite that one feels to 
be anxious about nothing at all. 
This peculiarity by which anxiety distinguishes itself from all other moods, 84 
is also that which endows it with a devastating power -a suffocating effect that 
shatters Dasein and pushes it to the extreme limits of its Being as 'there-being' or 
'being-in-the-world'. Anxiety engulfs the whole of that structure called being-in-the- 
82 BT, pp. 176-177. 83 ibid. 
84 Some of the characteristics of anxiety - that it is not directed at any particular intrawordly entity and 
that it takes over the whole of the person - had however also been ascribed by Scheler to the (for him) 
central and contrasting 'spiritual feelings' of bliss and despair: 'The light and darkness of these 
feelings appears to bathe everything given in the inner world and the outer world in these acts. They 
"permeate" all special contents of experience. Their peculiarity can also be seen in the fact that they 
are absolute feelings that are not relative to extra-personal value-complexes or their motivating 
powers. For we cannot be in despair "over something" or blissful "over something" [... ] It can even be 
said that if this "something" is given or if it is subject to explanation, we are certainly not yet blissful 
or in despair [ ... ] either they are not experienced at all, or they take possession of the whole of our 
Being. (Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics, p. 343). 
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world. And this opens a frightening new perspective before Dasein -a horizon where 
'the "world" can offer nothing more, and neither can the Dasein-with of others". 85 In 
fact, what oppresses Dasein the most is what anxiety brings into the open as a 
palpable possibility: the possibility of the dissolution of the ready-to-hand and 
everything intrawordly into meaninglessness; the possibility of senselessness of the 
world and consequently the nothingness of Dasein's Being as being-in-the-world. If 
that which threatens one in anxiety is not an entity in the sense of some definite 
intrawordly item, then anxiety has brought everything into irrelevance by denying 
involvement to entities within-the-world and,, hence, significance to being-in-the- 
world. In anxiety, Heidegger says, 'the totality of involvements of the ready-to-hand 
and the present-at-hand discovered within-the-world, is, as such, of no consequence; 
it collapses into itself, the world has the character of completely lacking 
significance'. 86 Here, the entire web of reference and assignment, relation and 
involvement breaks down. Dasein's familiarity with the world collapses, and with it, 
the world itself sinks into nothingness; nothing matters any longer. 
Such a perspective, which in everyday concernful absorption in the world 
would be impossible to conceive, is an enduring possibility that Dasein lives through 
in the state of anxiety. Heidegger describes the effects of this phenomenon and its 
impact upon Dasein in terms of 'uncanniness'. In the state of anxiety Dasein feels 
(uncanny' (unheimlich, Nichtzuhause-sein 87 ) because, it looses its self-assured 
'tranquilized' absorption in the world of its concern. As anxiety brings about the 
collapse of everyday familiarity, a sense of loss and estrangement invades Dasein. 
The public world of the 'they' sinks away and the 'world' can no longer offer any 
comfort. In this state of 'alienation' or 'uncanniness', 'being-in' enters the existential 
mode of 'not-being-at-home' and Dasein becomes estranged and totally 
85 BT, p. 233. 
86 BT, p. 23 1. 
87 BT, p. 233. The term unheimlich is standardly used to denote a sense of threatening, uncanny, 
strangeness. One feels unheimlich alone in a forest in the dark, for example. Heidegger combines 
elements of this ordinary signification with the literal meanings of the word's semantic components, 
viz. being un-home-ly, not being at home. To some extent analogously, the English word 'uncanny' is 
derived from what is 'beyond one's ken'. 
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individualized. In Heidegger's words, 'anxiety individualizes Dasein and thus 
discloses it as "solus ipse". ' 88 
This 'existential solipsism' must not, however, be mistaken with traditional 
notions of an isolated 'subject-thing'. For in this context, the phenomenon of anxiet. N, 
far from turning Dasein into a 'worldless occurrence' it impels itto face its world (as 
world) and itself (as being-in-the-world). In other words, in anxiety, Dasein gets 
thrown back upon 'its authentic potentiality-for-being-in-the-world' . 
89 A potentiality 
which otherwise, that is, in the state of average everydayness, gets denied by 
Dasein's constant attempt to 'tum-away' or 'flee' by 'falling' into the publicness of 
the 'they'. In fact as Heidegger says, 'when Dasein "understands" uncanniness in the 
everyday manner, it does so by turning away from it in falling; in this tuming-away 
the "not-at-home" gets "dimmed down"90 and this shows phenomenally 'what 
failing, as fleeing, flees in the face of: 
It does not flee in the face of entities with in-the-world, they are precisely what it flees 
towards - as entities alongside which our concern, lost in the 'they', can dwell in 
tranquilized familiarity. When in falling we flee into the 'at-home' of publicness, we flee in 
the face of the 'not-at-home'; that is, we flee in the face of the uncanniness which lies in 
Dasein - in Dasein as thrown being-in-the-world, which has been delivered over to itself in 
its Being. 91 
Thus, it is important to note that, for Heidegger, the kind of being-in-the-world that 
is 'familiar and tranquilized' is itself a mode of Dasein's uncanniness, not the 
reverse. That is, because the mood of 'uncanniness' is one of the essential constituent 
characteristics of being-in-the-world, the feeling of 'being-not-at-home' is more 
primordial than that of 'being-at-home-in the-world'. 
There are, of course, a nurnber of questions needing to be raised at this 
juncture but the point which must be clarified at the start of our reflection is that the 
term 'nothingness'- just as the expression 'uncanniness"- refers to the nothingness of 
88 BT, p. 232. 
89 ibid. 
90 BT, p. 234. 
9' ibid. 
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being-in-the-world. In fact, the 'Nothing' in this context is not a 'pure Nothing' but 
nothing-within-the-world - Nothing that reveals itself to Dasein as being-there (in- 
the-world). This explains passages like the following: 
Anxiety 'does not know' what that in the face of which it is anxious is. 'Nowhere', 
however,, does not signify nothing: This is where any region lies, and there too lies any 
disclosedness of the world for essentially spatial being-in. Therefore that which threatens 
cannot bring itself close from a definite direction within what is close by; it is already 
'there', and yet nowhere; it is so close that it is oppressive and stifles one's breath, and yet it 
is nowhere. In that in the face of which one has anxiety, the 'it is nothing and nowhere' 
becomes manifest. The obstinacy of the 'nothing and nowhere with in-the-world' means as a 
phenomenon that the world as such is that in theface of which one has anxiety. 92 
Now we may ask why anxiety, or better, that which is revealed by anxiety (as the 
insignificance and nothingness of the world or the feeling of homelessness and 
alienation) is an intrinsic constituent of being-in-the-world? For, as we have seen, 
Heidegger argues that 'anxiousness as affectedness is a way of being-in-the-world; 
that in the face of which we have anxiety is thrown being-in-the-world; that which 
we have anxiety about is our ability-to-be-in-the-world. 93 
We have said that in anxiety the world's significance collapses and through 
this the world becomes for the first time obtrusive as world. But what exactly is 
meant by this collapse of significance? Given that Dasein is its own ability-to-be, 
which is essentially dependent on contexts of involvement constituted by structures 
of significance, does not the collapse of the latter take away Dasein's ability-to-be? 
And if so, would this not constitute the end of Dasein qua Dasein? 94 We need to 
point out, first of all, that the collapse of significance (intrawordly entities and the 
world as a whole 'taking on the character of insignificance') should not be 
understood, for example, as entities appearing separated from their in-order-to, or 
their toward-which, or their for-the-sake-of-which. Anxiety is not, in other words, the 
92 BT, p. 23 1. 93 BT, p. 235. 
94 Commentators who interpret anxiety as divesting Dasein of any ability-to-be (making it unable to 
project itself) therefore tend to identify anxiety with death. See e. g. William Blattner, Heidegger's 
Temporal Idealism, pp. 76-81. But while there is clearly an important connection for Heidegger 4= 
between anxiety and authentic being-towards-death, we cannot simply thus equate anxiety and death 
(as the impossibility to exist). 
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upsurge of 'absurdity' as illustrated by Sartre in Roquentin's experience of the root 
of the chestnut tree in his novel Nausea. In anxiety, chairs, desks, pens, or football 
pitches remain what they are. But Dasein can no longer understand itself in terms of 
any particular for-the-sake-of-which to which these items belong. Dasein is, in this 
sense, severed from its wordly possibilities: 'the "world" has nothing to offer any 
more, nor does the being-there-with of Others'. 95 But this does not take away any 
ý11 ability-to-be from Dasein. If it did, Dasein would cease to be. Rather,, Heidegger 
emphasizes that anxiety discloses me to myself as individualized pure ability-to-be: 
Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its being-towards its ownmost ability-to-be - that is, its 
being free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. 96 
It seems, then, that what anxiety conEronts me with is the nothingness of the world - 
as its 'not mattering' - and through this 'not mattering' the world itself stands out as 
world. But this cannot mean that in anxiety nothing at all matters to Dasein. What 
anxiety makes manifest to me is my non-identity with any wordly for-the-sake-of- 
which (my lacking an essentia), and the possibility of my choosing mattering. 
In order to address the questions raised by this adequately, we need to 
elucidate, first, the Being of Dasein in terms of care and understand the structure of 
the latter and, second, to consider Dasein's ability-to-be-a-whole. These discussions 
will provide us with an opportunity to consider the meaning of not-being-in-the- 
world and will permit us to see why being-in-the-world is itself the source of 
nothingness, hence anxiety. As Dasein's possibility-for-being-a-whole coincides 
with its possibility-of-not-being-in-the-world, an existential account of death will be 
the central theme of our next discussion. And because the analysis of the 
phenomenon of conscience seeks to sustain the truth of Being and Nothing in terms 
of an authentic and inauthentic understanding, we will conclude by analyzing 
Heidegger's interpretation of this phenomenon. 
95 BT, P. 23? 
96ibid. 
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9. The Question of Dasein's Totality: Being-towards-Death 
Being-in-the-world, as Heidegger constantly remarks, is a structure which is 
primordially whole. Yet, because the constitution of this structural whole and its 
everyday mode of Being is phenomenally manifold, a grasp of such totality and an 
ontologico-existential definition of it seems quite improbable, even more so because 
the whole in question is not the sum total of various constitutive elements but a 
single phenomenon: 'a single primordially unitary phenomenon which is already in 
this whole in such a way that it provides the ontological foundation for each 
structural item in its structural whole'. 97 This phenomenon which must always be 
viewed in its totality and which explains all structural aspects of Dasein's modes of 
Being is, in Heidegger's terminology, 'care' (Sorge). Care, accordingly, is a 
phenomenon that can neither be torn apart nor be derived from certain special acts or, 
be it, drives such as willing, wishing, or urge, because such phenomena are all rooted 
with ontological necessity in Dasein as care not vice versa. In other words, 
Care as primordial structural totality lies 'before' every factical 'attitude' and 'situation' of 
Dasein, and it does so existentially a priori; this means that it always lies in them. So this 
phenomenon by no means expresses a priority of the 'practical' attitude over the theoretical. 
When we ascertain something present-at-hand by merely beholding it, this activity has the 
character of care just as much as does a 'political action' or taking a rest and enjoying 
oneself. 'Theory' and 'practice' are possibilities of Being for an entity whose Being must be 
defined as 'care'. 98 
The phenomenon of care consolidates, we may say, all those earlier descriptions of 
Dasein: 'Dasein is an entity for which in its very Being, that Being is an issue', 
'Dasein is an entity whose essence is detennined by its existence', and so forth. For 
caring, considered from an ontological point of view is, in one way or another, - that 
is, from the most involved use of equipment to sheer 'disinterested' beholding - 
97 BT, p. 226. (Italics mine). 
98 BT, p. 238. 
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making Being into an issue. To make Being into an issue means in turn that Dasein, 
as long as it is, directs itself towards its ability-to-be. Thus, Heidegger says, Dasein 
is primarily being-possible; Dasein is in every case what it can be, and in the way in 
which it is its possibility. 
Of course Dasein is not something present-at-hand and its being-possible 
must therefore be distinguished both from possibility in the logical sense and from 
the contingency of things present-at-hand. For while possibility, as a category of 
presence-at-hand, denotes that which is not (yet) actual and not (at any time) 
necessary and that which it is ontologically 'on a lower level than actuality and 
necessity' 99 , possibility, as an existentiale, is the primordial characteristic of Dasein 
as existing in-the-world. Indeed, Dasein is determined in terms of possibility because 
existence means primarily ability-to-be (Seink6nnen). And because Dasein's essence 
is in part constituted by existence its determination as 'being-possible' lies in its very 
essence. This is 'a potentiality which understands and for which its own Being is an 
issue'. 100 
However,, the explication of existence in tenns of potentiality-for-being or 
ability-to-be presents a problem with regard to our possibility of grasping Dasein in 
its totality. For if Dasein's essence consists of its existence and if the latter means 
, J, ability-to-be, then as long as Dasein exists, it must - as such a potentiality - not yet be 
something. Indeed, Heidegger says, 'any entity whose essence is made up of 
existence, is essentially opposed to the possibility of our getting it in our grasp as an 
entity which is a whole". ' 01 And this means that 'in Dasein there is always something 
outstanding, which, as an ability-to-be for Dasein itself, has not yet become "actual" 
102 We may point out that the reason why Dasein cannot be ontically experienced as 
a whole and be determined ontologically in its being-a-whole is due to the peculiarity 
that lies in the Being of this entity - (Dasein is always ahead-of-itself because 'being- 
99 BT, p. 183. 
1()('BT, p. 275. 
'0' BT, p. 276. 
102 BT, p. 279. 
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ahead-of-itself is the main constitutive item in care, i. e. the Being of Dasein) - not to 
a deficiency within our cognitive faculties. But what does such a lack of totality 
signify in relation to Dasein's being-in-the-world? Does it mean that Dasein can 
never be-in-the-world in the 'full' sense of Being? Does it mean that its being-there 
will always be marked by not-being, hence incompleteness? frideed, for if the 'ahead- 
of-itself is an essential item in the structure of care, then it must be equally essential 
to the basic constitution of Dasein that in it there should constantly be something still 
unsettled. Because if Dasein were to 'exist' in such a way that nothing more was 
outstanding in it, then it would, for this very reason, 'be'-not-there. That is to say that 
the 'not-yet' is so fundamental to the Being of Dasein that, if it ever overcomes what 
is C still outstanding' in its Being, its very Being would simultaneously be annihilated 
altogether. In fact, the analysis of the Being of this entity shows that Dasein can 
never reach its 'wholeness'. For if it does so 'this gain becomes the utter loss of 
103 being-in-the-world' , in which case Dasein can never again be as the entity it is. 
But must we not in this case dismiss the question of Dasein's totality as inadequate? 
Heidegger disagrees. The question, as he maintains, should not be put aside, at least 
not before one has made sure that the presentation of the 'end' and 'totality' has been 
phenomenally appropriate to Dasein; and the analysis of 'being-ahead' and 'being- 
not-yet' has been genuinely existential. He, thus, raises the following concerns 
Has not the impossibility of getting the whole of Dasein into our grasp been inferred by an 
argument which is merely formal? Or have not at bottom inadvertently posited that Dasein 
is something present-at-hand, ahead of which something that is not yet present-at-hand is 
constantly showing itselP We must answer these questions before the problem of Dasein's 
totality can be dismissed as nugatory- 104 
To say that, 'when Dasein achieves its wholeness it loses its being-there' means 
obviously that, in gaining its totality, Dasein dies. But what is much less obvious is,, 
in Heidegger's view, our understanding of Dasein's death in a sense that is distinct 
and proper to this entity. Hence, a point that remains constant in the background of 
103 BT, p. 280. 
'04 ibid. 
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almost everything that Heidegger says throughout his analysis of death consists of a 
pronounced opposition to any understanding (religious or scientific) of dying in 
terms of a change over from Dasein to something present-at-hand or ready-to-hand. 
For Heidegger the deceased, as distinct from the dead person, is always more than a 
piece of equipment or something just present-at-hand-and-no-more. No doubt by 
dying Dasein leaves the 'world' behind and becomes 'not-being-there', but we must 
not assume for this reason that it, qua Dasein, takes over meanings alien to its 
Being. Thus, to be alongside someone who is not-in-the-world in a mode of 
respectful solicitude - as we are in the funeral rites and commemoration - should 
never be confused with a concernful being-alongside something ready-to-hand. 
Yet, the dying of others, Heidegger says, 'is not something which we 
experience in a genuine sense; at most we are always just "there alongside". 105 We 
do certainly suffer the death of others, especially loved ones, but in such suffering 
what we experience is not death but 'loss': 'Death does indeed reveal itself as a loss, 
but a loss such as is experienced by those who remain. '. 106 To think that with the 
death of others we gain an experience of dying for ourselves implies that one can 
' share' or 'participate' in someone else's death. But this idea rests upon the 
presupposition that 'any Dasein can be substituted for another at random' 107 an 
assumption that has, in turn, its basis in the everyday mode of Being where, being- 
with-one-another and sharing the 'world' is a common possibility of Dasein. But 
what may be taken for granted in Dasein's everydayness is of no use when it comes 
to accessing or sharing others' experience of dying, for there is no such possibility. 
By its very essence, death is in every case mine, in so far as it 'is' at all. And indeed death 
signifies a peculiar possibility-of-being in which the very Being of one's own Dasein is an 
The fact that, as non-existent, Dasein becomes no-more-possible suggests that if we defme Dasein's 
existence in terms of potentiality and understand the latter to be the opposite of actuality, then we may 
say that, only as dead can Dasein be actual. 
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issue. No one can take the other's dying away ftom him. Dying is something that every 
Dasein itself must take upon itself at the time. 
108 
Heidegger claims that the only adequate way of approaching and delimiting death is 
to encounter it first as a phenomenon. This can be achieved by elucidating 
phenomena that are constitutive of death, namely, the 'end' and the 'totality' that are 
within Dasein itself Accordingly, we must look for the existential meaning of 
Dasein's coming-to-an-end in Dasein and understand 'ending' as that which can 
constitute being-a-whole for the entity which exists. As we have seen, a constant 
'lack of totality' is one of the most certain factors in Dasein's Being. Phenomenally, 
this 'not-yet' belongs to Dasein as long as it is. But what concerns us now is whether 
or not this 'not-yet' should be understood as something 'still outstanding', and if so 
what could 'outstanding' mean in relation to Dasein's death? In accordance with the 
most common interpretation, the expression 'still outstanding', finds its sense in 
terms of something missing. Hence, Heidegger says, 'outstanding as missing' is 'a 
way of being missing' 109 that is grounded upon a 'belonging-to'. That is to say, 
something which belongs to an entity is not-yet together with this entity but, as soon 
as what is missing joins the entity to which it belonged originally, the 'not-yet' gets 
eliminated. Here, as we can see, there is no modification in the Being of the entitiy 
when nothing is outstanding and the entity is 'all together' or when something is 
missing in it. Can such lack-of-togetherness define the 'not-yet' which inheres to 
Dasein's existence as its possibility for dying? Surely not. For the 'togetherness' of 
Dasein - if that is to signify this entity's 'completeness' - can never be constituted by 
continuous adding up and gathering together of entities that are already ready-to- 
hand or present-at-hand within the world. Quite the contrary, in the case of Dasein, 
as soon as the 'not-yet' is filled up Dasein ceases to be all together. 'Any Dasein 
always exists in just such a manner that its "not-yet" belongs to it'. 
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G not-yet' with respect to Dasein's kind of Being is not a 'not-yet-being' which will in 
some point in time be actual, but a kind of 'not-yet' that 'is' not at all and will at no 
time 'be actual'. Hence, what is at issue here is the Being or not-Being of the "not- 
yet' which pertains to Dasein as its fundamental character. For Dasein 'must as 
itself, become - that is to say, be - what it is not-yet'. 
111 If we consider entities whose 
Being is constituted by becoming we notice that, in the case of entities other than 
Dasein, becoming denotes attainment of perfection and fulfillment. But 'even 
"unfulfilled" Dasein ends'. 112 Having said that, do we know what the 'end' means? 
'Ending' in terms of everyday usage of the word means 'stopping'. We say, 
the road stops here or the rain has stop. Of course the road does not disappear 
because it breaks off and stops here, but ending in this sense modifies that which was 
previously present-at-hand: the road is no-longer-present-at-hand because it stops 
here. Accordingly, what we mean to say in occasions like these, is that the road is no 
longer present-at-hand. Clearly, the 'end' of Dasein is not adequately understood on 
any such models taken from the domains of the present-at-hand or the ready-to-hand. 
The existential analysis of death as distinct from other possible interpretation of this 
phenomenon must seek to illuminate what lies beneath all ontical and biological 
explorations by accentuating a problematic that is ontological. Such an analysis is of 
course subject to a characterization of Dasein's basic state which in turn is 
subordinate to an ontology of life. Considering death as a phenomenon of life, the 
latter, Heidegger remarks, 'must be understood as a kind of Being to which there 
belongs a being-in-the-world'. 1 13 The term 'dying', accordingly, presents that way of 
Being in which Dasein is towards its death. However, the definition of death, as the 
end of being-in-the-world, contains no suggestion as to what comes after death. 
Heidegger never questions whether we can still live after death nor does he explores 
the possibility of being otherwise, i. e. being as no-Dasein. He says, 'our analysis of 
death remains purely "this worldly" in so far as it interprets that phenomenon merely 
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in the way in which it enters into any particular Dasein as a possibility of its 
being'. 114 In fact, Heidegger's discussion of death is founded entirely upon Dasein's 
basic state of being where death, as one of Dasein's inherent possibilities, is 
determined in terms of Dasein's being as being-towards-the-end. To define death in 
terms of Dasein's Being means to view the phenomenon in relation to the 
ontological signification of care and its fundamental characteristics which, as we 
have seen,, are: (a) existence, in the 'ahead-of-itself ; (b) facticity, in the 'being- 
already-in'; (c) falling, in the 'being-alongside'. How do Dasein's existence, facticity 
and falling reveal themselves in the phenomenon of death? 
Heidegger's first positive definition of death describes it as something 
'impending'; something that stands before us. This, he explains, means that death is 
a possibility-of-being which Dasein must take over. By thus standing before death 
Dasein also stands before its ownmost ability-to-be - an ability that makes Dasein's 
being-in-the-world into an issue. For death is the possibility of no-longer being-able- 
to-be-there. Standing before itself as this extreme possibility Dasein on the one hand 
assigns itself completely to its own ability-to-be, for this possibility is Dasein's 
ownmost and non-relational. Furthermore, the determination of Dasein's essence by 
its existence and the definition of existence in terms of an ability-to-be renders clear 
that Dasein, as long as it exists, cannot surpass the possibility of its death under any 
circumstances. Hence, Heidegger says, 'death is the possibility of the absolute 
impossibility of Dasein. 115 Now it is obvious, at least by implication, that death is not 
a kind of possibility which Dasein gradually acquires for itself during its being-in- 
the-world. Far from it, for this is a possibility into which Dasein has already been 
thrown. 
If Dasein exists, it has already been thrown into this possibility. Dasein does not, 
proximally and for the most part, have any explicit or even any theoretical knowledge of the 
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fact that it has been delivered over to its death, and that death thus belongs to being-in-the- 
world. 116 
However, Dasein flees in the face of its own death by way of falling and in this 
'failing being-alongside', as Heidegger remarks, 'fleeing from uncanniness 
announces itself. ' 17 For Dasein, despite existing at all time as a dying entity, for the 
most part prefers to cover up its being-towards-death by avoiding facing it. We may 
now see how existence, facticity and falling are defining characteristics of being- 
towards-the-end and why are they as such constitutive for the existential conception 
of death. 
Yet, if being-towards-death belongs primordially to Dasein's being then it 
must in one way or another manifest itself in everydayness. In public everydayness, 
Heidegger says, death is "known" as mishap which is constantly occurring - as a 
"case of death". ' 18 Here, death is encountered as something well-known that occurs 
within-the-world much like an event that is not yet present-at-hand for oneself. This 
is revealed in idle talk of the 'they' where death is referred to in an inconspicuous 
and evasive manner as 'one dies'. But given that the 'one' is precisely 'nobody', 
death, in everyday understanding, belongs to nobody in particular. 
Is there a way for Dasein to understand death authentically? Such an 
authentic comportment towards death would be an understanding of it which does 
not seek to evade it or cover it up, but to 'let it show itself from itself as it is'. Could 
Dasein sustain and affirm itself in such an 'authentic' being-towards-its-death? In the 
first place we must stress the fact that being-towards-death is a distinctive possibility 
of Dasein itself -a possibility of Dasein's Being. But because death as such a 
possibility is not something ready-to-hand or present-at-hand, its actualization would 
deprive Dasein of the very ground for existing. In fact, Heidegger says 'the more 
unveiledly this possibility gets understood, the more purely does understanding 
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penetrate into it as the possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all -) . 
119 if 
Dasein were to actualize its possibility for death it would have to bring about its own 
demise. Hence,, the only way in which Dasein can comport itself towards something 
possible in its possibility, i. e. its own death, is by anticipating it. This permits Dasein 
to understand its own extreme ability-to-be -a possibility in which nothing less than 
its own Being is at issue. Anticipation, furthermore allows Dasein to see the non- 
relational character of death and to confront the fact that 'death lays claims to it as an 
individual Dasein'. 120 In thus becoming face to face with its own death Dasein frees 
itself for the possibility of authentic existence. 
Anticipation discloses to existence that its uttermost possibility lies In giving itself up, and 
thus it shatters all one's tenaciousness to whatever existence one has reached. In 
anticipation, Dasein guards itself against falling back behind itself, or behind the ability-to- 
be which it has understood. 121 
By the disclosure of death as an unavoidable possibility, anticipation discloses also 
all other possibilities that lie ahead of this possibility, and thus the possibility of 
existing as a whole ability-to-be, because clearly Dasein's possibility for being-a- 
whole coincides with its possibility for being-towards-death. 
How does such an anticipatory understanding project itself upon a possibility 
which, on the one hand, is constant and certain and on the other, indefinite as to 
(when' this possibility may become possible? Heidegger's answer is that, in 
anticipating its end, Dasein understands itself as Being under a constant threat. Such 
an understanding is made possible by the attunedness of (authentic, non-covered-up) 
anxiety in which Dasein faces 'the "Nothing" of the possible impossibility of its 
existence'. 122 What precisely is the connection., in Heidegger's analysis, between 
authentic anxiety and authentic being-towards death? 
Anticipating death as one's insurpassable possibility individualizes Dasein 
radically. It does not mean to 'think about' or contemplate death, but lucidly to 
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surrender oneself or expose oneself to the threat of finally being unable-to-be, and to 
hold oneself in this as a constant threat. In anticipating death, Dasein constantly 
confronts 'the "Nothing" of the possible impossibility of existence'. 123 What makes 
this possible is the affectedness of (authentic) anxiety. For it is anxiety which 
radically individualizes Dasein in such a way that it both discloses it to itself as pure 
ability-to-be and severs it from intrawordly entities and indeed the world as a whole: 
only in anxiety is the world disclosed to Dasein as 'not what matters'. Thus, because 
anxiety grounds Dasein's self-understanding as anticipating being-towards-death, 
Heidegger can say that 'being-towards-death is essentially anxiety' . 
124 MI-Sj, 
according to Heidegger, is an 'impassioned freedom towards-death -a freedom that 
has been released from the illusion of the "they", and which is factical, certain of 
itself, and anxious'. 
125 
10. The Call to Nichdgkeit 
Does this authentic ability-to-be have any factical support? Does such an ontological 
possibility have also an ontical basis? For after all each Dasein always exists 
factically. In view of this, Heidegger says, 
This existentially 'possible' being-towards-death remains, from the existentiell point of 
view, a fantastical exaction. The fact that an authentic ability-to-be is ontologically possible 
for Dasein, signifies nothing, so long as a corresponding ontical ability-to-be has not been 
demonstrated in Dasein itself. 126 
Heidegger wants to show that Dasein not only throws itself factically into such a 
being-towards-death but that it - by reason of its own Being - even demands an 
authentic ability-to-be determined by anticipation. Dasein, as absorbed in public 
everydayness and lost in the 'they' is, for the most part, immersed in an inauthentic 
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mode of Being. To emerge from inauthenticity, Dasein in the first instance must 
rescue itself by finding itself and by bringing it back to itself. But in order to do so 
Dasein needs to have this ability attested, in other words, it needs to see itself in its 
possible authenticity. This ability, Heidegger claims, is attested by the phenomenon 
of 'conscience' which reveals itself as a call (Ruj) - as the voice of conscience. 
Conscience, as a phenomenon of Dasein, discloses by giving 'something' to 
understand. Indeed, the call of conscience much like an appeal calls Dasein to its 
proper possibility-for-being-its-self by summoning it to its 'being-guilty'. In 
'hearing' the call Dasein, Heidegger says, understands the appeal as its wanting to 
have a conscience. Of course Dasein, as a 'being-with' who has lost itself in the 
publicness, is more inclined to listen to the idle talk of the 'they' than hearing this 
voice. But because Dasein is capable of listening it can be brought back to itself if 
the possibility of another kind of hearing interrupts its listening-away. This 
possibility, which must be given by Dasein itself and which 'lies in its being 
appealed to without mediation' 127 , 
is no other than the call of conscience. Hence, &in 
the tendency to disclosure which belongs to the call, lies the momentum of ajolt - of 
a violent shaking up. The call is from afar unto afar. It reaches him who wants to be 
brought back'. 128 
The call has a clear direction: it directs itself towards Dasein's self. But the 
self to which Dasein gets called is not, according to Heidegger's analysis, 'an 
66object"' on which to pass judgment', nor is it that self which 'inertly dissects its 
"inner life" with fussy curiosity', nor the self that one has in mind when 'one gazes 
44analytically" at psychical conditions and what lies behind them'. 129The call appeals 
only to that self which is in no other manner than 'outside itself , that is, 
transcendence as being- in-the-world. In thus appealing the call discloses Dasein to 
itself by passing over the 'they' and dispersing it in such way that the 'they' 
collapses into insignificance. The call of conscience maintains itself always in an 
127 BT, p. 316. 
128 ibid. 
129 BT, p. 318. 
117 
inconspicuous indefiniteness. It is audible yet silent, for it is a discourse without 
words or utterance -a silent discourse that talks about Nothing. 
The call asserts nothing, gives no information about world-events, has nothing to tell. 
'Nothing' gets called to this self, but it has been summoned to itself - that is, to its ownmost 
ability-to-be. 130 
But who does the calling? What kind of connection is there between the caller and 
the called? And how is their relationship determined ontologically? Considering the 
characteristics of the call, the question seems at first an un-answerable one. In fact, 
Heidegger states that 
If the caller is asked about its name, status, origin, or repute, it not only refuses to answer, 
but does not even leave the slightest possibility of one's making it into something with 
which one can be familiar when one's understanding of Dasein has a 'worldly' 
orientation. 131 
If, however, it is quite inappropriate to raise existentiell questions with regard to 
what factually the caller is or might be, it is perfectly fair to pursue an existential 
enquiry regarding the facticity of the calling and the existentiality of the hearing. The 
fact that what the caller is cannot be known in a definite manner does not mean that 
the caller is just nothing or is of no importance. On the contrary, Heidegger maintains 
that, not letting itself to be known and talked about are positive characteristics of this 
phenomenon -a phenomenon that maintains itself constantly in a peculiar 
indefiniteness, for all determinations go against its kind of Being. 
It might help us to come a step closer to the caller if we turn our attention for 
a moment from the question of 'who does the calling' to the question 'where does 
the call come from'. The voice of conscience, as it is known, is not something which 
we ever expect or are prepared for in advance. Nor is it planned intentionally by us 
and perfon-ned with our agreement. When the call comes it rather comes 
unexpectedly. without warning and 'even against our will'. Having said that, the call 
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does not come from someone else who is there with me but from me and yet from 
'beyond me' qua public self (man selbst). 132 
But should we, on the basis of such phenomenal data, interpret the voice of 
conscience as an alien power that holds Dasein under its control and domination? 
Certainly not, for this would imply that there is a being who is in the possession of 
such power and that it is this very power that makes itself known (as being God, for 
instance). Of course, from Heidegger's point of view, the point here lies not in 
whether one finds in God a convincing explanation for the call of conscience or 
whether one is inclined to explain it biologically, but in seeing that these seemingly 
different approaches in terms of something's Being or not-Being present-at-hand are 
totally inadequate modes of conceiving the kind of Being that characterizes the 
caller: 
[T]hese explanations are procedures that are facilitated by the unexpressed but ontologically 
dogmatic guiding thesis that what is must be present-at-hand, and that what does not let 
itself be objectively demonstrated as present-at-hand, just is not at all'. 133 
The fact that the call is not performed by me should not lead us to the conclusion that 
the caller must be sought in an entity other than Dasein. For the only kind of being 
that can provide us with a clue to interpreting the Being of the 'it' which does the 
calling is Dasein and its existential constitution - that is, Dasein in its facticity as 
thrown being-in-the-world. To be sure, thrownriess is a 'fact' that determines Dasein 
as an entity that has to be as it is and as it can be. But Dasein's facticity, its that-it-is, 
is essentially other than the factuality of something present-at-hand. For Dasein does 
not encounter itself as something occurring in nature, something present-at-hand 
within-the-world nor is the 'thrownness' an inaccessible characteristic of Dasein and 
therefore an unimportant feature in its constitution. Thrownriess, despite being often 
covered up, belongs to the disclosedness of the 'there' and reveals itself constantly in 
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Dasein's current affectedness. But Dasein as we discussed earlier chooses to flee in 
the face of its thrownness thus revealed to it in the mood of anxiety. We have 
described this fleeing as a flight in the face of the uncanniness which individualizes 
Dasein and brings its being-in-the-world face to face with the 'Nothing' of the world. 
The call, however, discourses in the uncanny mode of keeping silent because 
uncanniness, despite being covered up by the 'they', is the most fundamental kind of 
being-in-the-world. Thus Heidegger says 
In its 'who', the caller is definable in a 'worldly' way by nothing at all. The caller is 
unfamiliar to the everyday they-self-, it is something like an alien voice. What could be more 
alien to the 'they', lost in the manifold 'world' of its concern, than the self which has been 
individualized down to itself in uncanniness and been thrown into the 'Nothing'? 134 
But what if, Heidegger now asks, this Dasein who in facing up to Nothing is anxious 
with anxiety about its ability-to-be and who is holding to itself in the very depths of 
its uncanniness should be the caller of the voice of conscience? Indeed, we must not 
look else where or resort to powers other than Dasein for this would result not in 
clarifying the uncanniness of the call but rather in its annihilation. Dasein is at the 
same time both the caller and the called. For,, the call of conscience or conscience 
itself is possible only on the basis of Dasein's Being as care. 
Conscience manifests itself as the call of care. The caller is Dasein, which, in its thrownness 
(in its being-already-in), is anxious about its ability-to-be. 135 
In order to characterize what is attested by the conscience we must determine the 
character of hearing that accords genuinely with the voice of conscience. The call, 
Heidegger maintains, is genuinely heard by authentic understanding. The question, 
therefore, is to define what it is that which is said or implied when the appeal is thus 
understood. Earlier we said that the call 'says' nothing in terms of the 'they" and 
gives nothing to be talked about, for it is but the reticent voice of conscience that 
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comes forth from the uncannines of thrown individualization. However , in 
hearing 
the voice we have been given something to understand - something that we are 
compelled to interpret in one way or other. In fact, all experiences and interpretations 
of conscience, as Heidegger remarks, 'are at one in that they make the "voice" of 
conscience speak somehow Of (. (gUilt,,. 136 
The call either addresses Dasein as 'guilty', or refers to a possible (guilt' - (conscience 
gives warning) - or affirms, as a good conscience, that one is 'conscious of no guilt'. 
Whatever the ways in which conscience is experienced or interpreted, all our experiences 
(agree' on this 'guilty'! 137 
As one may expect, Heidegger's interpretation of conscience and what the call 
discloses as 'guilt' have very little in common with the normally understood meaning 
of these phenomena. However, starting the investigation with what the everyday 
interpretation of Dasein says about guilt, Heidegger refers to several 'vulgar' senses 
of this phenomenon. 
In the first place, 'being-guilty' means to 'owe' something or 'have 
something due on account'. This sense of 'being-guilty', which is analogous to 
'having-debts', is a mode of Being with others that arises in the context of our daily 
relationship with each another - that is, 'in the field of concern'. In these contexts 
being-guilty denotes a kind of lack which is due to a failure to satisfy a certain 
demand or requirement which applies to one's existent being with others. Formally 
speaking, being-guilty here means, 'being-the-basis for a lack of something in the 
Dasein of another'. 138 But because being-guilty in the sense of breaking a 
requirement or a law - or being-guilty as 'having debts' and as 'having responsibility 
for'- are ways in which Dasein is, the phenomenon of guilt must, in Heidegger view, 
be conceived more fundamentally on the basis of Dasein's Being, rather than in 
relation to ways in which Dasein may or may not happen to behave. In other words, 
one is not guilty because one has done something, has for instance, broken the law or 
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harmed someone else. Rather, one is guilty on the basis of what or who one is - that 
is, on the basis of one's own Being. Accordingly, a genuine analysis of the 
phenomenon of guilt must be carried out without taking into account Dasein"s 
concemful being with others - hence, without a connection to any notion of law, duty 
or compassion. 
The idea of 'guilty! ' must be sufficiently formalized so that those ordinary phenomena of 
(guilt' which are related to our concernful being with others, will drop out. The idea of guilt 
must not only be raised above the domain of that concern in which we reckon things up, but 
it also be detached from relationship to any law or 'ought' such that by failing to comply 
with it one loads himself with guilt. 139 
This makes it clear that all understandings of guilt and interpretations of conscience 
on 'ethical' grounds are irrelevant to an authentic understanding of guilt as what the 
call of conscience calls towards. Of course, there are no explicit discussions of 
Aristotelian ethics or Kantian morality in Being and Time, but everything that 
Heidegger says in relation to the ground of guilt contains an implicit criticism of 
traditional (religious and philosophical) interpretations of this phenomenon. 140 In a 
wider sense, the basis for this rejection lies in the tradition's approach to ontology 
and its unilateral interpretation of Being as being-present-at-hand, and consequently 
the 'not' as not-being-present-at-hand. In relation to the meaning of guilt, for 
instance,, Heidegger says, 'ontology came across the 'not' and made use of it. But is 
it so obvious that every 'not' signifies something negative in the sense of a lack? ' 141 
To interpret the burden of guilt in terms of a failure to respect the law or an 'ought' 
means to define 'guilt' as a lack, as something that is missing. A lack - as the not- 
being-present-at-hand of that which ought to be - means a distinct kind of Being that 
is proper to the present-at-hand. Now the 'guilty' is certainly something that can 
apply to existence. But can something be missing occasionally from Dasein's 
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essence - something that is not yet present-at-hand but could eventually be brought 
back and added to it, as if existence was something present-at-hand? 
Has anyone ever made a problem of the ontological source of notness (Nichtheit), or, prior 
to that, even sought the mere conditions on the basis of which the problem of the 'not' 
(Nicht) and its notness and the possibility of that notness can be raised? And how else are 
these conditions to be found except by taking the meaning of Being in general as a theme 
and clarifying it? 
142 
Admittedly, the idea of 'guilty' still implies something like the 'not'. But given that 
the 'not' which lies in the concept of guilt has no relation to being-present-at-hand, 
but to existence, any account of it requires an existential understanding wherein its 
character can be conceived as a 'not' other than a 'privativum' or a 'negation'. This 
means that the idea of 'guilty' should be defined as 'as being-the-basis of a notness' - 
that is, 'being-the-basis for a Being which has been defined by a "not". ' 143 Now to 
see how Heidegger intends to exhibit something like this in Dasein's Being and 
argue for its existential possibility we need to remind ourselves of care and its 
constitutive moments - that is, facticity (thrownness), existence (projection) and 
falling. 
'Facticity' denotes Dasein's thrownness in the world and emphasises the fact 
that Dasein is an entity that has been thrown and brought into its 'there' not of its 
own will or agreement. The fact that Dasein is not its own ground, but must stand on 
a basis which it has not laid for itself, means that Dasein is this thrown basis. 
Therefore, this 'being-a-basis' stands for not having any control, any power over 
one Is own self or one's Being from the ground up. Here, the meaning of the 'not' has 
no relation to 'not-being-present-at-hand' for it is a 'not' that belongs to Dasein's 
Being and it is as such constitutive of its thrownness: 'This "not" belongs to the 
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strictly false, tends to disguise this close connection between nicht and Nichtigkeit. 
144 BE p. 330. 
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In being its seýf, Dasein is, as a self, the entity that has been thrown. It has been released 
from its basis, not through itself but to itself, so as to be as this basis. Dasein is not itself the 
basis of its Being, in as much as this basis first arises from its own projection; rather, as 
being-its-self, it is the Being of its basis. 145 
However, because Dasein is no less an existing being than it is a thrown one, it can 
and must project itself upon possibilities into which it has been thrown. This means 
that, Dasein despite the impossibility of ever getting this basis into its own hands - as 
it were - must, as existing, take over its being-a-basis. Hence Heidegger says, 'to be 
its own thrown basis is that ability-to-be which is the issue for care'. 146 To say that 
Dasein is its basis existentially means that Dasein relates to itself in terms of 
possibilities. Having said that, as thrown into its 'there' Dasein cannot keep pace 
with its possibilities, for it exists not before its basis but as this basis. In fact, the 
projection is not only determined by the notness of being-a-basis, but as projection it 
is itself essentially not. In other words, in the structure of projection (existence), as in 
that of thrownness (facticity), there lies essentially a notness. This notness constitutes 
Dasein's Being free for its existentiell possibilities and characterizes it as an entity 
that has to choose: 
Freedom, however, is only in the choice of one possibility - that is, in tolerating one's not 
having chosen the others and one's not being able to choose them. 147 
Does this mean that 'notness' applies equally to care? Is care too in its essence a 
notness? Indeed, Heidegger says, 'care is permeated with notness through and 
, 148 through . 
This shows the extent in which the existential notness as the ground of 
guilt is different from privation and lack which arises in Dasein by failing to attain 
certain goals and ideals that it may have set up for itself For, if we recall the 
definition of guilt as being-the-basis of a notness, we see that it is on this null basis 
145 ibid. 
146 BT, p. 329. 
147 BT, p. 313 ) 148 ibid. 
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that Dasein as such is guilty. That is to say, Dasein is already 'not' in its being as 
projection; it is 'not' before committing itself to an ideal and before undertaking any 
specific project where it might or might not fail to attain. Hence, Heidegger says 
This essential being-guilty is, equiprimordially, the existential condition for the possibility 
of the 'morally' good and for that of the 'morally' evil - that is, for morality in general and 
for the possible forms which this may take factically. The primordial 'being-guilty' cannot 
be defined by morality, since morality already presupposes it for itself. 149 
Being-guilty, in this primordial sense, reveals itself to Dasein in the experience of 
uncanniness. Indeed, in uncanniness Dasein is joined with itself primordially and 
faces its notness as the possibility of its ownmost ability-to-be. And this is precisely 
what the call - as the call of care - gives us to understand: the call summons Dasein 
to being-guilty on the basis of its owmnost being-a-notness. 
This calling-back in which conscience calls forth, gives Dasein to understand that Dasein 
itself - the null basis for its null projection, standing in the possibility of its Being - is to 
bring itself back to itself from its lostness in the 'they'; and this means that it is guilty. 150 
When Dasein understands itself aright - that is, when it hears the call of conscience 
authentically - it becomes free for choosing itself over above the they-self and this 
signifies that Dasein has chosen to have conscience and be-guilty authentically. Thus 
wanting to have conscience characterizes the authentic understanding of the call 
which discloses Dasein's Being in the uncanniness of its individualization. 
The disclosedness of Dasein wanting to have conscience is thus constituted by the 
affectedness of anxiety, by understanding as the projection of oneself upon one's owninost 
being-guilty, and by discourse as reticence. 151 
Ultimately it seems, then, that anxiety, anticipating death, and hearing the call of 
conscience are structural moments of a unitary phenomenon which Heidegger 
149 BT, p. 332. 
150 
ibid. 
15 1 BT, p. 3343. 
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designates as authentic existence or Entschlossenheit (resolvedness). Hearing the call 
means transparently understanding oneself in terms of the twofold fmitude or 
4notness' of having to choose and of being thrown (not being causa sui). We might 
say that such self-understanding constitutes the authentic past and the authentic 
present. Anticipating death is the third, futural, dimension of authentic temporality: 
Dasein'S holding itself in the 'not' of the constant threat of its own impossibility-to 
be. What underlies and makes possible such authentic understanding of the three 
temporal ecstases is anxiety, in which the world as a whole sinks into nothingness for 
Dasein - it ceases to matter - and Dasein comes to see itself as pure ability-to-be 
that is not defined by anything wordly. Only through anxiety does Dasein in this 
specific sense become able to sever itself from the world (while yet necessarily 
remaining being-in-the-world) and to choose itself in its own notness. We may 
therefore conclude that 'authentic existence'. for Heidegger, is in each of its 
structural moments defined as a disclosure of, and conftontation with, Nothing. In so 
far as authenticity qua Entschlossenheit is the un-covered-up truth/Being of 
Dasein 152 - for Dasein is revealed in it 'from itself and as it is' - it follows that the 
Being of Dasein is essentially pervaded by Nothing. We shall consider the possible 
implications of this for 'Being as such' below. 
The aim and the guiding thread throughout our analysis of Dasein was to 
build a basis that could sustain and help us to take the question of Being and its 
relation to Nothing further. To this end a detailed discussion of the constitution of 
Dasein proved to be necessary, for 'Nothing', as we have seen, announced itself at 
the heart of being-there. 
112 ibid. 
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11. Being without Meaning 
In this Section, we shall attempt to draw together some of the results of our foregoing 
interpretation of Heidegger's existential analytic. Heidegger attempts to pose the 
question of Being via an analysis of a privileged entity, namely Dasein. Its privilege 
consists in the fact that unlike other entities it has an understanding of Being, which 
means that it comports itself towards it. (In Husserl's language, it 'intentionally 
directs' itself towards Being, although for the most part not thematically). It emerged 
that the Being of this entity cannot be brought into an explicit understanding without 
including in the analysis two other kinds of entities, namely equipment and occurrent 
objects. The modes of Being of these entities are not directly equiprimordial, 
however, for it turned out that the Being of objects - presence at hand - which had 
provided the paradigm for all previous ontological approaches, is in fact derivative, 
being founded on readiness-to-hand. Hence the latter is analysed in much greater 
detail by Heidegger than presence-at-hand. But equipmentality or readiness-to-hand 
is a mode of Being which is only possible, it would seem, as one structural moment 
in the complex structure which is the Being of Dasein. Only if there is a being such 
as Dasein can there be equipment and, more generally, environment. But if presence- 
at-hand is founded in readiness-to-hand, as Heidegger clearly suggests, this would 
seem to imply that only if there is Dasein can there be any entity which has the mode 
of Being of an object. This means that of the three fundamental modes of Being 
discussed by Heidegger in Being and Time, namely (1) Dasein (existence), (2) 
readiness-to-hand, and (3) presence-at-hand, the last two are dependent on Dasein, 
just as Dasein is dependent on them, i. e. they are in this sense 'co-original', although, 
as we saw, there is an asymmetry between readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand. 
But if this is the case, we are tempted to ask: has Heidegger made only a beginning in 
Being and Time, by exploring the Being of Dasein, or has he in fact achieved, at least 
in basic outline, what was the stated overall aim of his ontological enquiry: to raise 
the question of Being in general. The answer to our question clearly depends at least 
in part on whether the modes of Being thernatized in Being and Time are intended to 
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be exhaustive - whether they are all the modes of Being there are. There are some 
reasons to doubt this. We saw, for example, that the mode of Being of aesthetic 
'objects' does not really fit into any of the three kinds discussed and that Heidegger 
seems to be aware of this. ' 
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But if we confine ourselves to the Being of the kinds of entities discussed, is 
it really true that they can only 'be' if there is Dasein? Dasein is of course being-in- 
the-world as care, and care consists in 'things' meaning something to Dasein 
('meaning' here includes being boring, being irrelevant, etc). Our question can 
therefore also be formulated as: can there be no Being without meaning? The 
question has provoked some debate in the literature on Heidegger, partly because of 
Heidegger's Delphic response to it: 
[A]I1 the modes of Being of entities within the world are founded ontologically [... ] upon 
the phenomenon of being-in-the-world. [ ... ] Of course only as long as Dasein is (that is, 
only as long as an understanding of Being is ontically possible), 'is there' Being. When 
Dasein does not exist, 'independence' 'is' not either, nor 'is' the 'in itself. In such a case 
this sort of thing can be neither understood nor not understood. [ ... ] In such a case it cannot be said that entities are, nor can it be said that they are not. But now, as long as there is an 
understanding of Being and therefore an understanding of presence-at-hand, it can indeed be 
said that in this case entities will still continue to be. As we have noted, Being (not entities) 
is dependent upon the understanding of Being; 154 
Being 'is' only as long as Dasein is, but entities can continue to 'be' even when 
Dasein does not exist! How are we to understand this? There is a temptation to 
conclude from this that Heidegger cannot mean by 'Being' that which determines 
how entities are, but only how and as what they are intelligible. Heidegger simply 
defines Being as meaning or intelligibility. 155 But this view is difficult to accept. 
There are innumerable passages in both the early and the late writings which show 
very clearly that he thinks of Being as that which detennines how beings are. So if 
his conclusion in Being and Time is that there is no Being without understanding of 
153 BT, p. 100. 
154 BT, pp. 254-255. 
155 This highly problematic view is especially associated with Hubert Dreyfus. See his Being-in-the- 
World, pp. 10-11 and pp. 254-257. For one critique of it, see William Blattner, Heidegger's 
Temporal Idealism, pp. 238f 
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Being, then this is not merely the trivial outcome of a definition of Being as 
'intelligibility,. What he seems to be saying in the above passage is rather this. It is 
part of what we mean by presence-at-hand that the present-at-hand can be even 
without Dasein 'being around'. In fact, even a transcendental idealist like Kant 
would agree with this. When and where there are no 'subjects', there are still objects. 
namely as possibilities of perception. In this sense, even an unperceived star in the 
most distant galaxy still 'is', for Kant. Heidegger in the last two lines of our 
quotation therefore says only what most people, including Kantian transcendental 
idealists, would accept. But all of this is only true as long as we have not 
ontologically interrogated the Being of presence-at-hand as such. (In Kantian 
language, it is true from the 'empirical' standpoint, but not from the transcendental 
one. ) But if we raise the fundamental ontological question (which is alien to the 
empirical standpoint of science) about what makes possible presence-at-hand in the 
first place, we find that the Being of something as a present-at-hand 'possibility of 
perception' (for example) is itself only possible if there is Dasein. At this 
fundamental ontological level. of questioning, everything is and is as it is (in its mode 
of Being) only if and in so far as there is Dasein. The question of Being can therefore 
not be raised without reference to an understanding of Being. For the Heidegger of 
Being and Time, therefore, Being is 'meaning', we might say, but not simply because 
it has been defined in this way. And 'meaning' itself here has to be interpreted in a 
very wide sense indeed, which includes the essentially enigmatic. 
In History of the Concept of Time, Heidegger interpreted Husserl's first sense 
of truth as the fundamental one (relatively speaking, i. e. within the Husserlian 
framework of enquiry): the performance of the identifying act in which the identity 
of what was emptily intended and what is subsequently intuited is experienced. 
Heidegger paraphrased this sense of truth as 'living in the truth' or being-in-truth. In 
Being and Time, being-in-truth is grasped, more fundamentally, as the disclosedness 
of Dasein itself in which all discovering of entities and 'states of affairs I is founded. 
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Being 'is' only where Dasein is in its there. Thus, being-in-truth is, at the most 
fundamental level, the disclosedness of Dasein as care: 
In so far as Dasein is its disclosedness essentially, and discloses and uncovers as something 
disclosed to this extent it is essentially 'true'. Dasein is 'in the truth'. 156 
But since falling belongs essentially to Dasein's mode of Being, and in falling 
entities and modes of Being take on the character of semblance, it belongs to the 
disclosedness of Dasein that it is also closed off to itself and that entities are covered 
up (hidden or disguised). Thus, in another sense of 'truth' (as that which is not 
semblance) Dasein is equiprimordially 'in the untruth'. Clearly, in this sense of truth, 
Dasein is in the truth only in so far as it is authentically disclosed to itself as being- 
in-the-world. Hence Heidegger says: 
[W]e have interpreted disclosedness [Erschlossenheit] existentially as the primordial truth. 
Such truth is primarily not a quality of 'judgement' nor of any definite comportment, but 
something essentially constitutive of being-in-the-world as such. [... ] In resolvedness 
[Enischlossenheit] we have now arrived at that truth of Dasein which is most primordial 
because it is authentic. 157 
What makes possible this 'most primordial truth' is the confrontation with 
nothingness in authentic resolvedness. This con-Erontation has its essential condition, 
as we saw, in the attunedness of anxiety. Being is thus revealed most genuinely 
('authentically') in the irruption of nothingness into (and as) being-in-the-world. This 
interpretation seems to us to be confirmed by Heidegger's elaboration of the question 
of Nothing in his inaugural lecture of 1929, 'What is Metaphysics'. Here he is 
explicit on some of the issues and connections which were only adumbrated in Being 
and Time: 
156 BT, p. 26-3). 
157 BT, p. 343. 
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[ ... ] the Nothing reveals itself in and through anxiety, although, to repeat, not in such a way 
that the Nothing becomes manifest in our malaise quite apart from beings as a whole. 
Rather, we said that in anxiety the Nothing is encountered at one with beings as a whole. 158 
The Nothing does not remain the indeterminate opposite of beings but reveals itself as 
belonging to the Being of beings. 'Pure Being and pure Nothing are therefore the same". 
This proposition of Hegel's [ ... ] is correct. Being and Nothing do belong together [ ... ] because Being itself is essentially finite and reveals itself only in the transcendence of 
Dasein which is held out into the Nothing. 159 
Nothing is an essential 'moment' of Being, although not one that is or could ever be, 
in Hegelian fashion, 'sublated'. This is because Nothing is primordially not an object 
of thought at all - hence its neglect by the ontological tradition which conceived of 
Being as the Being of objects (whether ideal or 'real'). We shall examine the nature 
of this occlusion of nothingness by the metaphysical tradition in more detail in the 
next chapter. 
12. Concluding Remarks 
It has emerged from our investigations in this chapter that the question of 'who man 
is' is most intimately bound up with the question of the essence of Being. The human 
being, as Heidegger says in later writings, should be understood 'within the question 
of Being', where 'the human essence is to be grasped and grounded, according to the 
concealed directive of the inception, as the site the Being necessitates for its opening 
up ). 160 To be sure the connection between Being and being-there, or Dasein, is such 
that the perspective of the enquiry oscillates necessarily from one pole to the other. 
This oscillation however,, has often been overlooked and has - in the light of 
Heidegger's later enquiries - been interpreted as a 'turning' (Kehre) or a shift from 
Dasein to Being or more generally from the Being of entities to Being as such. But 
the later emphasis on the question of Being as such is, in our view, a progression 
presupposing the fulfillment of the project set at the very start of Heidegger's enquiry 
158 Martin Heidegger, 'What is Metaphysics', in: Basic Writings, p. 102. (Henceforth cited as WM. ) 
159 WM, p. 108. 
160 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Al'etaphysics. trans. by R. Polt and G. Fried; (New Haven: Yale 
University Press , 2000), p. 
219. 
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into the meaning of Being. As all Heidegger's early texts testify, the question for 
Heidegger has always been about 'Being'. Thus the privilege that has been given to 
the exploration of human Being in Heidegger's early texts such as Being and Time 
must be viewed as a way towards the question of Being as such. 
In any case, judging that the analysis of Dasein as being-in-the-world 
provides a sufficient basis to understand the Being of man, we consider the 
existential analytic of Dasein as the first phase of the enquiry into the question of 
Being as such. Having said this, the expression 'first' here must not be interpreted in 
the sense of loundation% 'ground' or 'beginning'. Indeed, to conceive of an entity 
such as Dasein as the foundation of that which is not an entity at all (Being as such) 
would be a gross misunderstanding. For in order for man to be as a being and be who 
or what it is, the beginning must have already taken place. In other words, Dasein's 
facticity is such that, as an entity that is, it can only be a 'thrown-being-in-the- 
world'. In the 'Letter on Humanism' - as in many other writings - Heidegger 
addresses this problem and attempts to clarify a confusion that might have arisen 
regarding his early and later positions vis-a-vis the question of Being. He asks: 'but 
does not Being and Time say, "only so long as Dasein is is there Being"'? To be sure. 
It means that only so long as the clearing of Being propriates does Being convey 
itself to man. But the fact that the Da, the clearing as the truth of Being itself, 
propriates is the dispensation of Being itself. This is the destiny of the clearing. 
[ ]The sentence does not say that Being is a the product of man. The "Introduction" 
to Being and Time says simply and clearly, even in italics, "Being is the transcendens 
pure and simple". ' 
161 
161 Martin Heidegger, 'Letter on Humanism', in: Basic Writings, p. 240 
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Chapter III 
Nothing and the Question of 'Being as such' 
In Being and Time, Heidegger's analysis of an entity who questions Being concluded, 
one might say, that man's fundamental source of 'knowledge' lies not in reason but 
in the affectedness of 'mood'. It is in anxiety that man is first transparently disclosed 
to himself as being-in-the-world - as Dasein. And it is here that he 'discovers' 
something essential about his existence as a whole: That he is-toward death and as 
existing in-the-world is constantly dying; and that he is compelled to face up to the 
finitude of his very Being and the nothingness of his existence. Anxiety, accordingly, 
unveils the notness that determines Dasein in its ground and brings man to see that 
his Being hangs onto Nothing. 
1. Stepping Back from the Omission of Nothing 
In his inaugural lecture of 1929, 'What is MetaphysicsT, the question of Nothing, 
which was more alluded to and raised indirectly than actually elaborated per se in 
Being and Time, is finally addressed explicitly. Nevertheless, as we shall see, the 
discussion of it here always refers back to the results of the existential analytic of 
Being and Time and hence essentially presupposes them. 
In 'What is MetaphysicsT, Heidegger asks: if Nothing has such a pivotal 
role in determination of the Being of entities then should it not be viewed by 
metaphysics with the same care and attention that is accprded by it to beings (as a 
whole)? And should not science, whose theories today seem to dictate the meaning 
of existence, of life and Being in general, occupy itself with Nothing which, after all, 
pervades the who of the questioner. of the scientist? Yet Heidegger observes that 
science wishes to know nothing of Nothing. This occlusion goes hand in hand with 
the essential characteristic of metaphysics, namely its exclusive concern with the 
interpretation of the essentia or whatness of beings as a whole and its neglect of the 
13 3 
question of Being. In fact, metaphysics is just as much, and for related 'reasons'. the 
forgetfulness of Being as it is the neglect of Nothing. It is precisely these 
interconnected omissions which characterize the history of metaphysics as the history 
of nihilism. For nihilism, as understood by Heidegger, does not consist in an 
excessive preoccupation with Nothing, but on the contrary in banishing and ignoring 
that which stands for the unaccountable essence of man and Being: Nothing. 
To go expressly up to the limit of Nothing in the question about Being, and to take Nothing 
into the question of Being - this is the first and only fruitful step toward the true overcoming 
of nihilism. I 
LI Nothing as Not-Being and Negation 
It is, however, doubtful whether metaphysics and its traditional method of 
questioning, which seeks for generic qualities or properties that constitute what 
beings in their totality are, can address the question of Nothing without turning it into 
something and thus passing it by. For in order to ask 'what is Nothing? ' metaphysics 
must posit Nothing in advance as an object of reference. This objectification 
obviously makes Nothing into a being and thus the question subverts itself It follows 
from this that 'thinking', that is, predicative judgement, cannot capture Nothing. 
Nothing cannot be made into the logical subject of a proposition without eluding our 
grasp. The recognition of this leads to a second approach, which has indeed been the 
dominant one in the tradition. This is the determination of Nothing as negation. Here 
beings as a whole are our 'logical subject' and we negate them in their totality: we 
entertain the thought that 'they are not'. But is Nothing a mere counter-concept or 
contrarium to Being (as understood by metaphysics, i. e. the totality of entities in 
regard to having some whatness or other) - that is, its negation or privation? Is 
Nothing, for instance. as Aristotelian metaphysics believed, a non-being in the sense 
of unformed prime matter that - unlike beings which partake in is unable to 
Martin Heideg er: Introduction to Metaphysics; Trans. by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt, (New "g 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 217-218. (This new translation henceforth cited as IM). 
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take on a form and therefore have an outward appearance? Or, again, is Nothing the 
complete absence (lack) of beings apart from God who - as Christian dogma assumes 
- is the sole proper being in the sense of the 'absolute' actus purus that excludes all 
potentiality and nothingness? What if Nothing turns out to be the origin of negation? 
What if Nothing could be shown to be primordial with respect to negation? Would 
not, in this case, the very possibility of negation, as an act of reason or the logical 
intellect, be dependent upon a more original revelation of Nothing? 
In order to find something, Heidegger remarks, we must in someway already 
'know' that it is there: 'At first and for the most part man can seek only when he has 
anticipated the being at hand of what he is looking for'. 2 Thus it seems that in our 
search for Nothing we are guided by a certain anticipation whereby we are somehow 
aware of Nothing, though in a very rough manner. This means that, just as and 
because there is a certain pre-understanding of Being, there is also an awareness of 
Nothing, even if common parlance and understanding may interpret it as mere 
negation. Even this common understanding of Nothing points to the direction from 
which alone Nothing can be disclosed, nwnely: Being. That is to say, to understand 
Nothing as the complete negation of the totality of beings, as the tradition has 
predominantly done where it has concerned itself with Nothing at all, beings as a 
whole must be given in advance in order for them to be negated subsequently. But 
how can Dasein, who is essentially finite, encompass the totality of beings in order 
then to negate it? One can, no doubt - Heidegger says - 'think the whole of beings in 
an "idea" - presumably in the Kantian sense - then negate what one has thus 
imagined in one's thought, and thus "think" it negated'. 3 But just as the affinuative 
judgement cannot be the origin of our understanding of the 'that it is', but rather 
presupposes such an understanding, so the negative judgment cannot be our most 
fundamental exposure to the 'not, but presupposes a more original encounter with it: 
2 WM, p. 97. 
3 WM, P. 99. 
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How could negation produce the not from itself when it can make denials onlý when 
something deniable is already granted to it? But how could the deniable and what is to be 
denied be viewed as something susceptible to the not unless all thinking as such has caught 
sight of the not already? 4 
Heidegger's point here is of the utmost importance. We would interpret his implicit 
argument in these rhetorical questions as follows. The 'that it is' can never be 
primordially grasped through 'logic', because logic presupposes the prior discovery 
of the entities of which it makes predications. But we have seen in Being and Time 
that any such discovery is only possible on the basis of the disclosedness of the world 
through significance. Thus every logical negation always, as it were, comes 'too 
late'), since it only concerns entities rather than that which is their basis - the world. 
Moreover, logical negation can only concern a derivative - 'founded', rather than 
foundational - kind of entities, namely those whose mode of Being is presence-at- 
hand (object-being), for the concepts ofjudgement and object are correlative. 
In fact, we gained a more primordial 'knowledge' of Nothing, not by 
following a process of representational thinking, but through the existential analytic 
of Dasein, where Nothing revealed itself as such in the depth of Dasein's very 
essence. ) 
i. e. its existence. 
The Nothing takes over our Being in anxiety, which is the drainage of 
significance from the world in its totality. It is crucial to realize that Nothing as 
disclosed in anxiety does not reveal itself as a being. Nor does it ever become an 
"object' grasped by anxiety, as if the latter were a new 'medium' through which 
Nothing could be representationally caught. In anxiety, Nothing is encountered at 
once with beings. This does not signify that beings are annihilated by anxiety and one 
is consequently left with 'nothing' (no beings). Rather, Nothing lets itself be 
encountered with and in beings as a slipping away of the whole and not as the 
outcome of an annihilation or negation of beings. Anxiety as such, Heidegger says, 
knows nothing of 'the expressive function of a negating assertion' 
5 for here all 
utterance of the 'is' falls silent. Nothing, as we noted earlier, 'speaks' only in the 
4 WM, p. 105. 
5 WM, P. 10 1. 
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silent mode of reticence and it is this silence, which springs out from Nothing itself 
and which provokes Being to retreat in the face of it, that oppresses Dasein the most. 
1.2 Nothing as Nihilation 
Nothing, as Heidegger maintains, is essentially 'repelling' and in thus repelling it 
wards off beings all together. This is because the essence of Nothing is not 
annihilation or a negation of beings, but nihilation. Indeed, Nothing relates or 'acts' 
solely as a repulsion towards beings, as their sinking away. Nihilation, unlike 
negation and annihilation, does not let itself be rendered predictable and controllable 
by rules, laws, or logical calculi of representational thinking because, before 
Nothing, that which does the thinking and sets the rules is itself 'in retreat' like the 
rest of beings. Here, what nihilates is Nothing itself. Nothing as addressed by 
Heidegger belongs originally to the essential unfolding of Being and it therefore must 
not be viewed as another kind of being - an object of opposition or, in his language, 
a counter-concept to beings. The nihilation of Nothing rather occurs in the essence of 
entities. 
Now,, the significance of such a 'repelling' gesture towards beings on the 
whole lies in the fact that nihilation is not an accidental occurrence but discloses all 
entities and brings them forward as that which is radically other than Nothing. In this 
manner entities show themselves as entitities: 'that they are beings - and not 
Nothing'. 6 This 'and not Nothing' is therefore not a mere ornamental figure of 
speech or an added afterthought, but expresses the very possibility on the basis of 
which entities in general are revealed as beings. As Heidegger puts it: 'The essence 
of the originally nihilating Nothing lies in this, that it brings Da-sein for the first time 
7 before beings as such' . 
In fact it is on the basis of Nothing that Dasein's existence 
can reach beings. That is to say, existence in each case rises out of Nothing that is 
somehow already laid open. Accordingly, Da-sein - whose essence is existence - now 
signifies: 'being held out into Nothing'. In turn, such 'holding out into Nothing' 
WM, P. 10,. % 
ibid. 
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means that Dasein is always already 'beyond' beings. In other words, being-there or 
Dasein is transcendence. 
Holding itself out into the nothing, Dasein is in case already beyond beings as a whole. This 
being beyond beings we call 'transcendence'. If in the ground of its essence Dasein were 
not transcending, which now means, if it were not in advance holding itself out into the 
nothing, then it could never be related to beings nor even to itself. 8 
As that which is beyond beings or as pure transcendence, Dasein is henceforth 'the 
place' where Nothing can reveal itself In Heidegger's words, 'Being held out into 
Nothing - as Dasein is - on the ground of concealed anxiety makes man a lieutenant 
of Nothing'. 9 Now if metaphysics is an enquiry 'beyond' and over beings, then the 
question of Dasein or the question of who man is, is a genuinely metaphysical 
question because it brings us face to face with the nothingness of beings, but also 
because, 'going beyond beings occurs in the essence of Dasein'. Metaphysics, 
therefore, is neither a contingent division of academic philosophy nor a field of 
arbitrary speculative notions, but belongs to the essence of man: 'Metaphysics is the 
basic occurrence of Dasein. It is Dasein itself'. 10 Dasein's transcendence or the fact 
that being-there is 'held out into Nothing', signifies that Being itseýf is essentially 
finite. 
We may be inclined to ask, if existence is held out into Nothing and if 
Nothing can only be disclosed in the mood of anxiety, must not Dasein be constantly 
anxious in order to exist? But did not we say that 'authentic' anxiety occurs rarely? 
Heidegger's point seems to be this. The fact that one does not experience anxiety as 
such in one's daily life does not mean that anxiety is not there but that one is 
absorbed so profoundly in everyday intraworldly business that one has become 
closed, verschlossen, to the truth of existence3 or else one has chosen to live in 
ignorance. Acknowledging anxiety means to have access to a 'resolved' and 
'authentic' mode of existence, while those who attempt to conceal It live in 
ibid. 
9 WM, p. 106. (Italics mine). 
10 WM, P. 109. 
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semblance or 'inauthenticity', whereby the finitude of existence is covered-up. 
distorted or (unsuccessfully) denied altogether. In the 'fallen' or 'inauthentic' modes 
of existing, which characterize our everyday being-in-the-world primarily and 
usually, we flee from Nothing by turning towards beings. Yet, if we understand the 
matter aright, we are led to see that such turning away from Nothing is itself not 
simply our own doing, but is what is most proper to the essence of Nothing itself- 
Nothing repels beings (and us) away from itself because its essence is nNhation. 
Nothing nihilates and in thus nihilatiting guides us incessantly towards beings. 
It should now have become clearer why the 'not' cannot originate in negation, 
and why negation is founded in the 'not' that emerges from the nihilation of Nothing. 
Something can fall prey to negation and be susceptible to it only if thinking has 
formerly gained a 'familiarity' with Nothing - with 'not' that can become 
undistortedly manifest only when the nihilation of Nothing and hence, Nothing itself, 
is released from concealment. Having said this, negation is itself of course a kind of 
nihilative comportment and as such it is of prime importance. But this act, as 
Heidegger insists, is by no mean the only or indeed the most primordial 'authoritative 
witness of the revelation of Nothing belonging essentially to Dasein'. 11 
Admittedly, the enquiry concerning Nothing places us before metaphysics 
itself, where the legitimacy of its method becomes questionable. For Nothing, as our 
discussion has sought to show, is not the indeterminate opposite of beings, but it 
belongs to the essence of Being. Being and Nothing, in other words, are essentially 
related, and are indeed the 'same', 12 but the their identity-in-difference differs from 
any that would allow for 'reconciliation' or Aujhebung. 
21 Why Are There Beings Rather Than Nothing? 
In Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger, returning once more to Nothing's being 
repellent to thought, asks: what if one's concern for the fundamental rules of logic 
11 WM, p. 105. 
12 WM, P. 108. 
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should be rooted in a misunderstanding? And what if one's fear of Nothing should 
also be based on such a misconception? Such a misunderstanding would not be 
fortuitous, it would rather have its roots in an age-long failure to comprehend the 
question of Being -a failure to understand that is ultimately based upon the oblivion 
of Being. For why should we accept, as if it were a matter of course, that logic and its 
rules are adequate to provide a standard for dealing with the question of Being as 
such,, while the truth could well be the other way round? In other words, the 
considerations we have brought forward so far at the very least suggest the question 
whether logic may not itself have its ground in a particular fundamental response to 
Being? In this case, will not all thinking that follows strictly the laws of thought be 
impotent from the start of even understanding the question of Being in a way that is 
not pre-determined by that original response? 
Nothing remains in principle inaccessible to all science. Whoever truly wants to talk of 
Nothing must necessarily become unscientific. But this is a great misfortune only if one 
believes that scientific thinking alone is the authentic, rigorous thinking, that it alone can 
and must be made the measure even of philosophical thinking. But the reverse is the case. 13 
Science will always judge Nothing, if not understood in terms of negative 
propositions, as a fanciful absurdity, and will therefore be always indignant if it is 
asked to confront it. In any case, in order to 'deal with' the question of Nothing, 
science would perforce absorb Nothing into its mode of thinking and thereby 
transform it to suit the requirements of representational thought and the 
corresponding language. But Nothing does not lend itself to such treatment or, as 
Heidegger prefers to say, Nothing cannot be vulgarized for all authentic speaking 
about it always remains extraordinary. 14 
13 IM, pp. 27-28. 
14 Hence, 'true discourse about nothing can never be immediate like the description of a picture for 
example'. As an illustration of how one may 'truly' speak about nothing, Heidegger cites a poem from 
Knut Hamsun's work The Road Leads On: 
'He sits here between his ears and hears true emptiness. Quite amusing, a fancy. On the ocean 
something stirred, and there, there was a sound, something audible, a water chorus. Here nothing 
meets nothing and is not there, there is not even a hole. One can only shake one's head Mi resignation. ' 
(IM, p. 29). 
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In looking back to the beginning of Western philosophy and its historical 
unfolding, we see that, in contrast to modem scientific attitude, ever since Being 
came into question (albeit, within metaphysics, not as such), the question about 
Nothing was raised in parallel. Indeed, far from being an aside, the question of 
Nothing was asked 'with the same breadth, depth, and originality with which the 
15 question about beings is asked'. Thus, in following the path of philosophy at its 
inception, Heidegger asks: 'why are there beings rather than nothing? ' This question, 
as he says, is the widest of all conceivable questions, for it confines itself to no 
particular entity or being or any kind of being. 16 The question is not interested in 
particulars nor does it ask what kind of nature this and that being might have, what 
its telos might be, how can it be transformed, etc. The question is such that it 
embraces 'everything' and this means that 'all that is not Nothing comes into the 
question, and in the end even Nothing itself - not, as it were, because it is something, 
a being, for after all we are talking about it, but because it "is" Nothing'. 17 
The question 'why are there beings rather than nothing? ' may give the 
impression that the enquiry aims at the source and the ground of beings or that, it 
seeks for the foundation of what is. This, of course, is not the case. In fact, the 
ground in question, as it will turn out, is not a ground at all. One needs to remember 
that Heidegger's quest has no interest in the causes or 'sufficient reasons' of beings. 
Instead, the careful formulation of the question involves a deliberate attempt to 
abstain from the usual practice of tracing the origins of a being to another being until 
one reaches a being that one names 'the Supreme Being', the causa prima. 
Heidegger does not merely ask 'why are there beings? ', but 'why are there beings at 
all - that is, why is there something, anything, in the first place - rather than 
nothing? ' The addition 'rather than nothing' is not superfluous or merely ornamental, 
15 IM, p. 26. 
16 In this connection is interesting to note that Heidegger here interprets Being and Time, in 
confon-nity with our reading of that text in chapter 11, as already having been concerned with the 
question of Being as such, rather than the Being of particular kinds of entities per se (e. g. Dasein): 
'But if we think along the lines of Being and Time, the "question of Being" means asking about Being 
as such. ' (IM, p. 20). 
'I 'I M, p. 2. 
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but an essential contribution to the determination of that which Heidegger is asking 
about. If the question is put in abbreviated form, i. e. 'why are there beingsT, the 
starting point of the enquiry should have to be beings, entities. This direction of 
questioning constrains one ontically to question the beings as to their ound, gr 
because by starting from beings the enquiry progresses inevitably towards a 
foundation. But this mode of questioning is not suitable to the 'subject matter' to be 
interrogated here. It is only when we start with the implicit assumption that Being as 
a whole is present and take for granted that beings or entities are always and 
incessantly there, that we can meaningfully ask 'why are there beingsT, which 
means: where and what is their ground? But here one no longer asks after Being as 
such and as a whole. Meanwhile, the question 'why are there beings rather than 
nothing? ' interrupts this regression towards a ground and interprets the 'why' 
differently. For the question now explicitly holds beings out into the possibility of 
not-being and asks: why do they not 'fall back' into not-being? Consequently, beings 
are no longer regarded as that which just happens to be there, ever present-at-hand, 
but they become, as it were, unstable, insecure, as not-being is envisaged as their 
4natural' condition. Hence, the search for the 'why' does not attempt to provide a 
present-at-hand foundation in order to explain the presence of something else that is 
present-at-hand, but points to a kind of event that is the emergence of beings in the 
sense of their opening up, coming forward through Nothing: 
The ground in question is now questioned as the ground of decision for beings over against 
Nothing - more precisely, as the ground for wavering of the beings that sustain us and 
unbind us, half in being, half not in being, which is also why we cannot wholly belong to 
any thing, not even to ourselves; 18 
2.2 How Does it Stand with Being? 
'Why are there beings rather than nothing? '. With this question one establishes 
oneself in the midst of beings in such a way that they lose their self-evidence as 
'8 IM, p. 3 1. 
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beings. And as beings move and waver between the extreme possibilities of either 
Being or Nothing, the questioning too loses all firm basis: Dasein, our being-there 
comes now 'into suspense, and nevertheless maintains itself, in this suspense!. 19 This 
is not to say that our questioning changes beings - for they remain what and as they 
are - but it shows that beings, whose constant being-there or presence we never doubt 
might, could just as easily not be. This possibility, i. e. the potentiality for not-being, 
is not something that we add to beings by thinking, rather it lies within beings 
themselves. To illustrate the point Heidegger gives the example of a piece of chalk, 
which has extension; is a relatively solid, grayish-white thing with a definite shape, 
and in addition to all that, is a thing to write with (its 'in-order-to'). The possibility of 
being something that leaves traces on the blackboard, that can be used up and 
consumed, are inherent characteristics of its Being. The chalk, as this particular 
entity, is in this possibility: It 'has in itself a definite aptitude for a definite use'. 20 
Other beings are their possibilities in quite different ways, as we say in our 
discussion of Dasein. Beings, in being their possibilities, essentially are in their 
oscillation between Being and Nothing. To the extent that beings uphold themselves 
against their extreme possibility of not-being they stand in Being - yet without ever 
overcoming that extreme possibility. 
The example illustrates the fundamental distinction between the being (the 
piece of chalk) and that which makes up its Being. What does this distinction consist 
in? In one sense, being means 'what at any time is in being'- 21 for example, the 
chalk with its various 'qualities'. In another understanding, however, Being signifies 
that 'which brings it about' '22 that 
by virtue of which something, instead of not-being 
(nichtseiend), comes-to-be, or again, 'that which makes up the Being in the being, if 
it is a being'. 23 
19 ibid. 
20 IM, p. 32. 
21 IM, P., 
_)3. 22 IM, p. 3 1. 
23 IM, p. 3 -' ). 
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In accordance with this twofold meaning of the word 'being' the Greek to on often 
designates the second meaning, that is, not the being itself, what is in being, but rather 'the 
in-being', beirigness, to be in being, Being. fn contrast, the first meaning of 'being' names 
the things themselves that are in being, either individually or as a whole, but always with 
reference to these things and not to their beingness, ousia. The first meaning of to on 
designates ta onta (entia), the second means to einai (esse). 24 
But Heidegger's question ultimately aims neither at 'beings', nor even at 'the Being 
of beings', but at Being as such: 
How are we even supposed to inquire in to the ground for the Being of beings [ ... ] if we have not adequately conceived, understood and grasped Being itselp. [ ... ] So it turns out 
that the question "Why are there beings at all instead of nothing? " forces us to the prior 
question: "How does it stand with Being? "25 
Here we do detect a shift of emphasis away from Heidegger's approach in Being and 
Time: what comes into question is now explicitly 'Being as such'. While, as we have 
argued, this was also the ultimate aim of Being and Time, Heidegger's 'method' in 
that work was to proceed via an investigation of the Being of specific kinds of 
entities, most centrally and fundamentally, of course, of Dasein. 26 
But as soon as we make an attempt to 'grasp' Being, it is always as though 
we were reaching into Nothing. In this case, is not Being after which we enquire 
rather like Nothing? Perhaps 'in the end the word "Being" is no more than an empty 
word. It means nothing real, tangible, material. Its meaning is an unreal vapor'. 27 Did 
Nietzsche, then speak the truth? But what if it was not 'Being' that has lost or never 
had meaning, but Nietzsche and Western metaphysics failed Being? The traditional 
metaphysical understanding of Being, Heidegger remarks, as the 'most universal 
concept', and thus as the emptiest concept, bears witness to the fact that ontology has 
24 ibid. 
25 IM, p. 35. 
26 We may say that Being and Time approaches Being through Dasein, while the direction of 
questioning in Introduction to Metaphysics (and after) begins with Being as such and approaches 
Dasein from such a 'prior' interrogation of Being: 'Within the question of Being, the human essence is 
to be grasped and grounded, according to the concealed directive of the inception, as the site that 
Being necessitates for its opening up. ' (IM, p. 219). 
27 ibid. 
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indeed failed to grasp or even to question the essence of Being as such. Because 
metaphysics conceives the Being of entities as a whole in terms of their whatness as 
predicable in judgments, it is unable to think Being otherwise than in tenns of what 
beings 'have in common', that is, as the highest, entirely contentless, genus. 28 But if 
'Being' has thus lost its meaning, this may be because the metaphysical tradition has 
misconstrued it in a very specific fashion. The main task of Introduction to 
Metaphysics consists, we may say, in showing that, contrary to the guiding 
assumptions of the history of Western philosophy in general and Nietzsche's claim in 
particular, the talk of the indeterminateness and emptiness of Being as such is itself 
erroneous. That Being is in fact determinate and far from contentless for us is 
expressed in a series of everyday conjunctions/oppositions which delimit it against 
an Other: 29 Being and becoming; Being and seeming; Being and thinking; Being and 
ought (Sein und Sollen). In each of these interrelated aspects of delimitation, Being is 
disclosed in a deten-ninate way. However, the way in which these delimitations are 
understood has undergone a radical transformation in what we can now call the 
history of Being. Thus any genuine questioning of the meaning of 'Being as such' 
must of necessity become a historical questioning, which accordingly must begin 
with a retrieval of the inception of the history of Being in early Greek thought. 
2.21 Being as Ovaiý- 
In chapter 1, we referred to the Greek meaning of beings, of entities, in the sense of 
z-a o vra and Oal vqueva. For Heidegger, as we know, tracing words back to their 
original meanings, is a way of evoking experiences that have become lost, deformed 
or forgotten in the 'course' of history. For instance, he points out that with the 
translation of the Greek word Ovatý- into the Latin term natura the original meaning 
For a more detailed discussion of this issue and the essence of metaphysics, see chapter IV, Section 
29 'The word "Being" is thus indefmite in its meaning, and nevertheless we understand it definitely. 
"Being" proves to be extremely definite and completely Mdefinite. According to the usual logic. we 
have here an obvious contradiction. [ ... ] We see, if we do not deceive ourselves 
[ ... I that we are 
standing in the midst of this contradiction. This standing of ours is more actual than just about 
anything else that we call actual -' (IM, p. 82). 
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of Oucriý- is lost. Something analogous, he adds, 'is true not only of the Latin 
translation of this word but also of all other Roman translations of the Greek 
philosophical language'. 30 Such translational procedures, accordingly, are not 
innocent, harmless manoeuvres, but the first phase in a process in which the 
originary essence of Greek thinking is progressively alienated and deformed. The 
early Greeks' fundamental experience of the self-revelation of Being apprehended 
Being as such, by virtue of which beings first become, as Ovajý-. 31 Being in this sense 
meant self-blossoming emergence, opening up, unfolding. This is an unfolding that 
opens itself up, the appearance of that which manifests itself in such unfolding and 
endures in it. Thus Ovaiý-, as the field or the realm of that which arises, is not the 
same or was not conceived in equivalent ten'ns to those phenomena which we today 
regard as constituting 'nature'. Ovuiý-, was rather that which opened up the 
possibility for all phenomena, including the possibility for nature to appear and to 
endure, in the first place. Ovaiý-, therefore, must not be understood as a process 
among other processes that we detect and recognize in entities (such as the process of 
growth in the plants), but as an event by virtue of which entities first become and 
remain. Hence, Heidegger maintains, Ovaiý- - 'this inward-jutting-beyond-itself - 
was, for the Greeks, Being itself- 
Ovo-tq originally encompassed heaven as well as earth, the stone as well as the plant, the animal as 
well as man, and it encompassed human history as a work of men and the gods; and ultimately and 
first of all, it meant the gods themselves as subordinated to destiny. Ovo7iq means the power that 
emerges and the enduring realm under it sway. This power is the process of a-rising, of emerging fi7om 
the hidden, whereby the hidden is first made to stand. 
32 
Thus, Ovaiý- was for the early Greeks the realm of Being as such and as a whole -a 
realm whose essence and character was understood as that which emerges and 
endures. This realm, reinterpreted as that which 'is experienced primarily through 
30 IM, p. 13. 
31 IM, p. 15. 
32 IM, p. 14. 
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what in a way imposes itself most immediately on our attention, is the later, narrower 
sense ofphysis: ta physei onta, ta physika, nature'. 33 
How does Being as ýuatq delimit itself in the distinctions mentioned above? 
With respect the first of these distinctions, Heidegger in fact only provides a brief 
'guideline'. When Parmenides declaims in his didactic poem that 'Being [is] without 
genesis and without decay, /complete, standing fully there alone', this 'says the same' 
as Heraclitus's dictum that 'all is in flux'. 34 What we can infer from this is that ýu(ytq 
is beyond 'being' (as constant presence at all times) and 'becoming' (as happenings 
and changes 'in time'). It is what makes both of these possible. In this sense, Being 
as ýuatq encompasses and surpasses both 'being' and 'becoming'. Becoming in 
another sense, as the 'no longer, and not yet', that which maintains itself through 
change, yet offering an inconstant view and thus always also being other than what is 
open to view, needs to be understood in relation to the second distinction, between 
Being and seeming. 35 Heidegger discusses the distinction of Being and 
seeming/appearing (Scheinen) in considerable detail. In the basic sense of Scheinen 
as appearing, Being as ýucytq is essentially appearing: '(DuFtv, the emerging that 
reposes in itself, is ýcavcaOcct, lighting-up, self-showing, appearing. 36 But Scheinen 
can also mean 'seeming' or 'semblance': insofar as Being is appearing and thus 
offering an appearance or 'look', it is also and essentially the possibility of 
semblance, that is, of the covering-up or distortion of unconcealment: thus 'both 
truth in the sense of unconcealment [i. e. appearing] and seeming as a definite mode 
of the arising self-showing belong necessarily to Being'. 37 For early Greek thinking, 
seeming thus both belongs to Being and yet also differs from it, however offensive 
this may seem to ordinary logic. And this is also true for becoming as a mode of 
33 IM, p. 16. 34 IM, pp. 10 1- 1031 - 
35 IM, p. 12 t. 
36 IM, p. 106. Cf. our discussion of Heidegger's understanding of 'phenomenon' in History of the 
Concept of Time (chapter 1. Section 1. 
37 IM, p. 115. 
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seeming. Heidegger grasps this constitutive relation of belonging and difference in 
terms of the notion of strife or struggle (7rokqLoq): 
Only by undergoing the struggle between Being and seeming did they wrest Being forth 
from beings, did they bring beings into constancy and unconcealment 38 
How does the third distinction - between Being and thinking - manifest itself in 
Being experienced as ýuatq? Heidegger seeks to unfold this distinction through 
going back to what he claims are the original meanings of ko7o(y and vociv in the 
thought of Heraclitus and Parmenides respectively. For Heraclitus, 'ýumq and koyoq 
are the same' while logos is understood by him as the gatheredness (Sammlung) of 
beings: 'The gathering together of the highest contending is polemos, struggle in the 
sense of confrontation the setting-apart-from-each-other (Aus-einander-setzung)', 39 
and 'for this reason, rank and dominance belong to Being'. 40 When Parmenides,, in 
turn, says that 'thinking [vomv] and Being [Ftvat] are the same', what does he mean 
by this? Heidegger interprets voFtv as 'apprehension' the 'taking up a position to 
receive the appearing of beings'. 4' Does this mean that Being is conceived in 
dependence to human thinking? By no means, for the human being is not the 
4 subject' or 'agent' of this apprehending: 
Apprehension and what Parmenides' statement says about it is not a faculty of the human 
being, who is otherwise already defined; instead, apprehension is a happening in which 
humanity itself happens, in which humanity itself thus first enters history as a being [ ... ] 
apprehension is the happening that has the human being. [ ... ] What 
is ftilfilled in this saying 
is nothing less than the knowing entrance-into-appearance of the human being as historical 
(preserver of Being). 42 
38 IM, p. III (Italics mine). 
39 IM, p. 140. 
40 IM, p. 14 1. It is perhaps not superfluous to mention, although we do not wish to enter into a 
broader discussion of this terrain, that the terms Heidegger is using here were also prominent in the 
political discourse of the time when Introduction to Metaphysics was written. Sammiung was a 
standard term in that context with a meaning equivalent to the French rassemblement. 
" IM, p. 179. 
12 IM, p. 150. 
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Heidegger is explicit that this apprehension in which humanity receptively 'takes in' 
what appears by 'taking a position to receive it' and 'bring it to a stand' defines the 
essence of the human. The passivity in the connotation of these formulations is itself 
'polemically' countered by Heidegger's further explication of apprehension as 
violent de-cision (Entscheidung). (Du(Tiq as the emerging 'holding sway' (Walten) 
itself has the essential character of overwhelming (iiber-wdltigend) power. Humanity 
comes to its own Being in and through this overwhelming sway, which it 
rapprehends' through 'violence-doing'. The latter is itself perhaps best understood, 
not in terms of ordinary notions, but in an essential sense: doing violence as 
venturing beyond ' the homely, the accustomed, the usual, the unendangered 43, - as 
being 'uncanny'. Heidegger thus arrives, in interpreting Sophoclean tragedy in these 
terms at a conception of the human being as shattering against the overwhelming 
sway of ýuatq: 
[ ... ] as those who 
do violence, [human beings] overstep the limits of the homely, precisely 
in the direction of the uncanny in the sense of the overwhelming. 44 
Historical humanity's being-here means: being posited as the breach into which the 
excessive violence of Being breaks in its appearing, so that this breach itself shatters against 
Being [ ... ] In willing the unprecedented, the violence-doer casts aside all help. For such a 
one, disaster is the deepest and broadest Yes to the overwhelming- 45 
This may itself appear as a rather 'forced' reading of Parmenides' saying that 
'thinking and Being are the same'. But we may anticipate that in the light of the 
above statements, the accusation of interpretive 'violence' would hardly disturb 
Heidegger. 46 
43 IM, p. 161. 
44 IM, p. 16 1. 
45 IM, p. 174. 
46 In fact, he explicitly mentions and dismisses the objection: 'According to the usual opinion of 
today, what we have said is in fact just a result of that violent character and one-sidedness, which has 
already become proverbial, of the Heideggerian mode of interpretation' (IM, p. 187). But, 'the 
authentic interpretation must show what does not stand there in the words and which is nevertheless 
said. For this the interpretation must necessarily use violence. (IM, p. 173). For some questions 
regarding Heidegger's violence in interpreting Sophocles, see Clare Pearson Geirnan, 'Heidegger's 
Antigones', in R. Polt and G. Fried (eds. ), .4 Companion to Heidegger's Introduction to 
Metapýysi 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 200 1), esp. pp. 164-171 
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The fourth distinction - Being and ought - is not to be found in early Greek 
thinking. It is essentially modem, although it is Prepared in Platonic philosophy. It 
will occupy us later in this chapter, and even more so in the next chapter, when we 
turn to Heidegger's confrontation with Nietzsche and value thinking. 
2.2.2 The Transformation of Being 
The fundamental determinations of Being we have discussed become essentially 
transformed at the end of Greek philosophy in Plato and Aristotle. The 
transformation at its heart involves a change from the understanding of Being as 
ýuatq to Being as t6s(x or st6oq in Plato. We need not occupy ourselves here with an 
(explanation' of this transformation, which Heidegger calls the collapse of 
unconcealment (but see chapter IV). What is important for us here is merely the 
character of the change itself. It involves a concealing restriction of the 
understanding of Being from the essence (the emerging sway that brings itself to 
appearance) to its consequence: the appearance as the perceptual 'look' offered by 
that which thus manifests itself While the 'apprehending' which understands Being 
as ýu(ytq 'takes beings [in their Being] with regard to the fact that they set 
themselves forth and as what', 47 the understanding of Being as t6sa takes them 
fundamentally as what they are. "at a being is, its outward appearance to a 
perceptual 'look', is also what allows it to come to presence. 48 Accordingly, the 
understanding of Being as t6ccc determines its further fundamental interpretation as 
47 IM, p. 195. 
48 For Heidegger, the questioning of the 'what' of beings as a whole is definitive of metaphysics. In 
this sense, as he will argue in the Nietzsche lectures, all metaphysics is Platonism. But if this is so, 
how are we to interpret the title Introduction to Metaphysics? 'If one chooses the designation 
"metaphysics" for the treatment of the "question of Being" in an indefinite sense, then the title of this 
lecture course remains ambiguous. For at first it seems as though the questioning held itself within the 
purview of beings as such, whereas already with the first sentence it strives to depart this zone in order 
to bring another domain into view with its questions. The title of the course remains deliberately 
ambiguous. The fundamental question of the lecture course is of a different kind than the guiding 
question of metaphysics. Taking Being and Time as its point of departure, the lecture course asks 
about the "disclosedness of Being" [ ... ] Disclosedness means: the openedness of what the oblivion of 
Being closes off and conceals. (IM, p. 20-2 1). 
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ouata, that is, constant presence. Under this new dispensation, becoming is 
therefore opposed to Being as the ýuj ov, what is-not. 'True' Being is that which is 
never (no more and not yet' but that which is always identically the self-same. But 
what about 'thinking'? Inasmuch as Being is now interpreted as constant presence, 
that which becomes, i. e. the 'reciprocal relation between emerging and decaying in 
appearance', 49 is seen to fall short of the paradigmatic Being of the ever-present idea 
as prototype. Becoming becomes a mere appearance, a seeming now regarded as a 
defect. As a result, 'ov and ýcctvo[tsvov (what is and what appears) are disjoined, 50 
Because Being resides now in the ever-present 'look', the truth is now the look itself 
or that which resembles it as closely as possible. This means that truth is now 
conceived as mimesis. This in turn prepares the way for the restriction of truth to that 
which re-presents correctly - at the final stage of this development, to correct 
judgment or assertion. But that which can be represented as it is in and from itself, is, 
as we have seen in our previous discussions, essentially an object, or, in Heidegger's 
language, something whose mode of Being is presence-at-hand. Thus, the 
transformation of Being, which Heidegger grasps as the collapse of unconcealment at 
the end of Greek philosophy in Plato and Aristotle, involves a fundamental re- 
alignment in all the distinctions through which Being is determined. While Being as 
ýuutq was polemically the 'same' as becoming, seeming, and thinking, we now get a 
series of exlusive oppositions, with each of the terms of each distinction being now 
of course understood differently from before: 
Being, in contradistinction to becoming, is the enduring. 
Being, in contradistinction to seeming, is the enduring prototype, the always 
identical. 
Being, in contradistinction to thinking, is what lies at the basis, the present-at-hand. 
49 Cf. IM, p. 122. 
50 IM, p. 197. 
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In addition, Heidegger argues, the transformation of Being prepares the way for a 
further, modem, conception of Being: 
Being, in contradistinction to the ought, is what lies at hand in each case as what 
ought to be and has not yet been actualized, or already has been actualized. 51 
All these meanings, i. e. endurance, perpetual self-identity, presence-at-hand, express 
in the end just one interpretation of Being, namely: Being as 'constant presence' or 
ov in the sense of ouatcc. In an important passage, Heidegger draws attention to the 
fundamental limitation that inheres in this understanding of the meaning of Being, 
which for us has become 'traditional'. If becoming, seeming, thinking and the ought 
are not Being (for they are that which opposes and delimits Being) then, they must 
either be nothing or be still somehow 'in being'. 
Surely, that over against which Being is set in opposition - becoming, seeming, thinking, the 
ought - is not something that we have thought up. But if all that stands over against Being in 
the divisions is not nothing, then it itself is in being, and in the end is in being even more 
than what is taken as in being in accordance with the restricted essential determinateness of 
Being- 52 
Yet, if these four opposing determinations are not nothing - which they are clearly 
not - and if they are not the same as Being - from which they are excluded - then, in 
what sense of Being are they 'in being"? What is the sense of Being in becoming, in 
seeming, thinking, and the ought? These questions indicate clearly that 'the concept 
of Being that has been accepted up to now does not suffice to name everything that 
"is". Hence if Being is to be opened up and grounded in its originary distinction from 
beings, then an originary perspective needs to be opened up'. 53 
There is no doubt that for Heidegger this 'originary perspective', which can 
guide the opening up of Being, is time. 54 Having said this, time itself - as the ground 
51 IM, p. 216. 
52 IM, p. 218. 
53 IM, pp. 218-219. 
54 'In such a meditation, "Being and time" means not a book but the task that is given. The authentic 
task here is what we do not know; and insofar as we know this genuinely - namely as a given task - we 
always know it only in questioning'. (IN4, p. 220). 
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that has given to Being its meaning since antiquity - has still not been exposed in its 
essence. Since Aristotle, time itself has been viewed by 'the tradition' as something 
that somehow comes to presence. Thus, time in the inception of Western philosophy, 
despite leading the way to the aperture of Being, remained and had to remain 
concealed. For the end of Greek philosophy, instead of considering time as that 
unique perspective within which Being is to be interpreted, conversely made Being 
in the meta-categorial sense of present-at-hand-ness that perspective by which time 
was to be detennined. 
2.3 The Restriction of Being by 'the Ought' 
There can be no doubt that an important part of the immediate background of 
Heidegger's thoughts concerning Nothing is Nietzsche's conception of nothingness 
as the experience of meaninglessness -a conception that for him defines nihilism as a 
condition in which highest values devalue themselves. The confrontation with 
Nietzsche is fully engaged in only in Heidegger's lectures on that philosopher, to 
which we shall turn in the next chapter. However, the ground for this confrontation is 
prepared by Heidegger's brief remarks on the fourth determination of Being: its 
delimitation by 'the ought'. In fact, by the end of Introduction to Metaphysics, not 
only his criticism of Nietzsche's particular philosophical approach to values, but also 
his reservations with regard to value-thinking in general (Wendenken) - including 
Max Scheler's phenomenology and the neo-Kantianism of thinkers like Rickert - 
have been adumbrated in outline. His critique of values deals with two aspects of the 
problem at once: (a) it contains a criticism of those of his contemporaries who 
engage in 'value-thinking' as the fashionable philosophical approach of the time, and 
(b) it denounces values as an outcome of metaphysics that began with Plato's idea of 
the 'Good' and culminated in Nietzsche's philosophy of the 'will to power'. 
Heidegger argues that the introduction of the notion of value is due to a 
separation of Being and the ought that was prepared by the determination of Being as 
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idea in the Platonic sense. Of course,, for Plato the idea of ideas is the idea of the 
Good Crov ayaOov). The Good, which Heidegger here interprets as that which can 
accomplish what is proper to it, 55 is the measure as such. Hence, it is the ayaOov that 
first endows Being with the power to open, to unfold essentially as t8ccc. Now, 
Heidegger asks: Is not therefore Being in Plato's metaphysics dependent and 
therefore second in the rank to that which grants such power, in other words, to the 
idea of the Good? Because the Good, as the highest idea is 'the archetype of the 
prototype', Being as t8F-(x comes necessarily into opposition to something else 'to 
which it itself, Being, remains assigned'. 56 
We need no far-reaching discussions now in order to make it clear that in this division, as in 
the others,, what is excluded from Being, the ought, is not imposed on Being from some 
other source. Being itself, in its particular interpretation as idea, brings with it the relation to 
the prototypical and to what ought to be. 57 
This means that,, in so far as Being is understood as idea, the Good, as the highest 
idea, must stand beyond and above Being. Thus, the de-grading of Being (determined 
as t8scc) by itself determines the positing of something above Being that 'Being 
never yet is, but always ought to be? ý58 
It became clear that the ought arises in opposition to Being as soon as Being determines 
itself as idea. With this determination,, thinking as the logos of assertion (dialegesthai) 
assumes a definitive role. 59 
In fact, the positing of the ought above Being means that Being here is governed by 
the ought, whereas in the distinction between Being and thinking, the latter is 
thought as the ground that sustains and determines Being. This implies that 'Being is 
no longer what is definitive, what provides the measure' 60 _a conception that, 
according to Heidegger, will lead to the principle of self-sufficient reason in the 
55 IM, p. 2 10. 
56 LM, p. 21 1. 57 ibid. 
58 ibid. 
59 
ibid. 
60 IM, P. 2 10. 
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modem era,, where the division and the opposition between Being and the ought 
become the fundamental framework for any scientific research. But it is onl,,, - Kant 
whose attunement with the Enlightenment understanding of beings first enunciated in 
Descartes - as whatever can be thought in mathematical-physical terms - brings the 
process to its final stage of fulfillment: the categorical imperative is now explicitly 
set over against 'nature' thus understood. 
For Kant, beings are nature - in other words, whatever can be determined and is determined 
in mathematical-physical thinking. The categorical imperative, which is determined both by 
and as reason, is opposed to nature. Kant more than once explicitly calls it the ought, 
considering the relation of the imperative to what merely is, in the sense of merely 
instinctive nature. 61 
However, the Kantian opposition of the 'ought' that stands above Being (conceived 
now as mathematicized nature) is unstable. Heidegger's reasons for this claim are 
only briefly hinted at, but seem to come to this: the categorical imperative is 
supposed to have the authority of an overriding norm. But where does it derive this 
authority from, unless it either has itself some 'real' ontological status, or derives 
from something else which has such a status. 62 
Faced with this challenge, 19th century value thinking seeks to ground the 
ought in values as such, arguing that an ought can originate solely from that which 
raises such a demand on its own, that which has a value in itself and is itself a value. 
But this move opens the door to a number of new Problems. For instance, if values 
stand opposed to the Being of beings, in the sense of facts, then how could values 
be? But, if values themselves cannot be then, in which sense does a value obtain? 
One (neo-Kantian) way of resolving the problem, Heidegger notes, has been to say, 
61 IM, p. 212. 
62 Hans Sluga has interpreted Heidegger's implicit argument along similar lines: 'The categorical 
imperative demands that we act as rational beings and, hence, on universalisable principles. If, 
however, we are necessarily and always rational, the formula can have no imperative force. It can only 
state a natural and universal fact about us. If, on the other hand, we take the formula (more 
realistically) to have the force of a real injunction, then it must be possible for us to act either 
rationally or not, and then it tacitly presupposes that being rational is desirable, is a good for us. [ ... ] 
the Ought [ ... 
] will tacitly presuppose the assumption of a substantive good. ' (Hans Sluga, ' "Conflict 
is the Father of All Things": Heidegger's Polemical Conception of Politics', in R. Polt and G. Fried 
(eds. ), A Companion to Heidegger 's Introduction to Metqpýysics pp. 219-220. ) 
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not that values are, but that values are valid. For 'what is easier than to understand 
Plato's ideas in the sense of values, and to interpret the Being of beings on the basis 
of the valid? -)63 Yet,, because validity seems necessarily to be validityfor a subject. in 
order to save the self-grounding ought that has been elevated to the level of values, a 
Being must finally be attributed to values themselves -a Being that, despite its 
sophisticated sound, is no other than being-present-at-hand or object-being. With 
'the Being of values, the maximum in confusion and deracination has been 
reached'. 64 For no matter how much effort one may expend in this direction, value 
thinking in general will, according to Heidegger's analysis, remain the outcome of a 
metaphysics that polarizes the 'ought' and the 'is'- a metaphysics that advocates 
subjectivity as the sphere of values in opposition to valueless nature as the domain of 
inanimate thinghood. On the basis of this conclusion, Heidegger asks: But why 
should we have to find ourselves in a position where we must make up for having 
interpreted Being as devoid of measure in the first place? Does not the fact that we 
find it necessary to introduce values show that we were wrong to conceive of Being 
as that which can no longer provide the measure? For if Being as such cannot 
constitute for us a standard and a measure, as has been assumed at the outset - 
ambiguously in Plato's Being as t6s(x and explicitly in the Enlightenment's Being as 
6nature' - then the particular mode of Being that is the Being of values cannot do so 
either. In this case, should we not admit that Being itself can, after all, provide us 
with measure? Yet, we are reluctant to allow this because of the conviction that 
Being is merely an empty word continues to prevail. 
63 IM. p. 212. Heidegger here seems to have in mind Max Scheler's phenomenolooN, of value which 
attributes 'objective being' to values. For a more detailed discussion of Heidegger's criticism of this 
version of value thinking, see chapter IV, Section 2. 
64 IM, p. 213. 
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2.4 Ethics without Values? 
Heidegger's position on value thinking, even if one accepts the legitimacy of the 
questions he raises, may still seem to remain deeply problematic. For if we consider 
to what extent the notion of values is interwoven with ethics, to denounce values 
may seem to result in leaving behind ethics altogether. Likewise, if there is a parallel 
between ethics and metaphysics, this seems to imply that with the 'overcoming of 
metaphysics' all ethical values would also be 'overcome'. Despite these questions 
obtruding themselves, Heidegger remains reluctant to engage directly with ethical 
issues. And when he does so, his indirect and untimely ways leave much room to 
interpretation, if not guesswork. Instead of engaging once more with the abundant 
and familiar literature written in condemnation of Heidegger's approach to ethics, we 
would like to consider one interpretation which argues favourably, along ostensibly 
Heideggerian lines, for the possibility of an ethics without values. 
According to Frank Schalow, 65 Heidegger believes that the notion of value 
conceals the ethos of ethics by subjecting it to a metaphysical dichotomy that divides 
'the is and the ought', 'nature and freedom'. But the fact that Heidegger shows no 
sign of defending or discussing explicitly the implications of his position might 
suggest that he either has no concern for ethics or else believes in the possibility of 
an ethics without values. Opting for the second interpretation, Schalow explores this 
possibility by focusing on Heidegger's notion of freedom. He argues that Heidegger 
attempts to understand freedom in relation to a conception of being-human that is 
attuned to the Greek understanding of nature as Ovcriý-. Dasein, accordingly, is not a 
mere 'natural' being, but that unique kind of being through which the self, nature and 
all beings as a whole are revealed in their emergence and withdrawal. This suggests 
that the analysis of Dasein's transcendence and its corresponding freedom - i. e. the 
idea that Dasein has the possibility of a direct participation in the openness of its 
temporal ecstases - are not completely devoid of ethical implications. Indeed, 
65 Frank Schalow- 'At the Crossroads of Freedom: Ethics Without Values', in: R. Polt and G. Fried 
(eds. ),. 4 Companion to Heidegger's Introduction to Metqpýysics, pp. 250-262. 
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transcendence, in Heidegger's view, though it is not a striving towards a divine being 
or a movement towards a higher value - as is the case for Scheler - makes the ethical 
possible. 
[T]hrough its self-transcendence, its surpassing of being-in-totality, Dasein can cultivate a 
response to the other. Such a response is an extension of its own Being as care (Sorge), the 
structural totality of Dasein'. 
66 
Here that which orders and guides the self in the first instance towards any kind of 
ethical matters or concerns is the controlling of its freedom by its limitations - that is, 
Dasein's finitude. This means that a concern for 'the good' can and does arise within 
the boundaries that are set through the reciprocal relationship between 'freedom and 
governance', 'decision and lawfulness'. 
As Schalow points out, in Being and Time, Heidegger states clearly that a 
(metaphysics of morals' (i. e. an ontology of Dasein and existence) lies at the basis of 
all theories of value as their unexpressed ontological presupposition. With this, 
Heidegger questions and problematizes the very idea of an 'objectivity' of values. 
Any such 'objectivity' reflects Dasein's 'subjectivity' in a particular mode. Where 
'objective values' are posited, the 'they-self assesses worth by appealing to what are 
in fact pre-given cultural preferences and by relying on external measures of 
valuation that have established themselves, such as social roles and positions, power 
and prestige. Hence, values in Heidegger's view display Dasein's absorption in the 
'they-self and its tendency to 'fall'. As fallen, Dasein measures its worth by 
appealing to an external standard of approval or disapproval held by everyone - 
which is, of course, the anonymous no-one. 67 Given that 'worth' as assessed by the 
'they-self reflects Dasein's 'inauthenticity' as fallen, values obstruct the disclosure 
of Dasein's Being as care. This is why, in Schalow' view, Heidegger prefers the 
"formalism' of self-responsibility in accord with one's essence as care: that is, 
66Schalow, 'At the Crossroads of Freedom', p. 253. 
67 This interpretation finds some support in Heidegger's analysis of the 'vulgar' interpretation of 
conscience in BT, pp. 339-34 1. 
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Dasein's choosing itself as ability-to-be. For, in renouncing any external (objective) 
guidelines, the behaviour of the 'authentic self cuts through the comparative, 
externally determined disposition of the 'they-self, taking its direction from no other 
source than the call of conscience. Heidegger's idea of freedom, accordingly, does 
not relate to the 'will', but to Being. In other words, he attempts to hold out a vision 
whereby freedom and Being are considered as reciprocal concerns. 
The move, though unorthodox, should not after all be surprising, as it 
constitutes a counter-movement against metaphysics that has turned towards the 
'subject' and has relocated the evaluative principle, once assigned to the Good, in 
human subjectivity. But did we not say earlier that implicit in Heidegger's account is 
a critique of the alleged objectivity of values? In fact, Heidegger here finds the 
historical continuity of a metaphysics that connects Western thinkers as distant and 
as different as Plato (the arch-'objectivist') and Nietzsche (interpreted as an exponent 
of a radical 'subjectivisim'). Indeed, for Heidegger, both thinkers - to the extent that 
they think in the oblivion of Being - are just two sides of the same coin. Nietzsche, 
by re-locating the source of both Being and values in the will to power, claims that 
the fundamental aim of his thought is to overcome age-old metaphysical constructs 
which have afflicted philosophy since Plato. But what he cannot see is that 'the will 
to power' is itself the outcome of that very metaphysics which he is aiming to 
overcome. And if life means 'nothing' and is 'meaningless', it is not because Being 
is devoid of meaning, but because the human will is now given the power to 
subordinate all beings and impose its design on what is. In fact, for Heidegger, 
'Nietzsche's metaphysics of will to power unleashes the extreme possibilities of 
Western philosophy by prefiguring the organization of all beings in the service of 
technology, the global drive toward control, manipulation, and domination'. 68 In 
support of Heidegger's understanding of freedom, Schalow argues that, whereas the 
anthropocentric focus on willing conceives freedom in terms of subjective volition, 
68 Schalow, 'At the Crossroads of Freeedom', p. 257. These issues will be addressed in greater detail 
in chapter IV. 
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freedom as proposed by Heidegger takes on the form of an invitation to participate in 
openness. This participatory role of de-cision (Ent-scheidung) - which Being and 
Time called 'resolvedness' (Entschlossenheit) - shows a way of residing in harmony 
with Being's manifestations, where freedom unfolds as a reciprocating between 
Being and Dasein. This kind of freedom, accordingly, is not a possession of the 
subject but has its seat in the ecstatic realm of openness, i. e. it belongs or resides 
within the open expanse of Being that guides whoever chooses to participate in this 
disclosive event. 
But, as freedom assumes primarily an ontological meaning and becomes an 
'attribute' of Being, a power that one receives rather than a capability that one has, 
one wonders whether it is still relevant to the ethical and political concerns of human 
beings? Whether it can still appoint the possibility of good and evil? One possible 
answer could lie in the subtlety hidden in Heidegger's idea offteedom as a gift. For, 
as Schalow also notes, 'if Heidegger's concept of freedom is to include a social 
dimension, then a second level for allocating its power must be operative within 
human choice'. 69 In other words, the power of freedom must be understood as what 
is distributed and shared through a partnership between self and other. In tenns of 
ethics, this would mean that the self is free to the extent that it embraces and protects 
the freedom it has in common with the other. The idea of 'authentic solicitude' 
which was explored in Being and Time - as that mode of care by which Dasein 
acknowledges its caring for the other by freeing the other's being-towards his or her 
own possibility 70 - defines such an act of freedom as 'letting be'. That is: seeking the 
other's 'emancipation' in such a way as to let the other be as other. 
In letting the other be, freedom is a way of responding to the other through an act of 
solicitude. Affects are not involuntary reactions but instead are modalities of openness that 
orient the decisions that we make. Thus the affect of compassion can be an instance of 
Dasein's ecstatic openness, a way of being attuned to the other's situation. This reciprocal 
69 Schalow, 'At the Crossroads of Freedom', p. 260. 
70 C f. the characterization of 'authentic' being-with as 'solicitude which leaps forth and liberates' in 
Being and Time, p. 344. 
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attunement, or way of co-responding to the other, lies at the heart of any ethical awareness. 
We can say that responsibility and responsiveness become co-extensive. 71 
Z5 Conclusion: Being as Historical 
The fundamental question of metaphysics, i. e. 'why are there beings rather than 
nothing? ' and the prior question to which it forces us, namely 'how does it stand with 
Being? ' are, according to Heidegger, historical questions through and through. 
Heidegger understands history as a kind of happening that is never synonymous with 
the past, because the past is that which is no longer happening. History is not what is 
contemporary either, because this merely 'passes by', as it were, without ever 
happening. But history in the sense of happening 'is determined from the future, 
takes over what has been, and acts and endures its way through the present. 72 To ask 
'how does it stand with Being' means to recapture, to retrieve, the beginning of a 
historical existence that has been buried under centuries of neglect and 
misconceptions. In this way we can prepare our existence to be transformed into a 
new beginning and begin, as it were, once again. This 'crucial form of historicism' 
which begins in the 'fimdamental event' is, from Heidegger's point of view, certainly 
possible, on the condition that: 
An inception is not repeated when one shrinks back to it as something that once was, 
something that by now is familiar and is simply to be imitated, but rather when the inception 
is begun again more originally, and with all the strangeness, darkness, insecurity that a 
genuine inception brings wit it. 73 
The question 'how does it stand with Being? ', far from being an abstract or an 
academic one,, is intimately connected with the question 'how does it stand with usT, 
with our Dasein in history. Certainly, all questions concerning our present mode of 
71 Schalow, 'At the Crossroads of Freedom, p. 26 1. 
72 IM, p. 47. 
73 IM, p. 4 1. 
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Being are historical, providing that we understand the relation between metaphysics 
and history in a Heideggerian. sense: 
Our asking of the fundamental metaphysical question is historical because it opens up the 
happening of human Dasein in its essential relations - that is, relations to beings as such 
and as a whole - opens it up to possibilities not yet asked about, futures to come, and 
thereby also binds it back to its inception that has been, and thus sharpens and burdens it in 
its present. 74 
'How do we stand todayT For Heidegger, 'seen metaphysically, we are staggering. 
Everywhere we are underway amid beings, and yet we no longer know how it stands 
with Being'. 75 For what if Being were not an empty word, a vapour, but 'the spiritual 
fate of the West' ? 76 What if the neglect and forgetfulness of Being, itself forgotten, 
were to be the innermost ground of decline? 77 While Nietzsche sees modem nihilism 
as a transitional crisis occasioned in part by the insight that the very concept of Being 
is merely the final wisp of evaporating reality - and with this, the long history of self- 
deception and of a metaphysics that confuses what is with what is not, comes finally 
to its end - nihilism, for Heidegger, is on the one hand profoundly embedded in the 
oblivion of Being, and on the other, in the complete and exclusive occupation with 
present beings. This nihilism, or better, nihilism thus understood 'is the ground for 
, 78 the nihilism that Nietzsche exposed in the first book of the Will to Power . With 
these as yet enigmatic remarks, let us finally turn to Heidegger's reading of 
Nietzsche. 
74 IM, p. 47. 
75 IM, p. 217. 
76 IM, p. 40. 
77 IM, p. 39. 
78 IM, p. 217. 
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Chapter IV 
Heidegger, Nietzsche, and the Essence of Nihilism 
We have seen that,, according to Introduction to Metaphysics, the thought of the 
Being of beings as value represents the last stage of metaphysics. This statement 
receives a much fuller elaboration in Heidegger's confrontation with Nietzsche's 
philosophy, developed in lecture courses held during the years 1936-40, 
especially in the course taught in Freiburg in 1940, entitled Nietzsche: The Will 
to Power (II. European Nihilism), and in the essay 'Nihilism as Determined by 
the History of Being', written between 1944 and 1946.1 In these writings, 
Heidegger, taking his departure from an interpretation of Nietzsche, proceeds to 
unfold a line of thinking concerning nihilism which seeks to think the 'nihil' in 
(nihilism' more fundamentally or 'essentially' than was possible for Nietzsche 
himself Indeed, Heidegger's meditation arrives at the observation that 
Metaphysics is a history in which there is essentially nothing to Being itself- 
metaphysics as such is nihilism proper [eigentlich]. 2 
Nietzsche's philosophy is interpreted by Heidegger as essentially metaphysical 
and moreover, as the completion of metaphysics and thus of nihilism, despite 
Nietzsche's call for an 'overcoming of nihilism': 
Thought in terms of the essence of nihilism, Nietzsche's overcoming is merely the 
fulfilment of nihilism. In it the full essence of nihilism is enunciated for us more clearly 
than in any other fundamental position of metaphysics. What is authentically its own is 
the staying-away [Ausbleiben] of Being itself But insofar as the staying-away occurs in 
metaphysics, such authenticity [Eigentlichkeit] is not admitted as the authenticity of 
nihilism. ' 
' Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. IV, translated by Frank Capuzzi, edited by David Farrell 
Krell, (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1982). Henceforth cited as N. 
2 N, p. 211. 
3 N, p. 219. 
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Nietzsche could not recognize the essence of nihilism, and of the nihilism 
manifesting itself in his work, since he remained entirely within metaphysics, 
albeit in the manner of bringing it to its completion. It is clear even from the 
brief remarks quoted above that Heidegger is not simply setting out a concept of 
nihilism which is entirely unrelated to Nietzsche's. Indeed he emphasizes the 
close connection of Nietzsche's philosophy with his own (Heidegger's) 
understanding of nihilism which, he suggests, is a more fundamental 
understanding of what Nietzsche himself sought to address, but failed - had to 
fail - to think authentically. In order to follow Heidegger's line of thought it is 
therefore necessary to engage with his interpretation of Nietzsche's analysis of 
European nihilism. Since this interpretation in some respects quite explicitly 
goes against what is said on the surface of Nietzsche's text, we shall first seek to 
understand what that text does in fact, on the surface, say, in order then to move 
to Heidegger's interpretation of its more essential meaning. 
Like Heidegger, we shall take as the primary basis of our discussion of 
Nietzsche's understanding of nihilism the notes assembled in Book I of The Will 
to Power under the heading 'European Nihilism'. 4 Given that many Nietzsche 
scholars would contest that such a textual focus on the Nachlass notes captures 
the 'essential' Nietzsche, this may be an appropriate place for some more general 
reflections on the vexed issue of Heidegger's textual interpretations. After all, 
not only his reading of Nietzsche, but also his - in scholarly terms - unorthodox 
interpretations of Plato or Parmenides have been challenged by philologists and 
other scholars. We may sunnise that Heidegger's response to such 
wissenschaftliche objections would in such cases be essentially the same: 
putatively neutral, wissenschaftlich scholarship can never hope to grasp what is 
4 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. By Walter Kaufirnann and R. J. Hollingdale, 
edited by Walter Kaufmann, (New York: Vintage Books, 1968). Henceforth cited as AT, 
followed by fi7agment number. WP is of course not a book by Nietzsche, but a collection of notes 
from his Nachlass, selected and arranged by the original editors after Nietzsche's death. 
However, as Heidegger stresses, this provenance of the text does not necessarily or by itself 
invalidate what is said in the individual notes as genuine expressions of Nietzsche's thought. 
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fundamentally being said in the texts of the essential thinkers, for such 
scholarship remains constitutively within the horizon of objectifying Historie. 
The presumption that the operative terms in those texts are used with a meaning 
that is establishable or even intelligible from within an essentially 
representational paradigm of thinking is a hermeneutic fore-judgement that may 
itself be called arbitrary. Examples of his rejection of this fore-judgement of 
course abound in his writings, but one from the present context of his 
confrontation with Nietzsche may suffice for purposes of illustration, since the 
pattern is repeated elsewhere. Nietzsche often refers to nihilism as a 
'psychological' state (e. g. WP 3). Yet, according to Heidegger, we have to 
understand this only seemingly straightforward ten-n as having a more 'essential' 
meaning in this case, and in fact to be a reference to metaphysics: 
If Nietzsche speaks of nihilism as a 'psychological state', he will also operate with 
(psychological' concepts and speak the language of 'psychology' when he explains the 
essence of nihilism ... Nonetheless, we must detect a more essential content in such language, because it refers to the 'cosmos', to beings as a whole. ' 
Just as the meaning of 'Being' is not accessible at the fundamental level to 
objectifying judgement, so the deeper, essential sense of what is spoken in the 
texts of the essential thinkers, is not in principle accessible to seemingly 'neutral' 
philological investigation. And indeed, it is clear that this view is consistent with 
Heidegger's analysis of the derivative and levelling character of all objectifying 
judgement. But, it may perhaps be retorted, what are our standards of 
interpretation to be, if not those of 'objective' philological scholarship? For 
Heidegger, any such demand for a 'standard' to be chosen by human will is itself 
symptomatic of the 'nihilistic' mode of thinking constitutive of modernity. This 
is to be contrasted - albeit not by way of simple opposition - with a mode of 
thinking which attempts to think the truth of Being as such (see Section 4 of the 
N, p. 26. See also N, pp. 28-9. 
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present chapter). A remark Heidegger makes about such thinking in 
Contributions to Philosophy may suitably be taken to apply also to the 
interpretive questions we are currently considering. What then becomes clear is 
that the dispute between Heidegger and his philological critics is not one that 
could possibly be decided on any 'neutral' ground. Heidegger thus seems to us 
entirely correct when he indicates, time and again, that there is no such neutral 
ground of hermeneutics. In this sense, Heidegger's readings and their truth or 
otherwise are indeed a matter of a de-cision (which, as should be obvious by 
now, is very far from saying that they 'lack rigour', for their rigour is not, nor 
does it aim to be, that of standard wissenschaftlich philology): 
This knowing, such unpretentious boldness, can be bom only in the grounding- 
attunement of reservedness. But then it also knows that every attempt to justify and to 
explain the venture from the outside - and thus not from within what it ventures - lags 
behind what is ventured and unden-nines it. But does that not continue to be arbitrary? 
Certainly. The only question is whether this arbitrariness is not the utmost necessity of 
a distressing distress - that distress that forces the thinking saying of Being into word. 6 
1. Nietzsche on European Nihilism 
In The Will To Power, Nietzsche announces 'the advent of nihilism' as the 
'history of the next two centuries', Nihilism 'stands at the door' and we 'already 
f rMS of it. 
7 live in the midst of incomplete 0 What is nihilism? A 
characterization of Nietzsche's concept of nihilism, as understood by himself, is 
by no means straightforward, since he uses a number of different formulations 
for it and distinguishes several different senses of 'nihilism'. The sense which is 
6 Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), tram. Parvis Emad and 
Kenneth Maly (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 171. 
(Henceforth cited as CP). 
7 The citations in this sentence are fi7om WP, Preface 2, WP 1, and WP 28. 
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most prominent in these notes grasps nihilism as 'the radical repudiation of 
value, meaning, and desirability': 8 
Nihilism as a psychological state wi ave to be reached, first, when we have sought a 
cmeaning' in all events that is not there: so the seeker eventually becomes discouraged. 9 
Radical nihilism is the conviction of an absolute untenability of existence when it 
comes to the highest values one recognizes... 10 
Now that the shabby origin of these values is becoming clear, the universe seems to 
have lost value, seems 'meaningless' - but that is only a transitional stage. II 
Nihilism is here described by Nietzsche as a psychological state, which he 
sometimes simply calls a 'feeling of meaninglessness', occasioned by the 
realization that the 'highest values' one used to recognize are non-existent. What 
has brought about this realization are our cognitive endeavours guided by one of 
these values themselves, the 'truthfulness' enjoined by the morality of the 
(ascetic ideal' which codifies the highest values that have govemed our life 
hitherto. 12 How does this 'feeling' manifest itself? Nietzsche speaks of 
13 
weariness, disgust, even an 'inability to endure this world'. It is clear from 
these descriptions that what is being characterized is what he then goes on to 
distinguish as 'passive nihilism': a condition he also summarizes under the 
concept of exhaustion. Symptoms of this condition are, according to Nietzsche, 
widespread in contemporary culture and can be found especially in phenomena 
offlight from this 'world' that has become unendurable. Foremost among these 
fonns of flight are the longing for intoxication and for states of unconsciousness 
(a 'deadening of the affects'). 14 But if nihilism as a psychological state is a 
suffering from meaninglessness, how are we to understand that 'meaning' which 
I WP I. 9 WP 12. 
10 WP 3. 
" WP 7. 
12 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, Essay 111, Section 24; in: On the Genealo 
of Morals and Ecce Homo, translated by W. Kaufimann and R. J. Hollingdale, edited by W. 
Kaufmann, (New York: Vintage Books, 1989). Henceforth cited as GM. 
13 Wp 12 A. 
14 For the desire for intoxication as a symptom of passive nihilism, see WP 48, for the longing for 
unconsciousness, see WP 48. See also GM 111, Sections 17 and 19. 
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is experienced as absent in it? To put it differently, what are those 'highest 
values' which rendered existence meaningful prior to their withdrawal or 
deposition? Nietzsche's most developed discussion of this can be found in WP 
12, which is also the fragment at the centre of Heidegger's interpretation of 
Nietzsche. Here Nietzsche sets out three ways in which a 'meaning' now lost 
used to manifest itself- 
1. First, meaning (value) was seen as residing in the notion of a goal or end of 
history, towards which it was moving teleologically, whereas 'now one realizes 
that becoming aims at nothing and achieves nothing': 
This meaning could have been: the 'fulfillment' of some highest ethical canon In all 
events, the moral world order; or the growth of love and harmony in the intercourse of 
beings; or the gradual approximation of a state of universal happiness... " 
It is clear that what Nietzsche has in mind here are teleological conceptions of 
history as found pre-eminently in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, but in 
secularised fon-ns also characteristic of (for example) orthodox Flegelianism, 
Marxism, and Comtean positivism. 
2. Secondly, meaning used to manifest itself in the idea of a 'grand unity in 
which the individual could inunerse himself as in an element of supreme value': 
Some sort of unity, some form of 'monism': this faith suffices to give man a deep 
feeling of standing in the context of, and being dependent on, some whole that is 
infinitely superior to him, and he sees himself as a mode of the deity. 16 
In this form of meaning, value is seen as inhering not in the end or goal of the 
process of world history, but rather in the unified totality of reality as such. 
Nietzsche's language (monism, man as a mode of the deity) suggests that he has 
in mind above all Spinozist metaphysics and its descendants. Here the individual 
human being is seen as an essentially dependent part or moment of nature, the 
15 WP 12 A. 
16 
ibid. 
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latter conceived as a necessarily interrelated and unified whole, in which, due to 
its self-subsistent plenitude of being, 'perfection' - 'supreme value', in 
Nietzsche's language - resides. 
3. Finally, meaning has been found in the idea of a world of being separate from 
this world of becoming: 'to pass sentence on this whole world of becoming as a 
deception and to invent a world beyond it, a true world' in which there is no 
becoming and passing away. This is probably Nietzsche's most familiar 
description of what he elsewhere calls the ascetic ideal: 
The idea at issue here is the valuation the ascetic priest places on our life: he juxtaposes 
it (along with what pertains to it: 'nature' 'world', the whole sphere of becoming and 
transitoriness) with a quite different mode of existence which it opposes and excludes, 
unless it turn against itself, deny itself- in that case, the case of the ascetic life, life 
counts as a bridge to that other mode of existence. 17 
Nietzsche's primary historical example for this ascetic valuation in its pure form 
is Platonism and, of course, the 'Platonism for the people' Christianity, although 
he frequently also cites Buddhism in this connection. 
The three modes of meaningfulness elucidated above are referred to by 
Nietzsche in one passage as the 'categories "aim", "unity", "being"' 18 , and we 
shall see that this formulation will be of central importance for Heidegger. 
Meanwhile we may ask whether there is anything like a unifying principle 
underlying the modes of meaning mentioned by Nietzsche. And indeed there 
seems to be. What they have in common is the idea that individual human 
existence receives its value, its 'justification' if we wish, through orienting itself 
towards something beyond it and other than it. Individual human beings perceive 
their meaning as bestowed upon them through acting for the sake of something 
other and 'greater' than them: 
17 GM 111,11. 
18 WP12 A. 
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The nihilistic question 'for what? ' is rooted in the old habit of supposing that the goal 
must be put up, given, demandedfirom outside - by some superhuman authority [ ... ] the authority of reason. [ ... ] Or 
history with an immanent spirit and a goal within, so one 
can entrust oneself to it. One wants to get around the will, the willing of a goal, the risk 
of positing a goalfor oneseýf 19 
At bottom, man has lost the belief in his own value when no infinitely valuable whole 
works through him; i. e., he conceived such a whole in order to be able to believe in his 
own value. 20 
These formulations are ambiguous in an important respect. When Nietzsche says 
that the common feature of the forms of 'meaning' recognized hitherto is that 
what makes human comportment 'meaningful' is something that is in some sense 
4 given ... 
from outside', does this refer only to the origin of such comportment, 
or also to its end? Other formulations, however, indicate clearly that Nietzsche 
has both senses in mind. Man has conceived of his comportments as meaningful 
if they were both experienced as demanded by an external source of value (God, 
reason, history, etc. ), and directed towards it as the goal of the individual 
comportment. This is why Nietzsche says that what underlies these forms of 
(meaning' is a 'moral evaluation': that the telos of human comportment is to be 
outside the individual,, and that his comportment is therefore to be, in this precise 
sense,, (unegoistic': 
The nihilistic consequence (the belief in valuelessness) as a consequence of moral 
valuation: everything egoistic has come to disgust us (even though we recognize the 
impossibility of the unegoiStiC); 21 
Nihilism ensues when the belief in the actuality, or indeed the very possibility, of 
such comportments disappears. This implies that what ultimately precipitates 
nihilism is a psychological realization, and this seems to explain Nietzsche's 
statement in Beyond Good and Evil that psychology has now become the most 
, 22 fundamental science, the 'queen of the sciences . Nietzsche 
here uses an epithet 
19 WP 20. 
20 Wp 12 A. 
21 WP 8. 
22 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, section 23 
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that has traditionally been applied to metaphysics, which suggests that he is 
thinking of his own thought as replacing metaphysics. We shall leave a further 
discussion of this matter until we have given Heidegger's interpretation of this 
passage. For Nietzsche, passive nihilism is a 'transitional stage' 23 . From what 
has been said so far, it is not difficult to understand why this should be so. In the 
condition of nihilism the world appears 'meaningless' because the values of the 
ascetic ideal that used to be recognized as 'highest' are seen as non-existent (or 
'impossible'). What remains after their demise is the world of 'becoming' and of 
individual existence which was considered as worthless by humanity in thrall to 
the values of the ascetic ideal. But once it is fully recognized that these values 
were illusory, it is only a short way to the further realization that there is no 
reason to consider what remains after their demise as worthless. This is the 
realization that the values of the ascetic ideal arise from the same ground as that 
which they represent as worthless: the world of becoming and of individual 
(egoism', a world which Nietzsche increasingly came to conceptualize under the 
title 'will to power'. Nietzsche saw the consequences of this realization as 
cataclysmic, and called the historical period defined by them 'the period of 
catastophe' or the 'tragic age': 
The repudiated world versus an artificially built 'true, valuable' one - Finally one 
discovers of what material one has built the 'true world': all one now has left is the 
repudiated one [ ... ] At this point nihilism 
is reached: all that one has left are the values 
that pass judgement [on the repudiated world] - nothing else. Here the problem of 
strength and weakness originates: 
1. The weak perish of it; 
2. those who are stronger destroy what does not perish; 
3. those who are strongest overcome the values that pass judgement. 
In sum this constitutes the tragic age. 24 
Nietzsche seems to think of (I. ) as the completion of passive nihilism: 
23 WP 7. 
24 Wp 3 17. Cf. also WP 56. 
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Morality [ 
... 
] taught men to hate and despise most profoundly what is the basic 
character trait of those who rule: their will to power [ ... 
] If the suffering and oppressed 
lost the faith that they have the right to despise the will to power, they would enter the 
phase of hopeless despair. This would be the case if this trait were essential to life and 
it could be shown that even in this will to morality this very 'will to power' were 
hidden, and even this hatred and contempt for the will to power were still a will to 25 
power. 
The responses mentioned under (2. ) and (3. ) in the quotation above are 
designated by Nietzsche as 'active nihilism'. He associates his own work in 
particular with (3. ), the overcoming of the 'values that pass judgement' on 
becoming and the will to power: 'that I have hitherto been a thorough-going 
nihilist I have admitted to myself only recently': 26 
Nihilism [... ] can be a sign of strength: the spirit may have grown so strong that 
previous goals ('convictions', articles of belief) have become incommensurate [ ... 
] It 
reaches its maximum of relative strength as a violent force of destruction - as active 
nihilism. ' 27 
While Nietzsche does not explicitly relate these particular remarks to his own 
philosophy, there can be little doubt that he saw it, or at least one side of it, as the 
destructive force par excellence. Almost all his later thinking seeks to hasten and 
to deepen the fall of the values of the ascetic ideal and to 'overcome' them. 
What renders Nietzsche's reflections on active nihilism perplexing is that, among 
the values and articles of belief to be 'destroyed' by it, he does not emphasize 
those which he has highlighted in his description of the ascetic ideal: the belief in 
a telos of history; or in a metaphysical holism and monism ('unity'); or in a 'true 
world' of changeless being behind the apparent world of becoming. Rather, he 
emphasizes as the most 
fundamental target of the destructive energy of active nhilism the idea of a truth 
that is independent of value-constituted 'perspectives': 
25 WT 55(6). 
'6WP 25. 
27 WT 2' 3. 
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[T]hat there is no truth, that there is no absolute nature of things nor a 'thing in itself. 
This, too, is merely nihilism - even the most extreme nihilism. 
28 
The most extreme form of nihilism would be the view that every belief, every 
cons idering-something-true, is necessarily false because there simply is no true world. 
Thus: a perspectival appearance whose origin lies in us [ ... ] That it is the measure of 
strength to what extent we can admit to ourselves, without perishing, [this] merely 
apparent character [ ... ] To this extent, nihilism, as the denial of the truthful world, of 
being, might be a divine way of thinking. 29 
'Perspectivism', the view that there is no 'absolute truth', is here introduced by 
Nietzsche explicitly as the expression of 'active nihilism' and thus as a part of 
his project of 'overcoming the values that pass judgement' on the world of 
appearances and becoming. According to perspectivism, all truth is perspectival: 
it applies to, or consists of, value-laden view-points and perspectival appearances 
from such view-points. Thus, there is no absolute, non-perspectival reality 
'behind' the human perspective - all there is beyond the human perspective and 
its relative truths are other, non-human perspectives and their relative truths. 30 
Why does Nietzsche think that such a doctrine might 'overcome' the values of 
the ascetic ideal? Perhaps he believes this because, in a perspectival world of this 
kind, the values of the ascetic ideal can find no application: in such a world there 
cannot be a pre-ordained telos towards which human history moves anyway; nor 
can there be a 'grand unity', since the perspectives are essentially plural; nor, 
obviously, can there be a 'true world' of being opposed to the world of 
appearances. 
'Active nihilism' is essentially a destructive energy. When Nietzsche 
calls himself an extreme nihilist, should we conclude from this that this 
destructive endeavour is Nietzsche's last word? This would hardly do him 
justice. For there are many places where Nietzsche indicates that the destruction 
of 'previous goals', that is, the values of the ascetic ideal, is only the first stage of 
28 WP I 
29 Wp 15. 
30 See e. g. WP 556, WP 565, WP 567. WP 568. I 
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a revaluation of values which would terminate in the affirmation of 'new values' 
and thus of a new form of 'meaning' This new 'meaning' would of course, from 
the view-point of the ascetic ideal, seem 'terrible' and as the apotheosis of the 
meaningless. In the notes on European nihilism, Nietzsche hints briefly at such a 
new meaning: 
Does it make sense to conceive a god 'beyond good and evil'? [ ... ] Can we remove the idea of a goal from the process and then affirm the process in spite of this? This would 
be the case if something were attained at every moment within this process - and 
always the same. 31 
The idea of an affirmation of the process of becoming without a telos is 
developed further in Nietzsche's thought of the eternal recurrence and of amor 
fati. 
My formula for greatness in a human being is amorfati: that one wants nothing to be 
different [ ... ] Not merely 
bear what is necessary [ ... ] but love it. 
32 
We cannot discuss this thought of Nietzsche's in detail here. It may suffice to 
remark that the success or failure of his declared endeavour to overcome nihilism 
would seem to be closely connected to the possibility or otherwise of such 
4 greatness'. 
2. Heidegger's Interpretation of Nietzsche 
Our interpretation of Nietzsche on European nihilism has so far been guided by a 
deliberate effort to stay close to the linguistic 'surface' of what Nietzsche's text 
says. It has, of course, like all readings, involved a selection among the available 
textual material, and an accentuating of some aspects over others - but we have 
31 WP 55(4). 
32 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 'Why I Am so Clever', 10; in: On the Genealogz of Morals 
and Ecce Homo, edited by W. Kaufmann, trans. W. Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, (New York: 
Vintage, 1989. 
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sought to follow the accentuations and emphases in the texts themselves, partly 
by focusing on formulations which occur, with slight variations, quite frequently 
in Nietzsche's writings. Heidegger's procedure in reading Nietzsche is 
deliberately different. To begin with, Heidegger claims that Nietzsche reaches his 
'essential' philosophy only in the Nachlass notes, and that these can therefore be 
read adequately without any reference to the writings published by himself 
Secondly, Heidegger maintains that Nietzsche's formulations, even in the notes 
collected in the Will to Power, are sometimes significantly misleading and 
therefore require an interpretation which reaches past the semantic surface of 
Nietzsche's language to its 'essential content'. 33 
After these preliminary remarks, let us now turn to Heidegger's interpretation 
itself 
For Heidegger, we cannot understand what Nietzsche means by nihilism 
without realizing that Nietzsche is first and foremost a metaphysician. 'Nihilism' 
in Nietzsche designates Nietzsche's own metaphysics. This metaphysics is 
essentially defined not by 'perspectivism' but by the concepts of will to power 
and the recurrence of the same 34 What is 'will to power'? 'Power' is understood 
by Heidegger here in the sense of essentially instrumental, 'technological' 
domination. When Nietzsche says, in some notes, that 'the world is will to 
power', this means, according to Heidegger: 
Because the 'transcendent'. the 'beyond', and 'heaven' have been abolished, only the 
'earth' remains. The new order must therefore be the absolute dominance of pure power 
over the earth through man. 35 
Such power is by no means 'subject-less', but rather presupposes a conception 
(and self-conception) of man as sub-iectum, as his own ground. This is where 
Nietzsche's essential affinity to Descartes is to be located, as will be elucidated 
33 See footnote 4 above. 
34 N, pp. 5-7. No reference to Nietzsche's texts Is given by Heidegger for the interpretive claims 
made in this and in the last sentence. 
35 N. 8. 
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below. Power qua domination is essentially an endless and limitless process of 
overpowering, since it consists in surpassing whatever level of power has already 
been attained. 36 The process of overpowering, since it acknowledges no end and 
indeed nothing besides itself, could be said to recur ever again to itself and this 
is what the 'eternal recurrence of the same' means. The term 'becoming*, 
according to Heidegger's interpretation, unites the meanings of 'will to power' 
and 'eternal recurrence of the same': the 'ten-n becoming signifies the 
overpowering of power, as the essence of power, which powerfully and 
continually returns to itself in its own way'. 37 The subiectum that fashions itself 
in the image of the will to power, the recurrence of the same, and becoming, 
understood in this way, would be no longer man as we have known him in the 
38 past, but a new kind of man, the Ubermensch. Nihilism, then, is Nietzsche's 
name for his own metaphysics as interpreted by Heidegger. But has Nietzsche 
not explicitly defined nihilism as a psychological state? Heidegger responds to 
this objection that Nietzsche does not mean by 'psychology' what is ordinarily 
meant by it. Rather, he uses this term to designate a particular metaphysics, 
namely the metaphysics 'that posits man [ ... ] as the measure and centre, as 
ground and aim of all being. ' Hence, 'Nietzsche's "psychology" is simply 
coterminous with metaphysics'. 39 
36 Heidegger again gives no reference in this instance, but he is almost certainly thinking of 
Nietzsche's argument in passages like " 695 and VvT 699. 37 N, p. 8. 
38 It seems that Heidegger's interpretation of the Ubermensch here is strongly influenced by the 
figure of the 'worker' in Ernst JUnger's influential treatise Der Arbeiter. This becomes especially 
clear in the following passage: 'What is needed is a form of mankind that is from top to bottom 
equal to the unique fundamental essence of modem technology and its metaphysical truth; that is 
to say, that lets itself be entirely dominated by the essence of technology [... ] In the sense of 
Nietzsche's metaphysics, only the Over-man is appropriate to an absolute "machine economy" 
and vice versa; ' (N, p. 117, my italics). We know that Heidegger read Ringer's essay 'Total 
Mobilization', containing a condensed version of the argument of Der Arbeiter, shortly after its 
publication in 1930, and regarded it as 'showing an essential comprehension of Nietzsche's 
metaphysics'. (See R. Wolin (ed. ), The Heidegger Controversy, p. 12 1). 
1 19 N, pp. 28-29. Heidegger's evidence for this reading consists in a passage from Beyond Good 
and Evil, section 23. His interpretation of this passage presupposes that the phrase 'will to power' 
is used in this passage not in a psychological sense, but in a metaphysical sense. Critics might 
therefore argue that the interpretation presupposes precisely what it claims to demonstrate - that 
there is no autonomous 'psychology' in Nietzsche which is not derived from a particular 
metaphysics. 
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In discussing Heidegger's interpretation, we have so far not made 
reference to a concept which is obviously central for Nietzsche: the concept of 
value. For Heidegger, this concept is also essentially connected with Nietzsche's 
metaphysics and cannot in fact be understood apart from it. When Nietzsche 
speaks of his philosophy as attempting a 'revaluation of all values', he refers by 
this to his metaphysics of the will to power (and hence to nihilism): 'The 
revaluation thinks Being for the first time as value. With it, metaphysics begins 
to be value thinking. 40 In fact, the very concept of value Is essentially tied to a 
metaphysics of power: 
Values are essentially related to 'domination' Dominance is the being in power of 
power. Values are bound to will to power; they depend on it as the proper essence of 41 
power. 
What does this mean? Does it mean that in Nietzsche's metaphysics, and only in 
it, values are seen as in fact (that is 'contingently') 'posited' by the will to power, 
because the world is in fact 'will to power'? If this was the case, there would be 
no essential dependency of the concept of value on the concept of the will to 
power, since Nietzsche nowhere says that any possible world has to be will to 
power by some kind of absolute necessity. However, it is clear and explicit that 
Heidegger maintains that the concept of value is essentially dependent upon the 
concept of will to power: 
If metaphysics is the truth of beings as a whole and therefore speaks about the Being of 
beings, from what interpretation of being as a whole does value thinking originate? Our 
answer is that it originates from a deten-nination of beings as a whole through the basic 
trait of will to power. 42 
Heidegger's primary textual reference in this regard is WP 12 B. where 
Nietzsche says: 
40 N, 6. 
4 'N, p. 50. 
42 N, p. 60. 
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all these values [of the ascetic ideal] are, psychologically considered, the results of 
certain perspectives of utility, designed to maintain and increase human constructs of 
domination - and they have been falsely projected into the essence of things. What we 
find here is still the hyperbolic naiveti of man: positing himself as the meaning and 
measure of the value of things. 
It is questionable, however, whether Nietzsche is saying here that all values are 
essentially (with absolute necessity) 'constructs of domination'. If this was his 
point, he would be saying that the advocates of the ascetic ideal, when they claim 
to believe in the value of the 'unegoistic' - i. e. the opposite of domination - are 
making, so to speak, a 'logical' error, and misunderstand the very concept of 
value itself But this does not seem to be his point. Rather, he often says that we 
can demonstrate, with 'psychological honesty', that 'unegoistic motives' are in 
fact other than what they claim to be - that they are deceptions. Therefore, those 
who claim to believe in unegoistic values do not infact do SO. 43 Does this imply 
that, for Nietzsche, the idea of values not governed by the will to power is 
simply 'nonsense', or that it is a misunderstanding of what values in their very 
essence are? 
Heidegger, in putting forward this interpretation, in fact seems to be 
going beyond what Nietzsche himself says - we might say that he radicalizes 
Nietzsche's own interpretation of values, which Nietzsche had already regarded 
as a radical departure from all previous understandings of value or 'the good'. 
What is the thinking that underlies this radicalization and grounds it? We 
can find the following line of thinking on this issue in Heidegger. The notion of 
value derives ultimately from Plato's t8F-ccrou (x7oc0ou, the 'idea of the good'. 
Plato, at the beginning of metaphysics, understood the Being of beings as 
enduring presence in the unconcealed and, in this sense, as 'visibleness'. The 
43 The best known example of this kind of 'psychological' demonstration is Nietzsche's analysis 
of ressentiment and of the origin of 'slave morality' in GM 1,10-14. It is remarkable that 
Heidegger does not mention this or indeed any of Nietzsche's 'psychological' analyses in his 
discussion of Nietzsche's value thinking in this lecture course. 
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idea itseýf is aWOOv, according to Heidegger's interpretation of Plato, and is 
conceived by Plato as suitability, as what is 'good for something', for it makes 
possible that entities come into the unconcealed. The Being of beings, for Plato, 
thus is both enduring presence and what makes this possible. 44 At the beginnincr 
of modernity, when Being as enduring presence is replaced by Being as 
representedness, beingness as what makes possible entities accordingly becomes 
conditions of the possibility of objects, and it does so explicitly in Kant's 
philosophy. But thinking in terms of 'values' adds a ftuther element to the idea 
of 'condition for something'. This is the idea of a 'view-point' which 'estimates'. 
There are only values if there are points of view which estimate. 45 To 'estimate' 
involves assessing and comparing. (For Nietzsche, this is expressed in the 
terminology of 'higher' and 'lower' values. ) The estimating in question here is 
specified by Heidegger as 'reckoning with' something: 
A value is a value because it has validity. It has validity because it has been posited as 
valid. It is thus posited by an envisioning of something that through the envisioning 
first receives the character of a thing with which one can reckon and that therefore has 
validity [i. e. is of value]. 46 
How is this to be understood? Heidegger elucidates: 
Reckoning thus understood is a self-imposed positing of conditions in such a way that 
the conditions condition the Being of beings. [ ... ] When do 'conditions' [ ... ] come to be values? Only when the representing of beings as such comes to be that representing 
which absolutely posits itself on itself and has to constitute of itself and for itself all the 
conditions of Being. 47 
But this is precisely how the will to power has been interpreted by Heidegger: 
For Nietzsche, subjectivity is likewise absolute, albeit in a different sense [from 
Hegel's] [ ... ] Here truth 
is in its essence error, so that the distinction between truth and 
untruth falls away. The distinction is consigned to the command decision of the will to 
power, which absolutely enjoins the respective roles of various perspectives according 
44 N, pp. 168-171. 45 N, pp. 62-63. 
46 N, p. 62. 47 N, p. 177. 
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to the need for power [ ... 
] power is the disposing over the true and the untrue, the 
verdict concerning the respective roles of error, semblance, and the production of 
semblance for the preservation and enhancement of power remain solely with the will 
to power itse lf48 
Since for Heidegger 'Being' and 'truth' are fundamentally equivalent '49 this 
implies that in the metaphysics of the will to power, the subject of will to power 
4posits itself on itself and has to constitute of itself and for itself all the 
conditions of Being'. It follows from this that there can be belief in 'values' only 
if the world is conceived, explicitly or not, in terms of self-grounding 
subjectivity, i. e. as will to power: 
'Value' is essentially use-value, but 'use' must here be equated with the condition of 
the preservation of power; that is, always at the same time, with the condition of the 
enhancement of power. 50 
Before commenting on this argument of Heidegger's, it is necessary to ask again: 
is it intended to apply only to Nietzsche's concept of value? Or is it directed at 
any concept of value or worth that goes beyond the Platonic idea of the 'good' as 
interpreted by Heidegger (ro ccyccOov as 'what is suitable for, what makes 
possible... ') by adding an element of 'estimation', of 'higher' and 'lower'? If the 
fon-ner was the case, the claim might seem hardly controversial, although we 
have seen above that Heidegger in fact radicalises Nietzsche's concept of value, 
in so far as this can be judged from what Nietzsche explicitly says. Heidegger's 
references to the 'philosophy of value' of the neo-Kantians Windelband and 
Rickert and to 'phenomenology of value' (at that time mainly associated with the 
philosophy of Max Scheler) indicate, 51 however, that the target is certainly not 
only Nietzsche and does indeed seem to be 'value thinking' and valuing quite 
generally. This is confirmed by Heidegger's remarks in the 'Letter on 
Humanism', written in 1946-7. that 
48 N, pp. 143-144. 
49This is stated explicitly also in the Nietzsche lectures. See N, p. 13 1. 
50 N, p. 66. 
5'N, 
p. 59. 
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by the assessment of something as a value what is valued is admitted only as an object 
of man's estimation. But what a thing is in its Being is not exhausted by its being an 
object, particularly when objectivity takes the form of value. [ ... ] Every valuing, even 
when it values positively, is a subjectivizing. It does not let beings: be. Rather, valuing 
lets beings: be valid - solely as the objects of its doing. 52 
Perhaps we can summarize Heidegger's statements about value thinking and 
valuing in the following observations: (1) in valuing, what or how something 'is' 
in its Being is imposed through a doing by the subject of valuing; (2) the Being 
of something in so far as it is 'envisioned' as a value is the Being of an object; 
(3) the Being of a value is essentially dependent upon 'man's estimation'; (4) the 
Being of a value is essentially the Being of a use-object. (5) what it is 'of use' for 
is essentially the preservation and enhancement of the power of man. 
It is not our intention here to 'assess' these Heideggerian interpretations. 
It is more important for us to understand the issues that are at stake. It may be 
helpful in this regard to consider briefly how value thinkers, including Nietzsche, 
might respond to these observations, without ourselves seeking precipitately to 
adjudicate in this matter. 
(I. ) Nietzsche himself often claims that all values are 'Imposed' through a 
doing of the valuer. But in this respect he departs, of course, strongly 
from the main tradition of philosophical thinking on value, according to 
which the idea of value essentially is the idea of 'being affected' by 
something and of being therefore 'passively' receptive to it. According to 
some value thinkers, the greater or 'deeper' this affection is, the more the 
5' 
subject tends to disappear and be absorbed in it. ' Other philosophers of 
S2 4 Letter on Humanism', in: Basic Writings, edited by David Farrell Krell, (London: Routledge, 
19930, p. 251. 
53 For Schopenhauer, this 'absorption' of the subject was characteristic of the experience of 
aesthetic value. According to him, in this experience all willing or striving subsides and the 
willing subject vanishes together with it. See Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and 
Representation, Book I 
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value have argued that the idea of an active imposing of values through 
'willing' mistakes the very essence of the Being of values. 54 
(2. ) The claim that values are objects is not made by Nietzsche, and is 
perhaps especially associated with Scheler's phenomenology of value. 55 
Scheler means by this that, for example, the 'beauty' of a painting is 
given as a quality in the painting itseýf, it is not discovered through 
reflection and hence not, in this sense, 'subjective'. On the other hand, 
among the values recognized by Scheler are values which belong to the 
'person' and to 'acts' (intentional experiences) 'immediately'. 56 An act of 
love, for example, is of value, and experienced as such, in and by itself 
But since neither the person nor the person's intentional acts are 
essentially objects for Scheler, 57 it could be argued that values, according 
to his own account, cannot essentially be objects either, although they 
can essentially be made into objects, just like intentional experiences can 
be made into objects when we reflect on them. 
(3. ) That the Being of values qua values is essentially dependent on man 
would be disputed both by Nietzsche and by other value thinkers. For 
Nietzsche, all perspectives, human or non-human, are governed by 
values. An animal can experience something as pleasurable and eo ipso 
experience it as valuable, although it can of course not conceptualise it as 
such. Similarly, for Nietzsche, there may be perspectives in which values 
are given of kinds of which human beings have no inkling at all. In so far 
as values, for Nietzsche and other value theorists, are essentially subject 
to differentiation in terms of greater or smaller, higher or lower, they 
54 See e. g. Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Value, trans. A S. 
Frings and R. L. Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 246-247. Charles 
Taylor has argued in a well-known essay that what fundamentally 'matters' or is of value to me 
cannot be willed by me and can therefore not be the result of my doing. See Charles Taylor, 
'Responsibility for Self, in: Free Will, edited by G. Watson, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1983), p. 
55 Scheler, Formalism in Ethics, pp. 12f. 
56 Formalism in Ethics, pp. 100- 10 1 
57 Formalism in Ethics, p. 386f. 
182 
involve the possibility of 'estimation', of representing something in the 
mode of assessing and comparing it. But it could be argued that while 
such active 'reckoning' of the subject is essentially involved in any 
representation, the primary experience of value, as a living in the value 
and being absorbed in it, is not such a representation and hence does not 
and cannot actively assess in this way. It belongs to its essence, however, 
that it can subsequently become the object of assessment and 
comparison. 
(4. ) The idea that every value qua value is necessarily use-value 'for' 
something would be disputed by value thinkers as mistaking the essence 
of the matter. They would argue that, if something is to be 'of use for' 
something else, that something else must already have been recognized 
as either worthy in itself (as an 'end'), or as in turn useftil for something 
that is of value in itself. The idea of use-value is founded in the idea of 
some 'intrinsic' value which is not merely of use for, or suitable for, 
something else. As we saw earlier, while for traditional ethics that 
intrinsic value did not necessarily reside in or belong to the valuer 
himself/herself, Nietzsche denied this by 'psychologically' analysing 
anything 'unegoistic' as an illusion. The only intrinsic value recognized 
by humans, according to the later Nietzsche, is the enhancement of 
power of the valuer in an endless process of 'overpowering'. But there 
are indications in his writings that it might be a misunderstanding to 
interpret this process as necessarily one of self-grounding stabilization 
and em owerment of the subject: 
Heroism - that is the attitude of a man who strives towards an aim that is such that, 
reckoned in relation to it,, he does not count at all. H<eroism> is the good will to self- 
destruction. [ ... 
] Unconditional love includes - also the desire to be mistreated: it is a 
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defiance against oneself, and self-giving [Hingabe] turns ultimately into the wish for 
self-destruction: 'To perish in this sea!, 
58 
... ] true goodness, nobility, greatness of soul 
[ ... ], which does not give in order to take, 
which does not want to raise itself by being good, - wasteful expenditure as the type of 
true goodness, the rich fullness of the person as its presupposition 59 
3. Metaphysics and the Authentic Essence of Nihilism 
We have already mentioned that, for Heidegger, Nietzsche's 4 classical nihilism' 
fails to think the essence of nihilism authentically. This is due to the fact that 
Nietzsche thinks nihilism from within metaphysics, and thus is unable to 
consider the 'nihil' in 'nihilism' in a way that is appropriate to its essence. 
Nietzsche, as a metaphysican, does not and cannot take 'the question of the 
nothing seriously'. 60 But this is itself part and parcel of the fact that metaphysics 
does not think Being as such. Metaphysics cannot consider the nothing in its 
authentic essence because, for it, 'there is nothing to Being'. But precisely for 
this reason, the history of metaphysics itself is nihilism proper. In this Section we 
shall seek to understand Heidegger's path of thinking that leads to this 
conclusion. 
We have so far been using the term 'metaphysics' without elucidating it 
in any detail. In the text we are considering Heidegger gives a number of 
different, but ultimately overlapping and mutually illuminating descriptions of 
metaphysics. Metaphysics thinks the Being of beings (entities) by thinking 
beings as such and as a whole. It does so by means of categories, which govern 
assertory thinking, that is, judgement. 61 What is essentially asserted and 
58 Friedrich Nietzsche, Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari, (Berlin: 
de Gruyter, 1967ff. ). Section VII, volume 1, fragment 1[67]. The fi-agment was written between 
1882 and 1883. For drawing my attention to this and the subsequent fragment I wish to thank my 
supervisor, Dr. Poeltner. 
59 Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Section VIII, volume 3, fi7agment 15[851. The fi7agment was 
written between early 1888 and January 1889, i. e. shortly before Nietzsche's final collapse. 
60 N, 2 1. 
61N, 
p. 41. 
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assertable by judgement is what beings are. The Being of entities is therefore 
thought by metaphysics in terms of 'what beings as such are', that is, in terms of 
quidditas (whatness) or essentia. It is true that metaphysics distinguishes that 
something is ( its existentia) from what it is (its essentia). But this does not mean 
that metaphysics does after all ponder Being as such when it speaks of existentia, 
the 'that it is'. For even here, Being is not thought as such, but in terms of, and 
from,, beings. Furthermore, existentia is subordinated to whatness in the 
following sense: when metaphysics speaks of a being's 'truly existing', this 
means for metaphysics merely that this being corresponds most closely to 
whatever has been defined as the What of beings. 62 Beings (entities) 'are', but 
what it means to say that they are is never pondered by metaphysics as such. 
Because metaphysics thinks the Being of entities by predicating Oudging) what 
entities are, it cannot think Being other than as what all beings have in common, 
the most universal of predicates, or the highest genus. Thus to speak of Being 
within metaphysics is merely to look away from all concrete rich, particularities 
of entities, and retain only what is 'abstracted' from these, what is common to 
all. This yields the concept of Being as 'beingness', the most universal, empty, 
concept, although 'it remains true that every fundamental metaphysical position 
does think Being according to an interpretation all its own'. 63 But while 
metaphysics in this way stands in the differentiation of Being and beings, and 
makes use of it, it does not genuinely question it: 'With such differentiation of 
Being from beings nothing is said about the inner content of the essence of 
Being. '64 In this sense, Western metaphysics is the history in which there is 
nothing to Being. And this history, for Heidegger, is nihilism, understood 
authentically. Before considering this understanding of nihilism in more detail 
and in its relation to Nietzsche's concept, we need, at least briefly, to address the 
question of the unity of metaphysics. It is clear that there is such a unity in 
62 N, p. 206-207. 63 N,. p. 157. 
64N, 
p. 156. 
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Heidegger's interpretation of the history of metaphysics. Nietzsche"s valuative 
thought, which is equivalent with the metaphysics of will to power, completes 
and fulfills that history. But this completion is not merely an extraneous or 
haphazard 'coming to an end'. Rather, 
Because Nietzsche's philosophy is metaphysics, and all metaphysics is Platonism, at the 
end of metaphysics, Being must be thought as value; that is, it must be reckoned as a 
merely conditioned conditioning of beings. The metaphysical interpretation of Being as 
value is prefigured in the beginning of metaphysics. 65 
This is of course not meant to imply that Nietzsche's metaphysics is ultimately 
identical with Plato's. Nor should the 'must' in Heidegger's formulation be taken 
to indicate some 'lawftilness' of essential history, whereby we could determine, 
by way of a quasi-Hegelian logic, the necessary stages of the development of 
metaphysics. Ultimately, it seems that we cannot fully grasp the essence of this 
(must', for to grasp it would require an unconcealment of the inner essence of 
Being itself, but such unconcealment would run counter to that very essence. 
However, we can certainly notice affinities and differences in the fundamental 
metaphysical positions. 
When Plato, at the beginning of Western metaphysics, grasps the Being 
of beings as t6Fcc or Ei6oq, this means, that 'outward appearance' wherein 
beings come to enduring presence in the unconcealed. But this is at the same 
time to think Being as the 'prior', as a priori in the sense of the condition, as 
what makes beings possible. 'It is the essence of idea to make suitable; that is, to 
make the being [das Seiende] as such possible, that it may come to presence into 
66 
the unconcealed' . 
Thus the t8ca is of itself ccyccOov, rather than there being a 
special 'Idea of the good', as one of the standard interpretations of Plato has it. 
However, for this Platonic conception of Being as 'suitability' to be transformed 
into Nietzsche's conception of Being as value - that is, as what must be reckoned 
65 N, p. 165. Italics mine. 
"6 N, p. 169. 
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with for the preservation and enhancement of power of the subject - there had to 
be a fundamental transformation of metaphysics into the metaphysics of 
subjectivity. This transfonnation, which inaugurated modernity as an epoch of 
essential history, was emphatically announced in Descartes's cogito, ergo sum. 
For Descartes, the ground which makes possible is the subject of the cogito. For 
according to Descartes, it is the subject that must decide or legislate for itself 
what is to count as true. It must do so by means of a 'method' which has been 
chosen by the subject as binding and which conceives of thinking as cogitatio in 
a very particular sense. To think 'properly' for Descartes is to have 'clear and 
distinct ideas' and to accept only what is presented in them. But to accept as 
'true' only what is presented in 'clear and distinct' ideas is to determine the true 
in terms of what can be grasped or mastered as a representation that is fully 
transparent to it. Hence, the true for Descartes is equivalent to the certain, to 
what is securely in the representational possession of the subject. 
In important passages, Descartes substitutes for cogitare the word percipere (per-capio) 
- to take possession of a thing, to seize something, in the sense of presenting-to-oneself 
by way of presenting-before-oneself, representing. [ ... ] The presented-to, the 
represented - cogitatum - is therefore something for man only when it is established 
and secured as that over which he can always be master unequivocally, without any 
hesitation or doubt,, in the radius of his own power to enjoin. 67 
Descartes's metaphysics can therefore be interpreted as the metaphysics of self- 
empowering subjectivity. It may perhaps be objected that this reading does 
hardly do justice to Descartes. For does he not say that we should only accept as 
true what is presented in those ideas which we cannot doubt, that is, which are 
beyond our powers to question, and which are therefore irresistible for us, which 
'overpower' US? 68 This interpretation is in a certain sense correct, but it misses 
the essential point. For the self-empowering of the subject lies in the enjoining 
67 N, p. 104-105. h R. Descartes, 4t Meditation, in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, ed. E. S. Haldane and 
G. T. R. Ross. 
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and choosing of the standard of what is to count as true. Moreover, that standard 
or measure is determined by Descartes explicitly in such a way as to secure the 
further progress of representation. 
Descartes's cogitatio is not only a 'grasping', it is also deliberative, 
involving a process of doubting. It is though this deliberative holding-to account 
of what is presented that the cogitatio gives rise to - or 'co-posits', in 
Heidegger's formulation - the subject in an emphatic sense. The existence of the 
subject is therefore not derived by Descartes from the cogito in a syllogism, but 
is co-given through the cogitatio as understood by him. The deliberative holding 
to account and taking possession of what is given in 'clear and distinct' ideas 
makes what is thus given into objects in the emphatic sense - something that 
stands over and against a subject. Both objects in that sense and the explicitly 
self-conscious subject that grasps itself as standing over and against a world of 
objects emerge together in the Cartesian philosophy of subjectivity which sets 
the metaphysics of modemity onto its course. 69 This is why Heidegger can make 
such seemingly paradoxical remarks as that thinking of the Being of beings as 
objective is subjectivism: such thinking 'subjectivizes beings into mere 
obj ects ). 70 Heidegger does not refer to Kant in this context, but we may perhaps 
observe that this interdependence and belonging-together of the conceptually 
self-conscious subject and a world of objects standing over against it becomes 
explicit in Kant's claim that the 'I think' must be able to accompany all my 
representations ('ideas') as a condition of the possibility of a world of objects. 71 
What prompts this conception of the Being of beings as representedness - as 
objectivity for a subject? 
Liberationftom the revealed certitude of the salvation of individual immortal souls is in 
itself liberation to a certitude in which man can by himself be sure of his own definition 
and task. The securing of supreme and absolute self-development of all the capacities of 
69 Cf N, pp. 107-108. 
70 'Letter on Humanism', p. 25 1. 
71 Immanuel Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, esp. B 130-135. 
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mankind for absolute dominion over the entire earth is the secret goad that prods 
modem man again and again to new resurgences, a goad that forces him into 
commitments that secure for him the surety of his actions and the certainty of his aims. 
The consciously posited binding appears in many guises and disguises. 72 
When Heidegger speaks of the 'self-development of all the capacities of mankind 
for absolute dominion over the entire earth' as the goal underlying the Cartesian 
philosophy, there is no shortage of statements of Descartes which confirm this. 73 
We have already seen how and why Heidegger interprets Nietzsche's philosophy 
as the completion and fulfillment of the development that began with Descartes. 
We have seen that Heidegger does not pretend to give an explanation, a 
4 sufficient reason' - whether causal, logical, or psychological'- for this 
development. To be sure, we can point to affinities in which modernity is 
intimated or prefigured: in particular the Christian-Lutheran demand for the 
'certitude of salvation' as what ultimately matters, which becomes transformed 
into Descartes's certitude of representational knowledge. But any attempt to give 
a4 sufficient reason' or ground for why the history of metaphysics is as it is 
would of course itself be a metaphysical explanation. It would be 'nihilistic in 
the 'authentic' or proper sense in that it would be conducted in a mode of 
thinking in which there is nothing to Being. Since metaphysics does not question 
Being as such, nor does it think Nothing as such. 'Nothing', for metaphysics, 
means merely the negation of beings in negative judgements, nothing more than 
this. In the essay 'Nihilism as determined by the History of Being', appended to 
the Nietzsche lectures, albeit written somewhat later, Heidegger attempts to pose 
the question of the 'nihil' in nihilism on the basis of a mode of thinking which 
does not approach Being through beings, but moves 'in the realm of Being 
74 itself 
. Metaphysical thinking at 
its inception, we saw, thinks Being as that 
which makes beings possible. Through the 'what' entities as such can manifest 
72 N, p. 99. 
-1 ' Especially of course his remark in the Discourse on the Method, that the alm of philosophical 
thinking should be to create the conditions for making us 'the masters and possessors of nature'. 
74 N, p. 223). 
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themselves or come into the unconcealed. So it is not accidental or extraneous 
that metaphysics, in tarrying with and concerning itself with beings 'in their 
totality', should pass over or ignore Being as such. To use an analogy from sense 
perception which may to some extent throw light on the essential connection 
involved here: the figure on the differently coloured background of a painting 
becomes possible only through, or on the basis of, the background: there can be 
no figure without background. But if the figure or Gestalt is to become possible 
or stand out as such, the background which makes it possible must recede. in the 
language of phenomenology: it must become unthernatic. Analogously, thinking 
cannot thernatize Being as such if beings are to be possible. This means that 
Being, at the inception of Western metaphysics does not accidentally withdraw 
75 into the background or stay away: it does so essentially. Moreover, since it 
cannot be the case that thinking is simply other than Being, but is itself in Being 
- is the way Being manifests itself, we might express this happening by saying 
that Being withdraws in or through the history of metaphysical thought: the fact 
that for metaphysics there is nothing to Being is the staying away or concealing 
itself as which Being is. It is as this history of self-concealment in the thinking of 
beings as such, or as the history of 'nihilism proper', that Being 'has' to be, since 
it would be a fundamentally erroneous oversight or misunderstanding of the 
differentiation between Being and beings (entities) to think that Being could be 
I separate from' beings and the history of beings. For this would make it merely 
into another being, although a privileged one, as in onto-theology. But what is 
definitive of metaphysical thought is that this concealment or staying away of 
Being is itseýf concealed, that is, not questioned or pondered at all. Metaphysics 
does not recognize this concealment, 
not because it repudiates Being itself as to-be-thought, but because Being itse4f stays 
away. But if that is so, then the 'unthought' does not stem from a thinking that neglects 
something. [ ... ] 
Being [das Sein] itself occurs essentially as the unconcealment in 
75 N, p. 211. 
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which the being [das Seiendel comes to presence. Unconcealment itself, however, 
remains concealed as such. With reference to itself, unconcealment as such keeps away, 
keeps to itself The matter stands with the concealment of the essence of 
unconcealment. It stands with the concealment of Being as such. Being itseýf stays 
away. Thus matters stand with the concealment of Being in such a way that the 
concealment conceals itseýf in itseýf 76 
The history of metaphysics is thus the history of the essential staying away or 
twofold concealment of Being itself. This line of thinking gives rise to two 
questions with special urgency within the context of our discussion. First, what 
are the consequences of it with respect to thinking the 'nothing' in nihilism in its 
authentic essence? Secondly, what can we make of Nietzsche's demand to 
'overcome nihilism', once we understand nihilism in its authentic essence? 
For metaphysics, 'Nothing' is a matter of negative judgement. This 
judgement denies that some entity, or indeed entities as such, instantiate some 
whatness or other. Entities are not so-and-so. In this mode of thought, 'Nothing' 
is opposed to 'Being' in the sense that the so-being of some entity, or of entities 
as a whole, excludes their not-so-being, and it does so as a matter of 'logic'. 
However, for a thinking which moves 'in the realm of Being itself, this cannot 
be the end of the matter. Such a thinking questions Being as such, and this means 
that it questions it in its withdrawal or staying away as which Being is: 
Being is not segregated somewhere off by itself, nor does it also keep away; rather, the 
staying-away of Being as such is Being itself. In its staying-away Being veils itself with 
itself This veil that vanishes for itself, which is the way Being essentially occurs in 
staying-away, is Nothing as Being itself. Do we sense what occurs essentially in 
Nothing which is now to be thought? [ ... ] we are voicing the assumption that 
Being - 
thought as such - can no longer be called 'Being'. Being as such is other than itself, so 
decisively other that it even 'is' not. 77 
Nothing is the veil of Being's concealment or withdrawal, as which Being is. 
Hence, Nothing, thought as such, is not opposed to Being in the sense of being 
excluded by it. Rather we might say, it is the essence of Being as such. As 
76 N, pp. 2 13 -214. 77 N, pp. 214-215. 
191 
Heidegger notes, this may sound 'dialectical' and may easily be misleading. For 
one thing, there can be no question that Nothing, as Being's differing from itself. 
is in any way involved in a process of sublation. In staying away, there is 
Nothing to Being, and as such Being 'Is'. In so far as there is essentially Nothing 
to Being, Being is essentially as promise and mystery: 
That which according to its essence preservingly conceals, and thus remains concealed 
in its essence and entirely hidden, though nonetheless it somehow appears, is in itself 
what we call the mystery. In the inauthenticity of the essence of nihilism, the mystery of 
the promise occurs, in which form Being is itself, in that it saves itself as such. [ ... ] The 
essence of metaphysics consisst in the fact that it is the history of the secret of the 
promise of Being itseýf 78 
Metaphysics, as the inauthentic thinking of the essence of nihilism (i. e. of itself) 
is not aware of the promise as promise or the mystery as mystery. But after 
everything that has been said we should be in a position to realize that this 
inauthenticity belongs itself to the essence of the history of Being as nihilism: 
'The inauthenticity of nihilism is not eliminated from its essence. That indicates 
that nonessence belongs to essence'. 79 Hence, 'to overcome nihilism' may mean 
several quite different things. In one sense it may mean the attempt to overcome 
metaphysics in the sense of bringing the history of Being in its default 'under 
oneself. But such 'an overcoming of Being itself not only can never be 
accomplished - the very attempt would revert to a desire to unhinge the essence 
of man' . 
80 But 'overcoming metaphysics/nihilism' may also mean something 
else, which has nothing to do with a desire to eliminate metaphysics. Rather, it 
may mean 
surrendering the metaphysical interpretation of metaphysics. Thinking abandons the 
pure 'metaphysics of metaphysics' by taking a step back, back from the omission of 
78 N, pp. 226-227. 
79 N, pp. 220-22 1. 
go N, p. 2233. 
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Being in its staying-away. In the step back, thinking has already set out on the path of 
thinking to encounter Being itself in its self-withdrawal. 81 
Heidegger leaves no doubt that this is 'the way we have attempted to think it i. 82 
Indeed,, he goes further: 'Instead of such [eliminative] overcoming, only one 
thing is necessary, namely that thinking, encouraged by Being itself, think to 
83 encounter Being in its staying away as such' This would be to heed the essence 
of nihilism authentically. 84 
Nihilism,, then, in Heidegger's understanding of it, contains nothing 
negative. But in this case we may ask, finally: what is the connection with 
Nietzsche's concept of nihilism? Is it not simply a different concept altogether? 
We have already seen that Heidegger denies this. But is there any 'actual' 
relation between nihilism as thought by Heidegger and the 'negative' and 
'destructive' phenomena Nietzsche associates with this term? Heidegger 
expresses a surmise about this relation, but he does so in the form of a question: 
But how will we even pose the decisive question if we have not first pondered the 
essence of nihilism and at the same time brought ourselves to ask whether the staying 
away of the question concerning the essence of nihilism does not partly occasion the 
dominance of those [negative and destructive] phenomena? Is it the case that the 
dominance of destructive nihilism and of our not asking, not being able to ask, about 
the essence of nihilism ultimately derive from the same root? 85 
81N, 
p. 227. 82 N, p. 227. 
83 N, p. 225. We should not leave Heidegger's confrontation with Nietzsche without speculating 
at least briefly about Nietzsche's likely response to these thoughts. Without being able to enter 
fully into this issue, we may at least assume that Nietzsche would query the provenance and the 
force of Heidegger's talk of 'what is necessary' and 'what is worthy of thought' (N, p. 203). Does 
this not mean that such thought matters? And if this is what it means, does it not tacitly or openly 
employ a notion of value or worth? And if so, what is the origin and the authority of this 'worth'? 
Is it assumed to hold sway and to have a 'claim' on man (N, p. 223) even independently of man's 
recognizing it as a 'need' or 'distress' (Alot)? And if so, is it not, from a Nietzschean perspective, 
yet another articulation of the ascetic ideal" 
84 As Miguel de Beistegui argues, the 'step back into the essence of nihilism is the only genuine 
response to the historical unfolding of nihilism. Not will, but thinking itself is the way in which 
nihilism comes to be experienced on the basis of its essence'. (Heidegger and the Political, p. 
82). 
85 N, pp. 221-222. 
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4. 'Overcoming' Nihilism, and the Abandonment of Being 
The question of the relation between ni. 1 ism as understood by Nietzsche 
('classical nihilism') and nihilism thought according to its authentic essence is 
addressed more explicitly in the earlier text Beitrage zur Philosophie (Vom 
Ereignis), written between 1936 and 1938. What comes to the fore in this, as 
well as in other contemporaneous writings of Heidegger, is the theme of 
Seinsgeschichte (the history of Being) as what necessarily detem-iines and self- 
concealingly manifests itself through the history of metaphysics as nihilism. We 
have so far been deliberately cautious in drawing upon this aspect of Heidegger's 
thinking of Being and its relation to Nothing, although it has obtruded itself in 
the preceding Section of this chapter. Our reserve in this respect has not been 
motivated by a wish to deny either the presence or the importance of this 
dimension of Heidegger's later thinking. However, it has been a central aim of 
this thesis to show how and why the question of Being, as understood by 
Heidegger, can be interpreted as emerging from an intimate engagement and 
Auseinandersetzung with the tradition itself, a tradition embodied in the context 
of the present discussion in the figures of Husserl, Nietzsche and, to a lesser 
extent, of Plato and Descartes, as representatives of decisive stages of Western 
thinking of the Being of beings. 86 More particularly, it has been our aim to 
demonstrate how the neglect of the question of Being can be traced in and from 
the lacunae of the metaphysical tradition itself, and how this neglect can indeed, 
86 This assessment of the importance of these thinkers should be uncontroversially recognizable 
as consonant with Heidegger's own assessment, except perhaps in the case of Husserl, whose 
name all but disappears from Heidegger's post- 1929 writings. However, for reasons outlined in 
the introduction to Chapter 1, we have chosen not to disregard Heidegger's earlier view of 
Husserl's philosophy as the philosophy in which 'the great tradition of Western philosophy' has 
been 'thought ... to an end'. 
See Martin Heidegger, Logik, ed. W. Biemel, GA 21, (Frankfurt: 
Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), p. 88 and p. 114. 
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as Heidegger maintains, be seen as intimately connected with the heedlessness of 
the tradition in relation to the Nothing which is Being in its withdrawal. In other 
words,, the profound significance and importance of Heidegger's departure from, 
and confrontation with, the metaphysical tradition, is one which can be 
recognized even inde endently of Heidegger's interpretation P of that tradition and 
of its fundamental neglect and obliviousness to Being as such 
(Seinsvergessenheit), as itself symptomatic or expressive of a 'necessary' 
withdrawal and progressively deepening self-concealment of Being - that is, of 
the 'abandomnent' of beings by Being (Seinsverlassenheit). The thesis has thus 
implicitly also been seeking answer the question to what extent it might be 
possible to think what Heidegger brought to light as the Seinsvergessenheit of 
Western metaphysics without the further interpretation of this obliviousness as 
the necessary history of Being's self-concealing abandonment of beings. The 
present study thus attempts to bring into view a possibility whose viability 
cannot be judged in the abstract, but only in its enactment. However, it is equally 
clear and indeed undeniable that in Heidegger's reflections Seinsverlassenheit 
plays an increasingly pivotal role, detennining not only the interpretation of the 
significance of the neglect of Being/Nothing by metaphysics (i. e. essential 
nihilism), but also his conception of the possibilities of a thinking 'after' the end 
of metaphysics, which is referred to in some texts, especially in the Beitrdge, as 
the 'other beginning'. 
'Nihilism' as understood by Nietzsche is not, if we follow the reflections 
of Beitrdge on this question, merely a different phenomenon from Heidegger's 
'essential nihilism: 
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What Nietzsche is the first to recognize - in his orientation to Platonism - as nihilism is 
in truth, and seen according to the grounding question that is foreign to him, only the 
foreground of the far deeper happening of the forgottenness of Being, which comes 
forth more and more directly in the course of finding the answer to the guiding-question 
[of metaphysics]. But even the forgottenness of Being (depending on the definition) is 
not the most originary destining of the first beginning: rather, it is the abandonment of 
Being that was perhaps most coverered over and denied by Christinanity. 87 
Nietzsche did not describe a different phenomenon from nihilism in Heidegger's 
sense, rather he gave a 'provisional' , 'idealistic', and 'moralistic' interpretation 
of a happening which 'must be grasped more fundamentally as the essential 
consequence of the abandomnent of Being'. 88 Nietzsche's characterization of 
nihilism is 'idealistic' in the sense that it refers, if we accept Heidegger's 
reading, to Nietzsche's own metaphysics of the will to power in which the Being 
of beings is thought as value,, a concept which is claimed to have its origin in 
Plato's thought of the t8coc Tou (xycc0ou, transfonned under the aegis of the 
representing subject of modernity into that which can be reckoned on in the self- 
empowerment of the subject. However, in an important passage, Heidegger does 
explicitly acknowledge that Nietzsches own conception of nihilism seems to 
have revolved around the 'psychological' diagnosis of the 'goallessness' of 
contemporary culture. The 'overcoming' of nihilism, according to at least some 
of Nietzsche's formulations (e. g. WP 20), would have to consist in a positing of 
new goals by man himself According to Heidegger, such an 'overcoming' of 
nihilism through the self-empowering 'willing' of new goals signifies only a 
deeper entanglement in nihilism, as understood by him (not by Nietzsche), and 
ultimately expresses merely the depth of the utter abandonment of Being: 
87 CP, p. 80. Also p. 83. 
88 Cp, P. 96. 
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And therefore the greatest nihilism is where one believes to have goals again ... The 
essential mark of 'nihilism' is not whether churches and monasteries are destroved and 
people are murdered or whether this does not happen... rather, what is crucial is 
whether one knows and wants to know that precisely this tolerating of Christianity, and 
Christianity itself 
... are merely pretexts and perplexities in that domain which one does not want to acknowledge and to allow to count as the domain of decision about 
Be-ing [Seyn] and not-Be-ing. The most disastrous nihilism consists in passing oneself 
off as protector of Christianity ... Be-ing has so thoroughly abandoned beings and 
submitted them to machination and 'lived experience' that those illusive attempts at 
rescuing Western culture ... must necessarily become the most insidious and thus the highest form of nihilism. 89 
One thing that emerges clearly from this passage is that Heidegger's concept of 
nihilism is indeed quite different from Nietzsche's: for Nietzsche, nihilism is, 
centrally, the absence of a belief in 'goals'. So when Heidegger says that what 
from such a perspective may appear as an overcoming of nihilism (through a 
rediscovery of 'goals', whether new or old) is in fact the 'most disastrous 
nihilism', this cannot mean that such an expediency involves merely a more 
profound entanglement in what Nietzsche wanted to overcome: what it signifies 
is rather a deepening of the forgottenness of Being, a phenomenon which 
Nietzsche simply did not recognize, let alone regard as question-worthy. 
However,, Heidegger is not merely being misleading when he suggests that his 
own understanding of nihilism is 'the more originary and essential determination 
of that which Nietzsche recognized for the first time as nihilism'. 90 Not only is 
Nietzschean nihilism merely a symptom or 'foreground' of the forgottenness of 
Being, but, more importantly, what is retained in Heidegger's understanding 
from Nietzsche's concept of nihilism is the sense of dereliction. Yet, this 
'nothingness' is not interpreted, as in Nietzsche, 'moralistically' - that is, in 
89 Cp, pp. 97-8. 
90 CP, p. 8-33. 
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terms of human conceptions of desirability, and hence as something to be 
eliminated - but 'ontologically' as refusal: 
But how do we understand the Nothing here? ... As the overflow ofpure refusal. 
" 
... But how would it be if Be-ing itself were the self-withdrawing and would hold sway as 
refusal? 92 
The essence of nihilism experienced authentically grasps the dereliction of the 
forgottenness of Being which is the history of Western metaphysics not as a 
human error which might be eliminated or overcome, 93 but as the necessary 
happening of Being's double self-concealment. Being is in the Nothing of its 
refusing itself to beings, that is, in its abandoning of beings, which is a 'self- 
withdrawing of/from all estimation and measuring'. 94 Any 'overcoming' of 
metaphysics in the sense of an opposition to it is thus necessarily a deepening of 
nihilism, since any such opposition requires necessarily an objectifying or re- 
presenting of metaphysics as something 'over against' oneself which can be 
made or unmade by 'willing'. In the vocabulary of Beitrdge, the understanding of 
Being evinced in such a setting oneself up over against metaphysics (the history 
of Being) remains obviously within the confines of machination, that is, within 
the interpretation of the beingness of beings as re-presentable under the horizon 
91 CP, p. 17-33. 
92 Cp., P. 174. In Beitrdge, Heidegger uses the archaic spelling Seyn (translated as: Be-ing) when 0 
speaking 'of Being as experienced authentically in its own truth, while the standard spelling Sein 
(translated as: Being) is used in relation to Being as thought within the guiding question of 
metaphysics (i. e. 'what is the beingness of a being? ') 
93 Cp, P. 13 1. Cf Martin Heidegger, Basic Questions ofPhilosophy, (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 158-60. (Henceforth cited as BQP). 
94 Cp, P. 176. 
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of -cEXvq (of making and what can be made), an interpretation which has its 
inception in Plato. 95 
Nevertheless, we are not condemned merely to a continuation of metaphysics 
understood in terms of 'doctrines'. For Heidegger, the 'crucial question' is on the 
contrary precisely 'whether modernity is grasped as an end and an other 
beginning is inquired into, or whether one sticks obstinately to the perpetuation 
of a decline that has lasted since Plato'. 96 This possibility of an 'other beginning' 
haunts the pages of the Beitrdge. Indeed, once the step has been taken to an 
interpretation of Seinsvergessenheit as the manifestation or expression of a 
deeper ground, namely the necessary abandonment of beings by Being, it is clear 
that such an other beginning cannot be merely one possibility of human thinking. 
Rather, the other beginning, if it is to be at all, is itself necessary and ultimately 
not initiated by human thinkers: 'any kind of metaphysics has and must come to 
an end, if philosophy is to attain its other beginning'. 97 Hence Heidegger 
sometimes simply speaks in the present continuous of 'the crossing to the other 
beginning, into which Western thinking is now entering'. 98 Thus the thinking- 
saying of a philosophy which thinks the truth of Be-ing must experience itseýf not 
as the doctrine or view of a thinker, but as something that 
comes from an other beginning. This saying does not describe or explain, does not 
proclaim or teach. This saying does not stand over against what is said. Rather, the 
saying itself is the 'to be said', as the essential swaying of Be-ing. This saying gathers 
Be-ing's essential sway unto a first sounding, while it itself [this saying] sounds only 
out of this essential sway. 
95 CP, pp. 76,92,129. 
96 Cp, P. 94. 
97 CP, p. 121 (emphasis added). 
98 Cp, p. 3 (emphasis added). 
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The other beginning, then, is and must be far removed from a merely 
oppositional overcoming of metaphysics (i. e. of the essence of nihilism). Rather. 
the other beginning would be a thinking which moves in the realm of Be-ing as 
such, one that situates itself within the purview of the grounding question 'what 
is the truth of Be-ing? ' If the history of the first beginning is the history of 
metaphysics, and this history is the self-concealing Nothing (abandonment, not- 
granting, refusal) as which Be-ing essentially is, then the only authentic 
4overcoming' (Uberwindung) of metaphysics is a return into, or retrieval 
(Verwindung) of metaphysics, but a return which does not go along with 
metaphysics, but rather grasps it through a distantiation as Seinsverlassenheit. 
Indeed, we might say that the other beginning, the only possible overcoming of 
nihilism (in Heidegger's sense), is a renunciatory leap into the abandonment of 
Be-ing, an abandonment which was itself concealed (i. e. not thought 
authentically) within and as metaphysics: 
Leaping into the other beginning is returning into the first beginning and vice versa... 
Returning into the first beginning is rather and precisely distancing from it, is taking up 
that distant-positioning which is necessary in order to experience what began in and as 
that beginning ... Only the distant-positioning to the first beginning allows the 
experience that the question of truth (ccX7j0F_tcc) necessarily remained unasked in that 
beginning and that this not happening determined Western thinking in advance as 
(metaphysics'.... The other beginning is not counter-directed to the first. Rather, as the 
other it stands outside the counter and outside immediate comparability. " 
The Verwindung of metaphysics, which is the crossing to the other beginning, 
thus has a double character: it retains the first beginning by retrieving or 
returning into it (rather than leaving it behind), but it also distances itself from it 
99 CP, p. 130 (emphasis added). Cf. BQP, p. 161. 
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in by encountering it, not in terms of its own metaphysical self-interpretation, but 
as the abandonment of Being: 
[History of the first beginning] is the history of metaphysics. It is not individual 
attempts at metaphysics that tell us anything now at the end of metaphysics but rather 
conly' the history of metaphysics .... Because this knowing awareness thinks nihilism 
still more originarily into the abandonment of Being, this knowing is the actual 
overcoming of nihilism; and the history of the first beginning thus completely loses the 
appearance of ftitility and mere errancy. '00 
In thus encountering the first beginning authentically as the necessary and 
essential abandomnent of Be-ing, it could be said that we are both furthest and 
closest to the truth of Be-ing: 'Be-ing is reachable only by a leap into the 
abandonment by Being'. 1 01 This 'leap', to reiterate a point made earlier, cannot 
be a question of human willing relating itself to something in principle separable 
from it as an over-against (an object of machination). It rather experiences itself 
as a becoming 'en-owned and.. belong[ing] to Be-ing' 102 , such that 'Be-ing 
itself 
grounds humanness). 103 In the crossing to the other beginning, it is not a human 
fore-grasping that sets the standard, and consequently 'we do not know whither 
we go nor when the truth of Be-ing becomes the true nor whence history as the 
1,104 history ofBe-ing takes its ... path . 
It has of course not been our aim in the above discussion to unfold all 
aspects of Heidegger's thought of the other beginning, nor indeed to assess his 
interpretation of the oblivion of Being in the Western metaphysical tradition as 
itself determined 'more originarily' by a necessary abandonment of beings by 
100 CP, p. 123. 
10' CP, p. 172 (final emphasis added). 
102 CP, p. 177. 
103 CP, p. 129. 
")4 CP, p. 124. 
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Being. Yet, we may at least ask: despite the disclaimers in the last quotation, 
does not Heideggers interpretation have significant implications with respect to 
both 'whither' and 'whence'? As we have seen, this interpretation does not seem 
to permit - that is, it explicitly excludes - any understanding of metaphysics and 
its Platonic fundamental orientation as (for example) mere futility or error. 
Indeed, a crossing to an other beginning is said to be possible only through a 
Verwindung, that is, a retaining-passing-through, of the essential history of 
nihilism. Is it perhaps at least in part for this reason that this interpretation leaves 
out of detailed consideration, in regard to the question of an other beginning, any 
putative 'alternatives' external to Western metaphysical thinking? However 
sympathetic we may be to Heidegger's analysis of the fundamental neglect at the 
heart of Western metaphysics, it could be asked whether his 'meta-metaphysical' 
interpretation of that neglect in terms of the essential history of Be-ing is not, in 
the end, too exclusively determinate about the 'whence', and therefore also 
perhaps too restrictive about the possible paths to be taken in the transition 
towards an unknown 'whither'. We shall briefly return to these issues at the end 
of our final chapter. But, as stated at the beginning of this Section, these are 
questions that ultimately point beyond the thematic focus of the present study, 
which is a re-tracing of Heidegger's confrontation with the Western metaphysical 
tradition. 
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Chapter V 
A-AHOEM and AHOH-. 
Heidegger's Reading of Parmenides 
Heidegger's interpretation of Parmenides' approach to the question of 'truth' not 
only concerns itself with the inherent connection between the meaning of Being and 
'truth' (aAqOcia), but it also establishes a distinctive relationship between the 
forgetfulness of Being (diagnosed as the source of nihilism), and the historical 
transformation of the essence of 'truth'. ' In the lectures on Parmenides the question 
of the sense of 'truth' and 'un-truth' is given the same attention that the question of 
the meaning of Being and its Other enjoys elsewhere. Heidegger's historical tracing 
of the meaning of the 'opposition' itself casts light on the extent of the modem 
limitations in this regard. For us, just as was the case with the meaning of Nothing in 
our previous discussions, the sense of 'un-truth' will here be of prime importance. 
For, as will become evident during the course of our analysis, what constitutes the 
counter-essence to 'truth'. what comes to oppose 'truth', is as indispensable for the 
determination of 'truth' as is Nothing vis-a-vis Being. 
1. The History of the Transformation of the Essence of Truth 
Heidegger's reading of the sense of 'truth' (aAqOcia) in Parmenides' fragments 
draws a historical perspective on the transformation of the essence of 'truth' and 
brings into debate the question of the past by means of future possibilities. Here, the 
inquiry concerning who we 2 could be tomorrow proceeds in terms of a primordial 
understanding of the truth of Being. Given that Heidegger sees history as a 
1 As in the case of Nietzsche (and of Plato for that matter), Heidegger's interpretation of Parmenides 
has been disputed on scholarly-philo logical grounds. Here as in those other cases, a Heideggerian 
response would be unlikely to take the form of a 'philological justification' of his readings. For some 
generalisable comments on these interpretive issues, see the introduction to Chapter IV. See also 
footnote 46 of Chapter III on Heidegger's controversial reading of Sophocles. 
2 The 'we' refers to 'the modems of modem metaphysics, a humanity that, as regards an essential 
experience of Being, has erred into the dead end of the oblivion of Being'. See P, p. 16 1. 
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happening that 'is determined from the future, takes over what has been, and acts 
and endures its way through the present' 3, it should not be too surprising to find that 
all questions concerning our present mode of Being are historical questions. But what 
does 'history' mean and when or how does the history of 'truth' begin? 
Before dealing with these issues, it must be made clear that the historical 
perspective which Heidegger draws on truth, despite having, at first glance, some 
similarities with Nietzsche's approach to the question of truth, is fundamentally of a 
different order. There is no doubt that Nietzsche's treatment of truth falls into the 
same pile that comes under Heidegger's direct criticism -a criticism that sees 
modem 'research', helped by sophisticated technical tools and gadgets, as conflating 
the technique of historiography with history itself. And this, for Heidegger, bears 
witness to the fact that. ) despite all the learned talking and clever thinking which goes 
on among its devotees, man has already lost the meaning of history altogether. 
Modem views of history, since the 19th century, like to speak about 'meaning conferral'. 
This term suggests that man, on his own, is capable of 'lending' a 'meaning' to history, as if 
man had something to lend out at all, and as if history needed such a loan, all of which 
indeed presupposes that history 'in itself and at first is meaningless and in every case has to 
wait for the favor of a meaning bestowed by man. 4 
Thus Heidegger, unlike Nietzsche, does not conceive of truth as a human creation or 
construction. Truth, for Heidegger, cannot be fabricated at some point 'in' history by 
the arrival of some particularly creative thinker. This is also because Heidegger's 
understanding of history differs from that of Nietzsche and others. For, if 'history' is 
to be conceived essentially, i. e. thought in terms of the ground of the essence of 
Being itself -as Heidegger proposes - then it (i. e. history) is the transformation of the 
essence of truth. Therefore, it refers solely to the uniqueness of that primordial 
essence which is the source of all essential features of history and its essential 
consequences. This renders clear that, in considering the history of truth, Heidegger 
IM, p. 47. 
P, p. 56. 
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is not interested in the treatment of the concept of truth in a historiographical fashion. 
His aim is the history of the essence of Being and this for him means the truth itself. 
For, he says, 
if unveiling is the essence of truth, and if in accordance with the transformation of this 
essence of truth the assignment of Being is also transformed, then the essence of *history' is 
the transformation of the essence of truth. 5 
It is obvious that Heidegger sees his own way of thinking as more attuned with the 
cearly' ways of approaching truth than with that of his modem 'contemporaries'. In 
order to compare and confront these modem views he time and again invokes the 
thoughts of 'primordial' thinkers who are of a different order, i. e. who are not 
philosophers in the sense in which we know the so-called post-Socratic thinkers. 
There are, however, only few thinkers, such as Anaximander, Heraclitus and 
Parmenides, who qualify as 'primordial' or 'early' thinkers. What distinguishes these 
thinkers from others is their mode of thinking which is said to be fundamentally of 
another kind. The difference, Heidegger argues, lies predominantly in the fact that 
the early thinking is a kind of retreating in the face of Being -a retreating that 
provokes the thought of Being rather than the mastering of beings. These thinkers are 
called 'primordial' not because they have begun the history of thinking and are, 
therefore, the first ones to think, but rather because the beginning is that which lays a 
claim on them and begins something with them. These thinkers, Heidegger 
maintains, are 'begun by the beginning, "in-cepted" [An-gefangenen] by the in- 
ception [An-fang]; they are taken up by it and are gathered into it 6 Thus while we 
commonly think of history as a series of events and processes in the sense of their 
(coming to pass', Heidegger - more in tune with this 'primordial' mode of thinking - 
conceives of historical happenings under the horizon of 'destiny', 'destining' and 
(assignment'. We therefore hear him refer to history in terms of a 'sending' [das 
Geschicht] or the (assignment of Being'. Here what is the essentially 'send-able or 
5 p, p. 55. 
p, Introduction, p. 8. 
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trans-mittable and the self-transmitting' refers to the uniqueness of the relation 
between Dasein and Being - which echoes the argument of Being and Time - that is, 
Dasein's understanding of Being. 
If the essence of man is founded in the fact that he is that being to whom Being itself reveals 
itself, then the essential trans-mittal and the essence of 'sending' is the unveiling of Being. 7 
As may have already become apparent Heidegger's critique of the conventional sense 
of 'truth' bears a significant similarity to his approach to the traditional 
understanding of Being. The very question which was raised with regard to the 
meaning of Being is now raised with regard to the meaning of truth. What does 
'truth' mean for us? Is truth subject to change or does it have always the same 
meaning? If, for a primordial thinker such as Parmenides, aArlOcta means 
essentially something other than truth as we think it today then, what consequences 
does this have? Throughout history, Heidegger argues, the essence of truth has 
assumed distinct meanings and has been transformed from the early Greek aAr70cia 
to the Roman conception of truth as veritas, to the medieval adequatio, and from 
there to modem certitudo - that is, truth in the Cartesian sense of certainty, validity 
and assurance. 
With Nietzsche, truth in this last sense has, according to Heidegger, in its 
course of unfolding as the essence of veritas become certitudo, 'the certainty of life', 
where its 'advantage' or 'value' is based upon a correctness which is the essential 
certainty of the will to power. This, for Nietzsche, is the ultimate reality, a kind of 
truth he also calls 'justice', because all that is real takes its reality from correctness 
as the essence of the will to power. However, Nietzsche, Heidegger points out, was 
well aware of the problematic aspects that went along with basing everything on the 
self-assurance of power. For to say that 'the mere preservation of an already attained 
level of power already represents a decrease in the degree of power', 8 shows a 
7 P, p. 55. 
8 P, p. 58. Heidegger gives no reference for this interpretation of Nietzsche, but he Is presumably agam 
referring to Nietzsche's discussion of the feeling of power in WP 695. 
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realization on the part of Nietzsche that in the very essence of assurance resides a 
constant 'back-relatedness' to itself which creates an ever-renewed need for 'self- 
elevation'. It is in fact precisely because of this persistent back-relatedness that the 
self-assurance as self-certainty had to assert itself as (absolute': 
The fundamental outline of the metaphysical essence of reality as truth, and of this truth as 
absolute certainty, is prepared by Fichte and appears for the first time in Hegel's 
metaphysics of the absolute spirit. Here truth becomes the absolute self-certainty of absolute 
reason. In Hegel's metaphysics and in Nietzsche's, i. e. in the 19th Century, the 
transformation of veritas into certituto is completed. This completion of the Roman essence 
of truth is the proper and hidden historical meaning of the 19th Century. 9 
The transformation of the essence of truth has obviously altered also the essence of 
truth's Other. So we see that by the turning of the essence of truth from aA, -70cia to 
veritas, the essence of un-truth comes to mean falsum. This conversion is the 
presupposition for the modem characterization of the essence of falsity as error, with 
the consequence of rendering the correct or incorrect use of man's power of 
judgment as what matters most. This means that what defines and determines truth as 
4correctness' is now that which assures man's self-certainty. Thus, while the correct 
use of the power of judgment establishes the self-certainty of man, the incorrect use 
of the human power of affirmation and denial leads to error. ' 0 
Now in view of the primordial meaning of truth as fundamentally other than 
veritas, correctness and certainty, it is clear that what opposes truth should 
correspondingly come under scrutiny. That is to say, if the definition of falsum 
cannot fulfill the essence of that which stands in opposition to truth in the primordial 
sense, then we must ask what is the meaning of untruth -a question which can only 
be answered if we gain an understanding of the primordial meaning of truth, 
aA? 70eta, in the first instance. 
9 ibid. 
10 This is a condensed version of the argument given in the Nietzsche lectures of 1940 concerning 
Cartesian metaphysics and its completion in Nietzsche as constituting the essence of modernity. See 
our discussion in chapter IV, Section 2 
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2. The Meaning and Character of AAqOcla 
The Greek term aAqOcia, which means 'unconcealedness' (Unverborgenheit); II 
points first to something like 'concealedness'. The indication leaves both that which 
was concealed previously with a view to un-concealedness, and the who that does the 
concealing, undetennined. This indeterminatness is due to the fact that, among the 
early thinkers, whatever might be intimated with regard to the opposite of truth 
remains obscure - that is, it remains a suggestion constituting a subject of debate. 
They do, however, talk about the like of concealedness and address it under the 
various forms of 'closing off , such as veiling, masking, covering, conserving, 
preserving and holding back, etc. In each of these cases,, concealedness, despite the 
multiplicity and indeterminacy of its meaning, remains firmly that which defines 
truth as unconcealedness. In other words, unconcealedness as such always obtains 
the clarity of its features only from these modes of concealedness. 
In view of the meaning of truth as unconcealedness, we may consider the 
sense of untruth as Vlcv&ý- by leaving aside modem interpretations of the term and 
by focusing instead on its more original meaning. Rev&ý-, according to Heidegger's 
analysis, receives its essence from the realm of concealedness and it therefore 
determines itself in reference not to verum but aAqOcia. The term Vcv&ý- in the 
original sense means something like 'dissembling' -a kind of dissembling 
concealment, or a hiding in the strict sense (which, like veiling, is a mode of 
concealing). Hence, in the sense of dissembling concealment, i. e. hiding, 
permits the corresponding privative formation to a-Vmv&ý-, i. e. the non-hiding, the 
dis-hiding. And in this light the Greek opposition of aA77 06ý; and vcv&ý- no longer 
seems odd ). 12 Furthermore, if we consider that for the early Greeks concealedness is 
a fundamental characteristic of all appearance of entities and of every manifestation 
11 Heidegger remarks that: 'It should be kept In mind that in the following we will be speaking of 
"unconcealedness" [Unverborgenheit] and "concealment" but that the obvious expression 
"unconcealment" [Unverbergung] is avoided, although it is the "most literal" translation'. (See P, 
p. 12). Unverbergung refers literally to a happening, while the suffix - heit, as in Unverborgenheit, 
connotes a state or condition. 
12 P, p. 32. 
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of beings, then we realize that the 'proper' translation of vfcv(5oq should read not 
even 'hiding', but 'belng hidden'. 
AA770cia is tied to the verbal stem AaO, which means (concealing'. To the stem AaO - 
pertains the verb AavOavw, 'I am concealed'; the aorist participle, AaOo)v, AaOov, means 
'being concealed'. 13 
Evidently, if 'being hidden' is a form of concealedness, then qI6v45oq should connect 
with the term 'being concealed', i. e. AavOav. 6iv. Heidegger refers to a number of 
examples in order to show the precise linkage between the meaning of Vlevo5oq and 
Aa vOa vet v and to bring out the mistake that is standardly made in their translations 
and interpretations. In the following passage from Homer's Odyssey, for instance, 
Heidegger objects to the rendering of cAav0avw as 'he concealed', rather than the 
correct 'he was concealed'. This seemingly minor observation, seen in the context of 
Heidegger's overall position on the nature of truth, is in fact quite important. For 
'being hidden', just like 'being concealed', are not modes of 'will-driven' activities 
carried out by man in control of his affairs, but events that 'come over' beings and 
man himself Thus, whereas the usual translation reads: 'But then he [Odysseus] shed 
tears, without the others noticing it, Alkinoos alone was aware of his sorrow ... To all 
other guests he concealed his flowing tears', 14 Heidegger's suggestion is to translate 
the first line literally as, 'Odysseus, was concealed to the others as one shedding 
tears'. 15 Correspondingly, Heidegger translates a passage from the Iliad as 'Athena 
was concealed to Hector in her giving back of the lance'. 16 Here, the 'concealed' and 
the 'unconcealed' are not characteristics of the noticing, but features of the being. 
Thus the famous Epicurean proverb does not say 'live unnoticed', but AaOefiicoo--aý-, 
i. e. 'be concealed in the way you conduct your life'. 17 In other words, concealedness 
denotes the manner of Being and defines a certain character of the Being of man 
among others. Hence, Heidegger concludes: 
13 P, p. 27. 
14 P, p. 23 (italics mine). 
15 ibid. 
16 ibid. 
17 ibid. 
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AavOavopat says: I am concealed from myself in relation to something which would 
otherwise be unconcealed to me. This is thereby, for its part, concealed, just as I am in my 
relation to it. The being sinks away into concealment in such a manner that with this 
concealment of the being I remain concealed from myself. Moreover, this concealment is 
itself concealed. 18 
We have said that truth in terms of unconcealedness points to something like 
concealedness. Now, the expression 'unconcealedness' indicates also that a 
'cancelling' has occurred whereby concealedness has been taken away. This shows 
that, in the early Greek experience of truth, concealedness is not allowed and, though 
it is always possible, it does never arise. This tension is perfectly present in the form 
of the word itself. In fact, the impossibility of determining the precise meaning of the 
prefix 'un-' (as in un-concealedness) or 'a' (as in a-ArjOcia) reveals already 
something about the basic feature of the primordial essence of truth. For the term 
aA770cla tells us that 'in the essence of truth as un-concealedness there holds sway 
some sort of conflict with concealedness and concealment' 19 - an opposition and a 
conflict that reside at the heart of unconcealedness itself. This means that truth , i. e. 
unconcealedness, must essentially be drawn out of concealment in a conflict with it. 
But as Heidegger remarks, the fact that here 'who is struggling' and 'how the 
struggle takes place' are left indeterminate, does not allow us to think that 'among 
humans truth is something to be sought out and to be struggled for. Rather, the 
sought and struggled for, regardless of the conflict in man over it, is in its very 
essence a conflict: "unconcealedness 
lo. ) 
. 
20 
But what does 'conflict' here mean? Does it mean 'fight', 'war', 
ýcompetition' or something else? Normally, when we come across the expression 
zoAepoý-, we immediately think in terms of our modem understanding of conflict, 
hence we say that according to Heraclitus 'war is the father of all things'. This results 
in a major difficulty to grasp the oppositional character of unconcealedness as a 
" ibid. 
19 P, p. 14. 
20 P, p. 17. 
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conflict inherent in the very essence of truth. In addition, since for us 'truth' means 
that which is beyond all conflict, we conceive of what comes in opposition to truth as 
something false. And once 'untruth' in the sense of mere 'falsity' comes to be 
understood as 'incorrectness' this becomes the incompatible rival of 'correctness', 
which excludes the latter. But truth as 'correctness' is not of the same essence as 
truth in the sense of unconcealedness. Hence,, the opposition between correctness 
and incorrectness, validity and invalidity, explains nothing regarding the distInctive 
character of the opposition which resides in truth as unconcealedness. These 
traditional modes of oppositional thinking are entirely misleading here. In fact, as 
Heidegger puts it, 'the bastion of the prevailing essence of truth, veritas and truth as 
correctness and certitude,, is occluding the primordial understanding of aAqOcla'. 21 
Similarly, a long-standing traditional assumption that characterizes the opposition 
between truth and untruth as a conflict between 'positive' and 'negative' mis-directs 
our attention from the fact that there is no negativity, at least not necessarily, in what 
stands in opposition to aA; 70cta. For 'the Greeks' experienced the essence of 
concealedness as the basic characteristic of Being itself. And given the rich essence 
of aA)70.61a, truth in this sense cannot have falsity and dissemblance as its only or 
primary opposites. Rather, as we have already mentioned, the modes of concealment 
are varied and multiple and often bear no sign of the 'negativity' that characterizes 
the false and the distorted. This goes to show that the elevation of falsity as what 
excludes truth (rather than inherently belonging to it) into the position where it alone 
presents the opposition to the truth is peculiar to Western metaphysics. Meanwhile, 
as Heidegger remarks, 
the Greeks experience and express concealment in many ways, not only within the sphere of 
the everyday handling and considering of things, but also from the ultimate perspective of 
beings as a whole. Death, night, day, light, the earth, the subterranean, and the 
supraterranean are pervaded by disclosure and concealment and remain mired in this 
essence. Emergence into the unconcealed and submergence into concealment dwell 
primordially everywhere. 
22 
2' P, p. 6 1. 
21 P, p. 67. 
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Thus in order to understand the conflictual character of unconcealedness, we must 
pay heed to the diverse forms under which concealedness presents itself 
3. Forms of Concealedness 
In the initial stage of our reflection concerning the opposite of unconcealedness we 
have discussed the essence of yzm5oý- in relation to AavOavco or 'being hidden' 
where we said that qlcv&ý- is a hiding in the strictest sense. Then, on the basis of the 
statement that hiddenness is a mode of concealment, we sought to understand 
Heidegger's thought that the essence of ayev&ý- (the 'non-hiding' or the 'dis- 
hiding') must be determined in reference to aAqOcý-- 'the unconcealed'. In order to 
show this connection - which in the case of a-Vevgký- is of course not an 
etymological one - we mentioned that the verb AavOavco (I am concealed) pertains 
to the stem AaO (concealing) which in turn is tied to aA770va (unconcealedness). 
The main point that emerged from these remarks was that beings as such are 
determined by concealedness and unconcealedness which are, in turn, fundamental 
characteristics of Being itself. 
To be sure, whereas we conceive concealing as a kind of 'putting away', as 
something that has disappeared or perhaps been destroyed, the Greeks understood 
concealment as something that preserves, 'shelters and saves the concealed for what 
iý 23 t is . The concealment that preserves 
is, Heidegger says, characteristic of what is 
called the 'rare'. For the truly rare is not something that is available at times and just 
for a few but something that is available always and to everyone, with the exception 
that 'it dwells in a concealment harboring something utterly decisive and holding in 
readiness high claims on us, . 
24 
23 P, p. 62. 
24 ibid. 
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A secret or a mystery is such a mode of concealment. But, if the secret in the 
mystery is to be a genuine kind of concealment, then it must also be experienced, i. e. 
be 'disclosed' as that which is closed-off, as a concealment, a mystery. Meanwhile, 
terms such as 'open secret' and 'open mystery' are too often misapplied to cases 
where there is no secret to be intrigued by and nothing mysterious. Rather, everybody 
knows what should not have been known and what should have been kept secret. But 
what is implied by the 'open mystery' in the genuine sense is that there is something 
which is concealed from us, something that is a secret and we yet all know it, I it is . e. 
open to us but only in its closed-off form. Thus, the significance of the openness of 
the 'open mystery' resides, not in solving the mystery and thereby destroying it, but 
in leaving the concealedness untouched and allowing it to appear in this 
concealedness. In Heidegger's words, 'the "open mystery" in the genuine and strict 
sense occurs where the concealing of the mysterious is simply experienced as 
concealedness and is lodged in a historically arisen reticence'. 25 
Now within the mysterious there occurs another type of concealment known 
as the 'clandestine' which gives rise to something like 'conspiracy'. Here, the 
'inconspicuous' also makes its appearance by assuming the shape of 'camouflage' 
and 'deception'. Heidegger refers briefly to another sense of concealment as 'the 
merely not yet known' which includes, among others, the world of scientific and 
technical discoveries: 'When the concealed in this sense is brought into 
unconcealedness,, there arises "the miracles of technology" and what is specifically 
"AmenCan,,. '. 26 
In seeking to penetrate more deeply into the sense of concealedness, 
Heidegger draws out further implications involved in the meaning of AaOov, AaOcý- - 
as opposed to a-AqOeý- - by considering the verb AavOavcaOat or 
, vriAavOav, ccTOai: 'forgetting'. Forgetting, in the Greek sense, 
is a concealment. 
What happens in forgetting something - whatever this may be - is that the forgotten 
25 p, p. 63. 
2" P, p. 64. 
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falls away into concealedness in such a manner that the falling away itself stays 
concealed to the person who has forgotten. Accordingly, the forgetter 
is concealed to himself in his relation to what is happening here to that which we then call, 
on the account of this happening, the forgotten. The forgetter not only forgets the forgotten, 
but along with that he forgets himself as the one for whom the forgotten has disappeared. A 
concealment takes place here that at once befalls the forgotten and the forgetter, without, 
however, obliterating them. 27 
The most appropriate term to explain such a concealment is the word (oblivion' or 
'obliviation' (Vergessung) which indicates that into which the forgotten falls. It is 
important to point out that in 'obliviation', as an event of concealment, man is ruled 
out from the forgotten. Of course, traditionally one considers forgetting as an act or 
behaviour of man, as relating to something that one cannot retain or something that 
for biological, psychological or other such reasons escapes one. In this 
understanding, forgetfulness may mean poor attention, an inclination towards 
distraction or the loss of memory, amnesia. Meanwhile, the oblivion in question here 
does not, according to Heidegger, testify only to a human negligence and is not a 
mere consequence of people happening to forget this or that thing. Oblivion, as the 
event of obliviation,, is the concealedness belonging to a characteristic of 
concealment and as such it is related to A77077. Hence, Aqft oblivion, 'is a 
concealment that withdraws what is essential and alienates man from himself, i. e. 
from the possibility of dwelling within his own essence'. 28To repeat, forgetting here 
is not a subjective state because it does not relate only to the past - that is, to the 
I recollection' of what has gone by in the past - nor does it refer to thinking as 're- 
presentation'. To forget means rather, 'no-longer-being-there-with-it and by no 
means only a no-longer-remembering as the lack of a representation'. 29 Thus, 
because the essence of oblivion is concealedness, forgetting is a concealment that can 
shift and hold the essence of man in its entirety in hiddennness. In forgetting, 
27 P, p. 7 1. 
28 p, p. 72. 
29 P, p. 83. 
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Heidegger says, man is separated from the unconcealed and is placed into 
concealedness in such a way that concealment on the whole does not appear at all: 
A77077, oblivion, is the concealment that lets the past, the present, and the future fall into the 
path of a self-absenting absence. [ ... ]ArIO77 conceals while 
it withdraws. It withdraws while, 
withholding itself, it lets the unconcealed and its disclosure lapse into the 'away' of a veiled 
absence. 30 
But what can really be said about A2707, when inceptive Greek thinkers, as it seems,, 
themselves keep silence over it? 31 Where forgetfulness itself falls into oblivion - 
there the unconcealed closes-off and immerses itself into concealedness. Yet 
something, somehow, must be said about Aqft for it is precisely A77077 that defines 
aA770cia. 
4. A q0q, the Ampoviog Tbzoý-, or 'the District of the Uncanny' 
Seeking to evoke something of the inceptive Greek experience of Ar7O7,7 Heidegger 
mentions Pindar's ode and also refers to Hesiod's theogony where he gives an 
account of the provenance of the essence of A? 7Oi7 out of epiý; (strife) and vvý 
(night). " But he pays particular attention to two stories told by Plato in HoAtrcia 
(The Republic). The first myth, known as Plato's 'cave allegory', is concerned with a 
place (a cave) that denotes a hiding, a concealing and unconcealedness. The second 
is a rich and complex story where Ar7077 is said to be a hidden 'demonic place' 
(, 5aipovioý- z-ozoý-), a signless realm where there flows a mysterious river. The 
'place' is the field of concealedness. Theuv0oý-tells the story of the warrior 'Er' and 
runs briefly like this: After having received mortal wounds on the battle field, Er lies 
30 ibid. 
31 Yet, "'to keep silent" is not merely to say nothing. Without something essential to say, one cannot 
keep silent. Only within essential speech, and by means of it alone, can there prevail essential silence, 
having nothing in common with secrecy, concealment, or "mental reservations". The Greek thinkers 
and poets largely keep silent over Ar7O77'. (P, p. 73). In 32 P, p. 88. 
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dead on the ground for ten days. When they come to collect the dead, Er's body is 
said to be the only one remaining intact, i. e. non-decomposed. The body, however, is 
taken home and laid on the funeral pyre, waiting to be buried on the twelfth day. But 
in the meantime Er comes back to life and reports what has happened. Thus, in 
accordance with Heidegger's interpretation, Plato says 
'his "soul",, after it was elevated from the here, went with many (others) on a journey, and 
they arrived then at some kind of - as we say - "demonic" place; and there were two chasms 
(Xaqua-ra - Xaoý-, openings) in the earth next to one another, and there were also two 
others (openings) in the sky opposite to each other. AiXaa-rai were pointing toward order 
but were sitting between these gaping openings in the earth and in heaven. To Er, the brave 
warrior, the pointing ones gave the task to become ayreAov avOpcwroiý- ycvCUOai rcov EKýci 
(6140), a messenger to men about "the there". Hence it was necessary for him 
aKoveiv z-c icai Ocaa0al zav-ra -ra -v rco -ro7rw (6140) - to hear as well as to see 
everything in that place, a place said to be o5aiuovtoýý. 33 
The fact that Plato introduces expressions such as the 'there'(cKei) to denote the 
place that man visits after his death and the 'here' (ev0do5e) which refers to man's 
life here on earth, may appear a little odd. For one expects from a thinker of the 
status of Plato to be quite aware that there could be no rational argument to sustain 
such beliefs about what comes after death. But the truth is that Plato makes no effort 
to provide a well reasoned argument regarding what happens after someone dies. He 
just reports an old legend that he has heard. 
However, Plato seems to believe that man's death signals not his end but his 
transition from the 'here' to the 'there' -a transition, which being itself a journey, 
comes eventually to a close and gives way to a ftirther transition. Hence, Plato refers 
to the course of man's life and his residence in the zoAiý- in terms of a zcpio&ý-, a 
periodic path, we may say, within a locally and temporally determined circuit. But 
where is the beyond onto which man steps after his death and before his emergence 
into a new life form? Is the 'there' the place where angels and demons dwell? Is it a 
'heaven', a 'hell', a 'limbo' or a 'purgatory'? We are of course familiar with re- 
incarnation doctrines and claims for the immortality of man's soul, often attributed to 
33 See P, p. 99. 
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Plato himself. But Heidegger believes that it is precipitate to interpret Plato's 
thoughts by means of such notions. What may be said in this regard is that 'death 
brings the present course to a close, but is not the end of the Being of a man. ). 34 In 
any case, it is revealing to see that when it comes to what matters most - i. e. what 
determines the zoAzý- as the 'where' of Greek life and death - Plato, who is the fore- 
runner of the new fonn of thinking, has recourse to pv0oý- and seeks to include the 
old mythical language of his predecessors. 
Let us return to the story itself and consider the warrior's characterization of 
the 'there' as 'demonic'. Obviously, what is 'demonic' or Jatpoviog for the Greeks 
has little in common with our conception of the 'demonic' as something inhabited or 
created by 'demons' or 'evil spirits'. Nonetheless, it is not evident that we - in so far 
as we cannot experience the essence of aA770cia - will ever be able to comprehend 
the nature of -ro Jatpovtov. For t5atpovtov, as that which characterizes AqO77, 
stands in direct relation to aAq0va which constitutes in turn the essence of Being 
and as such determines all that emerges into Being (Ovaiý-) and everything that 
ordinarily is. In fact, 'the demons' (the (5aipoveý-), as Heidegger says, could be who 
they are and be in the way that they are - i. e. the self-showing ones, the pointing ones 
which descend from Being into beings - only within the realm of the disclosure of 
Being itself 
34 p, p. 93. On the Christian interpretation of Plato, Heidegger's remarks may be worth quoting at 
length: 'According to our usual, that is, in the broadest sense, "Christian", modes of representations, 
what is being raised here is the question of the "beyond". Christianity, from early on, following the 
path of Judeo-Hellenic teachings, has in its own way seized upon the philosophy of Plato and has seen 
to it that fi7om then until now the Platonic philosophy, held out as the high point of Greek philosophy, 
should appear in the light of Christian faith. Even the thinking before Plato and Socrates is understood 
on the basis of Plato, as is evident in the ordinary designation of this thinking: it is "pre-Platonic" 
philosophy, its fi7agments the "fi7agments of the pre-Socratics". Not only does Greek philosophy 
appear in a Christian theological interpretation, but even within philosophy it is presented as the first 
stage of Christian-occidental thinking. For the first metaphysical-historical meditations on the history 
of philosophy, understand Greek philosophy as the stage of immediate thinking, not yet meditated and 
not yet come to itself. Only this latter, certain of itself, in the modem sense the first "true" thinking, is 
actual thinking. Christianity functions here as the stage of mediation. In the wake of Hegel, the 
historiographical research of the 19th century adheres to all these his basic concepts but at the same 
time, in a remarkable self-deception, rejects his "metaphysics" and files to "Schopenhauer" and 
"Goethe"; yet even there Greek philosophy in general and the philosophy of Plato in particular are 
represented within the horizon of a Christian Platonism. The same holds for Nietzsche as well, whose 
much celebrated interpretation of the "pre-Platonic" philosophers is actually Platonic, i. e., 
Schopenhauerian, and utterly un-Greek'. 
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Night and day take their essence from what conceals and discloses itself and is self- 
lightening. That which is lighted, however, is not only what is visible and seeable but prior 
to that - as the emerging - it is what surveys everything that comes into the light and stays in 
it, i. e., everything ordinary, indeed in such a way that it precisely appears in the ordinary 
itself and only in it and out of it. 35 
Thus, because the (5atpovtoý- determines the basic relation of Being to man, the term 
itself continues to appear in Plato's and Aristotle's writings, although in the later 
period of Greek thinking the language of uvOog is abandoned. For example, we are 
familiar with the Aristotelian expression evi5aluovia, but may not know of its 
connection with (5atpoviog. We know . 6vi5atuovia to mean 'happiness' and 
understand it in relation to the human psyche. This, according to Heidegger's 
analysis, results from the Roman-Christian interpretation of the word as beatitudo, 
i. e. the condition of the beatus. But ev(5atuovia originally means 'the holding sway 
in the appropriate measure of the "cU' - the appearing and coming into presence of 
the gaIPOVIOV;. 36 Hence, Plato talks of the i5aipoviov in terms of an inner voice 
which is determined on the basis of Being itself. Such an attunement is certainly in 
connection, not with external entities, some kind of being-at-hand, but with Being 
itself. Here the i5aipoviov, as the divine that penetrates into unconcealedness, gives 
rise to the uncanny whose explicit voice we hear in the legends, inuvOog. The term 
(5ai, uo viog occurs also when Aristotle describes the essence of thinkers in relation to 
their knowledge of the 'demonic'. A passage from Nichomachean Ethics reads: 
It is said they (the thinkers) indeed know things that are excessive, and thus astonishing, and 
thereby difficult, and hence in general 'demonic' - but also useless, for they are not seeking 
what is, according to straightforward popular opinion, good for man. 37 
Aristotle uses the word 'demonic' in an all-encompassing fashion to describe that 
which from the 'ordinary' person's view-point is excessive, astonishing and 
difficult. Here, what distinguishes the ordinary opinion as ordinary is not the number 
35 P, p. 102. 
36 p, p. 117. 
37 The reference is to Nichomachean Ethics; Z7,1141 b. P, p. 100. 
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of people, 'the many', but their attitude - an attitude that Heidegger recognizes as an 
obsessive and forgetful pursuit of beings. For a busy person, what is current, what he 
does and what he pursues is often a matter of ease and without major difficulty, 
because 'he can always find, going from one being to the next, a way of escape from 
difficulty and an explanation'. 38 Thus, for Aristotle, it seems, the 'straightforward, 
the 'normal' or the 'ordinary' defines everything that remains within the boundaries 
of beings, of the real, of the 'facts'. But as soon as the focus turns upon Being, there 
comes the extra-ordinary, the excessive that lies beyond the normal and the ordinary, 
yet shines through it. 
This, Heidegger says, is the (uncanny' in the literal sense, something that is 
not to be clarified by elucidation on the basis of beings. For the uncanny is the 
simple, the insignificant that remains ungraspable as it surpasses all planning and 
withdraws itself from all kinds of manipulative calculations. What amazes the 
common experience - when and if in the midst of the everyday hustle and bustle 
with beings it succeeds to focus on Being - is Being itself, i. e. the emergence into 
unconcealedness and the recession into concealment that shows itself in each and 
every ordinary being. In other words, 
the astounding is for the Greeks the simple, the insignificant, Being itself The astounding, 
visible in the astonishing, is the uncanny, and it pertains so immediately to the ordinary that 
it can never be explained on the basis of the ordinary. 39 
Hence, to translate ro t5aipoviovas 'the uncanny' would be correct if, so Heidegger 
argues, we recognize that the uncanny is not identical with the o5aipoviov but takes 
its essence from the (5alpoviov. But, now we may ask, if the uncanny is not 
(5aipovtov, then what is the sense of the, 5aipoviov itself? 
The 5aipovlov is what surrounds and encompasses everything that is 
ordinary. And to the extent that it manifests itself in the ordinary without being itself 
the ordinary the 5atpovtov is said to be the uncanny or the extraordinary. 
P, P. 100. 39 P, P. ioi. 
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Accordingly, the uncanny cannot be the exceptional, but the normal, the 'most 
natural', provided that we understand nature in its Greek sense as Ovmý In this 
sense, the uncanny is 'that out of which all that is ordinary emerges, that in which all 
that is ordinary is suspended without surmising it ever in the least, and that into 
which everything ordinary falls back' . 
40 To repeat, this is because z-o 45aiuoviov is 
the essence and the ground of the uncanny. To (5atpoviov is what inhabits and what 
shows itself in the ordinary. Furthermore, to exhibit oneself by means of pointing and 
showing is in Greek 'Jalco (5aiovrcý- - i5aipovcý-)'. 
41 These 'are not "demons" 
conceived as evil spirits' 42 but are what indicate, what point toward and what 
determine beforehand the ordinary without itself departing from the ordinary. 
To Jaipoviov is what shows itself in pointing at what is ordinary and in a certain way 
therefore what is also present everywhere as the perfectly ordinary, though nevertheless 
never the merely ordinary- 43 
We have thus far made an attempt to explain the meaning of t5aipoviov. Now we 
must turn our attention to the rest of the pvOog where the returning warrior describes 
further the 'place' as the place it is: the (5quovioý- zviroý-, 'the district of the 
uncanny'. 
5. The Last Place within the Aaipovioý- Tozoý- 
As we have already mentioned, in the concluding section of the HoAiz-cia, Plato 
discusses the essence of the zoAiý- in relation to the (5aipovioý- roiroý-. Heidegger 
translates this as 'the district of the uncanny'. The wiroý; in question, he says, is the 
6 place' in the sense of 'the originally gathering holding of what belongs together' - 'a 
manifold of places reciprocally related by belonging together' - 'a settlement or a 
40 p, p. 102. 
41 ibid. 
42 ibid. 
41 ibid. 
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district [Ortschaft]'. 44A 5alpovloý-rozoý-, therefore, means the 'where' in which 
the uncanny shines explicitly and 'the essence of Being comes to presence in an 
eminent sense'. 45 Now the i5aipovioý; zviroý- as the place of the gods, is *neither on 
"earth" nor in "heaven... but has only things that 'point to the subterrestrial and the 
supraterrestial' . 
46 And according to the legend, the last place within this district 
where all wanderers must stop before their transition to a new course of life is the 
field of A770q: z"O v7ý7 A77077ý, zc, 5tov, 'the field of withdrawing concealment in the 
sense of oblivion'. 
47 
It is said that AqOi7, as the field that gathers the whole wandering, is inhabited 
by the 'demonic' in its highest and most extreme form. And as the warrior narrates, 
the way to the field of A77077 leads through a blaze consuming everything and through an air 
that asphyxiates everything; 'Also, it (namely this field of withdrawing concealment) is 
itself bare of all that grows as well as completely void of everything the earth lets spring 
48 forth' 
. 
The domain of A770q, as the story implies, opposes all Ouuiý- and forbids every 
emerging, manifesting or coming forth. Here, every disclosure of beings, of entities, 
of what is ordinary is impeded: A77077 is the place where everything disappears. But 
it would be perhaps too simplistic to think that what distinguishes this field - as the 
field that it is - is the absoluteness of such withdrawal in a quantitative sense of the 
tenn. For the point does not lie in the fact that everything disappears in this place and 
there remains nothing, but that the void, the nothing that remains is what comes into 
presence there and there alone. In Heidegger's words, 'the "away" of the withdrawn 
comes into presence itself in the essence of the withdrawal' . 
49 Accordingly, the 
barrenness of the void is not mere nothing but the nothing of the withdrawal. The 
place of A qOq , as the 
'where' in which the uncanny resides, is indeed 'demoruc', not 
44 
P, p. 117. 
45 ibid. 
46 p, p. 118. 
47 ibid. 
413 ibid. 
49 p, P. 119. 
221 
only because the withdrawal of all phenomena occurs here, but also because in this 
place the letting disappear presents itself in a most exalted manner. In fact, there is 
nothing ordinary in this field and, as the legend has it, all the wanderers encounter 
here is a river called Ap, 6A q; - which means, 'Carefree'. 
The name AucA77q indicates that the river which flows in the field of the 
Ai7O77 partakes of the essence of this domain. For the river maintains its presence 
only as withdrawing concealment and its water knows no care (a-cAErq) for what 
opposes the going away, disappearance and concealedness. In sum, the river whose 
water, as the narrator says, 'no vessel could cover, i. e. contain', 50 is ignorant of 
unconcealedness - that is, the care that saves and secures all beings in the 
unconcealed and keeps them constantly therein. The term 'care' - with which we are 
already familiar from Being and Time - does not refer to a type of distress and worry 
or some kind of preoccupation, but relates solely to the care over unconcealedness. 
Hence in the realm of essential thinking, where the essence of Being is thought, just as is 
unconcealedness, whenever the word 'care' occurs something else is intended than 
regretfulness of a human 'subject' staggering around in the 'nothing in itself, in a 'lived 
experience' ob ectified into empty nothingness. 51 j 
That is to say, the 'carefreeness' here means exclusively the lack of concern for the 
truth - not caring about aAq0va, hence a kind of 'loyalty' toward Ar7077 and concern 
for the domain of the withdrawing concealment. Such carefreeness, Heidegger 
remarks, is also (5atpoviov. 
The story continues by telling that, once the journey through the 
(5ai, uovtoý- -rozoý- is accomplished, those who are to embark on a new life on earth 
must first drink from the water of the river 'Carefree'. But the amount of water they 
are to drink must be of a precise measure. For those who drink the right amount of 
water will, in returning to earth, carry with them an attachment. a fundamental 
belonging to the field of the essence of concealment. Meanwhile those who drink 
50 
ibid. 
il ibid. 
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excessively, i. e. more than the recommended measure, will not be saved. They will 
not be on earth as a human being because they would have no means of relating 
disclosively - that is, in speech or, as it is for the Greeks, inUvOoý-, Aoyoq - since all 
and every being will be concealed to them. 
Complete, measureless oblivion, i. e., concealment, would exclude the last ground of the 
essence of man, because such oblivion would allow no disclosure and would deny 
unconcealedness its essential foundation. 52 
Thus AqO77, as that which withdraws, that which prevents emerging or Ovo7iý-, has a 
crucial part in preparing the source and the basis of the essence of unconcealedness. 
Man himself, as the myth says, 'stems from the district of the uncanny divine place 
of withdrawing concealment'. 53 We must take notice that, since A77077 belongs in an 
essential sense to aAqOcia, concealedness can never be a simple negation or a mere 
elimination of unconcealedness. For, as we have seen,, the saving and conserving of 
the unconcealed occurs in a direct and necessary relation with concealedness. 
The conserving is grounded in a perpetual saving and preserving. This preserving of the 
unconcealed comes to pass in its pure essence when man strives freely for the unconcealed 
and does so incessantly throughout his mortal course on earth. 54 
The important outcome of the warrior's tale consists, we may say, in demonstrating 
that the a- in a-A770cla is not a mere undetermined universal in the sense of 'un'- 
or 'not'-. Rather a-A770cla is itself founded on Arl0q. In this essential belonging 
together there is nothing that mediates between the two and no transition takes place, 
as they pertain immediately, in themselves and by their essence, to each other. From 
Heidegger's point of view, what is decisive in this story 55 is the fact that the 
52 p, p. 12-33. 
53 P, p. 124. 
54 ibid. 
55Heidegger translates the concluding lines of the warrior's story as follows: 
'After they lay down to rest and midnight struck, a thunderstorm and an earthquake set in, and fi7om 
there (from the field of Ar7Or7) all of a sudden everyone else was carried away, going toward the 
emerging prominence (toward being on earth) like a flight of stars (shooting stars)' (621 blff. ). 'He 
himself, however, was indeed prevented from drinking the water' (621 b4f. ). ( See P, p. 125). 
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unconcealed is not drawn out of concealedness, but the voice that we hear comes 
from the domain of their unity; or as he puts it, 
the pvOoý- does not tear away from concealment something unconcealed but speaks out of 
that region from which springs forth the original essential unity of the two, where the 
beginning is. 56 
The account of the pvOog of A 17077 seems to be the last word of early Greek thinking 
with regard to that which is opposed to aA? 70cia. Considering what has been said 
thus far, it is clear that what stands against aA770cla could never be the opposite or 
contradiction in a simple ('logical') sense, nor could it ever be the mere lack or the 
denial of it. For aAr7Octa may be preserved and be kept unforgotten only by means 
of its counter-essence Ai7O77. Although common opinion may be convinced that 
things are preserved authentically if they are grasped and constantly at hand, 
Heidegger maintains that it is the self-withdrawing concealment which orders 
mankind to save and to preserve. And, though difficult for us to see, the self- 
withdrawing concealment is for the Greeks 'the simplest of the simple, preserved for 
them in their experience of the unconcealed and therein allowed to come into 
presence I. 
57 
Hence, Plato could have not invented the pv0oý- of A? 70? 7 because no pvOoý- 
could be invented or found through seeking. The word of legends is rather 'a 
response to the word of an appeal in which Being itself dispenses itself to man' 58 and 
it is only within the sphere of what is thus disclosed in advance that a seeking can 
take place. To be sure, there is a significant lapse of time between Plato and Homer. 
By the time of Plato, there is already a shift in people's aptitude to respond and 
express the appeal of Being. This, Heidegger remarks, does not mean that by the 
passing of time the legendary word becomes weaker, but that man's perception 
56 ibid. 
57 P, p. 127. 
58 P, p. 128. 
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becomes dispersed and more variegated to the extent that it is no longer possible to 
experience as present the simple. 
The legendary word of Homer has not faded away. The otherwise silent pv0oý- of Ar7O77 
exists. Therefore even the Platonic pv0oý- of Ar7Oq is a remembering of, not merely a 
thinking 'about', the A77077 Pindar and Hesiod mention. This remembering utterance of the 
pvOoq preserves the primordial unveiling of the essence of A)7077.59 
We may still wonder why Plato insists at all upon this story when his aim is to 
discuss the essence of the 7roAiý-. How exactly is the analysis of the 'demonic' field 
of A770q, the district of the uncanny, relevant to a dialogue of the 7roAiý? The clue 
comes from the relation that Plato draws between the iroAtý7 and Being in terms of 
the conflictual character of aAqOcia. The myth of Ar7077 is here to testify that 
aAqOcta constitutes the ground of the Greek zoAiý7and that the relation between the 
; ToAiý; and Being is a primordial one. 60 In fact, the bond between Being and the 
iroAiý-, Heidegger says, shows how little Plato's BbAtreia has in common with our 
modem understanding of republic and with the Roman res publica ('res populi, i. e. 
that which concerns the organized and established people, what is most their 
"business"' )61 . The zoAiý- 
is neither a city nor a state and it 'is just as little 
62 
something political" as space itself is something spatial' . 
Because the Greeks are the utterly unpolitical people, unpolitical by essence, because their 
humanity is primordially and exclusively determined from Being itself, i. e. from aA770cia, 
therefore only the Greeks could, and precisely had to, found the ; roAlý, found abodes for the 
gathering and conserving of aAt7O, -1a. 63 
In addition we may say that the state, according to the modem view, is the site of 
64 
power -a power which has often been characterized as 'demonic' and 'evil' . But 
59 ibid. 
60 The term7roA tý- furthermore, shares the same root with the ancient Greek word for 'to be', ; rEAei v 
which means 'to emerge, to rise up into the unconcealed'- (for 'evidence', Heidegger refers to 
Sophocles). See P, p-90- 
61 P, p. 89. 
62 P, p. 95. 
63 p, p. 96. 
6' See Nietzsche. Untimely Meditations, p. 114. Also Thus spoke Zarathustra, 'Of the New Idol'. pp. 
75-78. 
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how could any modem and Christian notions of 'evil' and 'demonic', loaded with 
moral connotations, characterize the power wIthIn the iroA iý7 that guides 'the Greeks' 
in their experience of the place as the place of their gathering? 
The essence of power, as meant in modem thinking about the state, is founded in the 
metaphysical presupposition that the essence of truth has been transformed into certitude, 
i. e., into the self-certitude of the human being in his self-positing, and that this latter is 
based on the subjectivity of consciousness. 65 
But what is the 7roAig9 What kind of a place is it? The zoAiý- is 'the pole, the place 
around which everything appearing to the Greeks as a being turns in a peculiar 
way,. 66 This is the place where entities are able to manifest themselves in the full 
totality of their condition because here beings are let to appear in their Being. To say 
that the pole allows beings to appear in their Being, does not imply that beings are 
created by the pole but that the pole is where unconcealedness of beings as a whole 
takes place. The zoAtý-, Heidegger says, is 'the abode, gathered into itself, of the 
unconcealedness of the beings' 67 - 'the abode of the essence of Greek humanity'. The 
zoAtý- as 'the essence of the place' is thus 'the settlement of the historical dwelling' 
of this humanity. 68 
Now, given that aAi7O, -ia is conflictual in its nature, the zoAiý-, as the 
(. place' that is raised and sustained by aAqOela, is also the abode of oblivion and 
distortion in its multiple forms - hence, the home of all excesses, of the most radical 
oppositions to the unconcealed -a 'place' where counter-beings, the 'demons' appear 
in their manifold diversity. Jacob Burckhardt was one of the first to speak of the 
Greek zoAiý- in terms of frightfulness, horribleness, atrociousness, etc. 69 _ 
65 p, P. 90. 
66 p, P. 89. 
67 p, P. 90. 
68 ibid. 
69 Heidegger, stressing Burckhardt's influence on Nietzsche, adds that 'in the introduction to his 
lectures on the "history of Greek culture", Jacob Burckhardt knowingly inserts a thesis he heard as a 
student from his teacher in classical philology at Berlin, Bockh, and it runs as follows: "the Hellenes 
were more unhappy than most people think". Burckhardt's presentation of the Greeks, which he often 
repeated in his lectures at Basel from 1872 on, was based entirely on this insight, or, rather, surmise. 
Nietzsche had in his possession an auditor's transcript of these lectures, and he cherished the 
manuscript as his most precious treasure. Thus Jacob Burckhardt himself contributed to the fact that 
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expenences that are also expressed in Greek tragedy. For the zoAiý, as the pole 
around which the Greeks gather their life, is, as we said, the place that lets all beings 
appear in their 'true colours' that is, in their Being. Therefore, if the Greeks are to say 
anything about man's experience, his life and his existence in the ZoAiý;, this would 
necessarily be a 'tragic' tale. For tragedy, for the Greeks, is an expression inspired by 
Being and the experience of its essence as aAqOcia. And since it is this very 
experience that in the first instance gives voice to tragedy, Heidegger can go so far as 
to say: 'there is only Greek tragedy and no other besides it,. 70 
6. In Place of a Conclusion 
We may end our investigation by indicating yet one more direction pointed to by the 
term 'unconcealedness'. This is the original meaning of 'freedom' sketched by 
Heidegger in terms of the 'open', the 'clearing' and the 'letting-be', as what is 
primordially self-opening or free: 
To disclose, i. e. to let appear in the open, can only be accomplished by what gives in 
advance this open and thus is in itself self-opening and thereby is essentially open, or as we 
may also say is 'freedom'. The still concealed essence of the open as the primordial self- 
opening is 'freedom'. 71 
Does this mean that 'freedom' is the ground and the condition of the possibility 
for any disclosure whatsoever, for unconcealedness? Indeed. Heidegger says 
clearly that 'the open is by no means first and only a result or consequence of 
disclosure but is itself ground and the essential beginning of unconcealedness. ' 72 
This implies that the laws of nature, i. e. Ovctý; are grounded not in some kind of 
necessity opposed to freedom, but in freedom in the sense of that which lets the 
beings be, that by virtue of which disclosure is possible. Yet, is it not the case that 
Nietzsche still thought the essence of the Greek world and of its ; roAtý; in a Roman way'. For ftirther 
discussion on this topic, see P, pp. 90-9 1. 
10 P, P. 90. 
71 P, p. 1433 
72 P, p. 14' 3. 
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freedom determines itself as freedom only through a struggle against nature? 
Perhaps. But while metaphysics conceives 'freedom' in terms of the 'will' and 
understands the freedom of the latter in relation to human or divine actions, 
Heidegger proposes to think the essence of freedom with a view to the essence of the 
ýopen' and in fundamental unity with aAi7O, 61a. This, for Heidegger, is an urgent 
need because he maintains that, since the modem concept of freedom is totally 
unaware of the essential unity bonding together the meanings of 
Being/AA770cia/openness, it falls short of reaching the essence of man. In fact, from 
Heidegger's point of view 'we', the so called 'free men', may have not even attained 
to that freedom which is proper to our Being, for we have not yet grasped what that 
freedom is to which man 'must first attain,, in accord with his essence, if he is to be 
able to let beings be in the open what they are as beings'. 73 
This brings us to question the commonly held idea of freedom believed to 
have governed the Greek 'cities'. In other words, Heidegger's account of the 
primordial sense of freedom raises the suspicion that we may have been misled in 
our interpretation of freedom, just as we were in our standard conceptions of 
176A tra a in terms of the Republic, of the zoA iý- in terms of 'bourg' and city, and the 
(5atpovtoý- as 'demonic'. If this the case, then the Greeks' care and demand for 
'freedom', their conception of the zoAtý- as the 'free' place would have nothing in 
common with modem notions of civil liberties, autonomy and self-determination of 
human will or reason. Rather, the care would have been care for unconcealedness, for 
4 nature' (Ovcný), for an existence guided by the meaning of unconcealedness, of the 
4 open', of the 'letting-be' that pervades aAqOcia. In sum, if, as Heidegger says, 'the 
74 
open, to which every being is liberated as to its freedom, is Being itself, then the 
Greeks would have understood Ereedom in the sense of the openness of Being itself. 
This leads Heidegger to the statement that, since man, as the one who has forgotten 
r Being, is alienated from the open, his experience of freedom, his idea of himself as 
73 P, p. 143). 
74 P, p. 150. 
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being-free is neither Greek nor primordial, but is a metaphysical one. Man,, 
Heidegger says, 'forgets Being and in such forgetting learns nothing more than the 
overlooking of Being and alienation from the open'. 75 
It is however striking to think that the modem city or Republic may have its 
foundations, not in 'freedom". but in alienation,, in concealedness and in the oblivion 
of Being. Perhaps this is why, here, freedom is conceived as having everything, 
every aspect of life, every being, under the control of the citizen-subject. Perhaps 
this, as a way of keeping busy, is man's mode of sustaining himself in the oblivion. 
But just as anxiety is capable of striking the 'happy man', as if out of nowhere, so 
can the feeling of repression, coercion, alienation and homelessness envelop the 'free 
man' at 'home' at any moment. This may explain why Heidegger accounts for the 
4 alienation' and the 'homelessness' of Dasein in relation to the oblivion of Being, 
and why he views every advance toward a greater control and domination of beings 
as further estrangement from the 'truth' and deeper entanglement in nihilism. Being, 
he says, 'from whose bestowal man cannot withdraw, even in the most extreme 
oblivion of Being, does, however, flow away from man into the indeterminate 
totality of beings as a consequence of his alienation from aAqOeia. In this way 
Being is identified without distinction with beings or else is cast aside as an empty 
concep I. 
76 
In fact, Nietzsche described Being as an empty concept and no more than a 
vapour because he was, according to Heidegger, the 'last to experience this 
homelessness'. 77 But since he was looking for a way out from within metaphysics he 
could do no better than to reverse the old metaphysics - an attempt that had, in any 
case, already been made by Feuerbach. For Heidegger, however, homelessness is the 
symptom of the oblivion of Being with the consequence that the truth of Being 
remains unthought. Therefore, it is not Nietzsche's care for a new 'homeland' and his 
concern for the overcoming of homelessness that impresses Heidegger, but what 
75 P, p. 15 1. 
76 p, p. 15 1. 
77 'Letter on Humanism' in: Basic Writings, p. 24 1. 
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transpires in H61derlin's verses. In the 'Letter on Humanism', for instance, 
Heidegger remarks that H61derlin seeks the homeland in the nearness to Being, 78 but 
as Being remains concealed, the world's destiny which is voiced in his poetry finds 
no way of becoming manifest as the history of Being itself. Thus, because the 
estrangement of modem man and his homelessness constitute, as Heidegger believes, 
the destiny of the world, it is essential to think that destiny in terms of the history of 
Being and to recognize that the only way to 'overcome' homelessness is to prepare 
the way so that Being can come to the fore and can be experienced in its truth. For 
otherwise, 'expelled from the truth of Being' man would continue to 'circle round 
himself as the animal rationale' 
In the face of the essential homelessness of man, man's approaching destiny reveals itself to 
thought on the history of Being in this, that man finds his way into the truth of Being and 
sets out on this find. 79 
In this connection Heidegger also takes up Marx's notion of 'estrangement': 
what Marx recognized in an essential and significant sense, though derived from Hegel, as 
the estrangement of man has its roots in the homelessness of modem man. This 
homelessness is specifically evoked from the destiny of Being in the form of metaphysics, 
and through metaphysics is simultaneously entrenched and covered up as such. 
80 
The Marxist view of history, Heidegger adds, rises above other historical accounts 
because Marx, through the experience of alienation, was able to reach an essential 
81 dimension of history. Meanwhile, because neither Husserl nor the Sartre of Being 
and Nothingness genuinely recognized the importance of the historical in Being, both 
classical phenomenology and existentialism remain blind to that dimension within 
78 'When Holderlin composes "Homecoming" he is concerned that his "countrymen" find their 
essence. He does not at all seek that essence in an egoism of his nation. He sees it rather in the context 
of a belongingness to the destiny of the West. But even the West is not thought regionally as the 
Occident in contrast to the Orient, nor merely as Europe, but rather world-historically out of nearness 
to the source. The homeland of the historical dwelling is nearness to Being'. See 'Letter on 
Humanism' in: Basic Writings, pp. 241-242. 
79 'Letter on Humanism' in: Basic Writings, p. 244. 
"0 ibid. p. 243. 
" 'No matter which of the various positions one chooses to adopt toward the doctrines of communism 
and to their foundation, from the point of view of the history of Being it is certain that an elemental 
experience of what is world-historical speaks out in it'. ibid. p. 244. 
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which a positive, i. e. a creative dialogue with Marxism could be first attained. 
Having said this, such a productive dialogue with Marxism requires, in Heidegger's 
view, a re-thinking of materialism - away from 'naYve notions but also from the 
cheap refutations' 82_ on the basis of its metaphysical resolution that accounts for the 
appearance of what there is in terms of the material of labour. 83 For to say that 
materialism asserts that everything is at bottom just 'matter' is too simplistic, since it 
says nothing about the essence of materialism - an essence which is concealed in the 
essence of technology. 84 
Now, because Heidegger considers the reign of technology a destiny within 
the history of Being, technology comes to represent a truth grounded in the oblivion 
and hence in the history of metaphysics, which is in turn just one discernible stage of 
the history of Being itself. But if metaphysics is only a phase, only one possibility 
within the history of Being, then we may ask what is meant by the talk about the end 
of philosophy? In what sense has philosophy entered its end? To be sure, in 'The End 
of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking', Heidegger says that 'Nietzsche 
characterizes his philosophy as reversed Platonism. With the reversal of metaphysics 
that was already accomplished by Karl Marx the uttermost possibility of philosophy 
is attained'. 85 This possibility is philosophy as metaphysics whereby all there is, i. e. 
beings as a whole, are thought in their belonging together with Being and represented 
in thinking as that which provides the ground. Since the beginning, metaphysics has 
thought Being as the Being of beings and conceived it as the ground of beings -a 
ground that by showing itself as presence brings each and every being to presencing 
in their own peculiar way. On the basis of this same ground Heidegger traces the 
82 ibid. p. 243. 
83 With regard to labour and productivity the extent of Marx's debt to Hegel is so widely discussed 
that it might not even need mentioning. However, Marx' Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 
1844 also contain important remarks concerning the theme of alienation in relation to Hegel's 
Phenomenology of Spirit. See in particular, 'Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a 
Whole' in: Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, pp. 125-148. 
84 'Letter on Humanism' in: Basic Writings, p. 243. 
85 'The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking' in: Basic Writings, p. 43.3). 
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achievements of modern metaphysics from the middle ages to Nietzsche in a few 
lines: 
In accordance with the giving type of presence, the ground has the character of grounding as 
the ontic causation of the actual, the transcendental making possible of the objectivity of 
objects, the dialectical meditation of the movement of absolute spirit and of the historical 
86 process of production, and the will to power positing values. 
Thus, seen from the 20th century point of view, or from Heidegger's position., 
philosophy enters into its final stage as the completion of metaphysics. A completion 
which does not entail - at least not necessarily - the end of philosophy in the sense of 
its complete cessation, but a completion that leads 'from one end to the other'. 
Heidegger makes use of the term 'end' to convey the sense of gathering that belongs 
to the place. The end of philosophy, he says, 'is the place, that place in which the 
whole of philosophy's history is gathered in its uttermost possibility. End as 
completion means this gathering". 87 Today, in view of the separation of the sciences 
from philosophy and their independent development in all domains of beings, it has 
become difficult to see that these sciences have all grown out of philosophy and are 
in any case the outcome of a possibility that was enclosed in philosophy itself since 
the age of the Greeks. 88 
But, if the end of philosophy proves to be 'the triumph of the manipulable 
89 
arrangement of a scientific-technological world" should we understand the end of 
philosophy in the sense of its evolving into the sciences? Should we consider such 
progress as the complete actualization of all the possibilities posited in the thinking 
of philosophy? Or should we believe that there are ftirther and other possibilities for 
philosophy than its mere dissolution in the technologized sciences? In other words, 
can philosophical thinking do more or do other then what it has done up until now? 
86 ibid. p. 432. 
87 'The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking, in: Basic Writings, p. 432. 
88 Technology 'does not go back to the techne of the Greeks in name only but derives historically and 
essentially from techne as a mode of aletheuein, a mode, that is, of rendering beings manifest 
[Offenbarmachenl'. See 'Letter on Humanism' in: Basic Writings, p. 244. 
89 'The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking' in: Basic Writings, p. 435. 
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Is there still an important task reserved for thinking, 'a task accessible neither to 
philosophy as metaphysics nor, even less, to the sciences stemming from 
philosophy'909 Heidegger's reply to the latter question is certainly affirmative, since 
he believes in the possibility of a thinking that is neither metaphysics nor science. 
But what kind of thinking this may be, is for the moment but a question -a guiding 
question whereby thinking prepares its own transformation in the process of learning 
first what remains reserved and in store for it. Such a transformation will guide us 
into other horizons, other possibilities, it will show us different ways of relating to 
ourselves, to each other, to nature and to the divine. Here may lie an avenue towards 
understanding, facing up to, and perhaps 'overcoming' nihilism. 
Meanwhile we may end our discussion with a note addressed to the 
(alienated' and 'homeless'. There is a yet more terrible sense to repression, to 
anxiety, to homelessness and to alienation than they may have experienced, for the 
homeland to which they hope to return is yet to be envisaged, not upon well-known 
models, but by learning to think otherwise. But what can we expect from 
philosophy? Perhaps not much. But one thing is certain: philosophy can show its 
possibilities only once we have prepared the terrain by having learned to pay heed to 
what has been forgotten, by having learned to see through the history and perhaps 
even to go beyond it. With this in mind, Heidegger's way of thinking may come as a 
great source of encouragement and inspiration. Having said this, Heidegger, while 
having some familiarity with non-Western modes of thought, does not consider in 
any detail thinking other than that which originates from Greek, Roman, or biblically 
inspired modes of questioning. Does it really seem likely that 'the Greeks' were 
surrounded by an immense, endless and thoughtless desert and where the only ones 
to whom Being revealed itself'? If we really wish to think differently, should we 
perhaps widen the horizon of our thinking and let the fresh air blow away our fear of 
90 ibid. p. 435. 
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looking further, beyond the limitations and prejudices hardened by centuries? But 
then again, this might be a question only for the 'alienated' and 'homeless'. 
Li 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abrams, M. H., Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic 
Literature (New York: Norton, 1971). 
Adorno, W. Theodor, Minima Moralia, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott (London: Verso, 
1996). 
Hegel: Three Studies, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambidge/Mass,: MIT 
Press, 1993. 
Allen, R. E. & Furley, D. J., Studies in Presocratic Philosophy, vol. II: The Eleatics 
and Pluralists (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975). 
Aristotle, Metaphysics, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. R McKeon (New York, 
1941). 
Physics, trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
Ethics, trans. J. A. K. Thomson (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1976). 
Poetics,, trans. Gerald F. Else (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 
1970). 
Badi, Amir Mehdi, Hegel et les Origines de la Pens6e Contemporaine (Lausanne: 
Payot, 1964). 
Barnes, Jonathan, The Presocratic Philosophers (London: Routledge, 1996). 
Beaufret, Jean, Parmenide Le Poeme, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1995). 
Beistegui, Miguel de, Heidegger & the Political, (London: Routledge, 1998). 
Bernet, Rudolf-, Kern, Iso; Marbach, Eduard, An Introduction to Husserlian 
Phenomenology (Evanston Northwestern University Press, 1999). 
Blattner, D. Williairn, Heidegger's Temporal Idealism, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). 
Birault, Henri, 'Heidegger et la pensee de la finitude', in Revue Internationale de 
Philosophie 52 (1960). 
Bostock., D., 'Plato on "is not"',, in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 2 (1984). 
Bourdieu, Pierre, L'Ontologie Politique de Martin Heidegger (Paris: Edition de 
Minuit, 1988). 
Bowie, Andrew,, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy (London: Routledge, 
1993). 
Bowra, C. M.,, 'The Poem of Parmenides',, in Classical Philosophy 32 (1937). 
Brentano, Franz, Psychology ftom an Empirical Standpoint (London: Routledge, 
1970). 
Buckley, Michael, At the Origins of Modern Atheism (New Haven & London: Yale 
Universuity Press, 1987). 
Burnet, J. M.. Early Greek Philosophy (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1930). 
Camus, Albert, The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt (New York: Knopf, 1956). 
Carre, Meyrick H., Realists and Nominalists (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1946). 
Cassin, Barbara, Parmenide, Sur la Nature ou sur L'itant Paris: tditions du Seuil, 
1998). 
Calogero, G., Studi sull'Elatismo (Rome: 1932). 
235 
Caputo, D. John, Demythologizing Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana Universit. ',, Press, 1993). 
Caton, Hirman, The Origin of Subjectivity: An Essay on Descartes (New Haven & 
London: Yale University Press, 1973). 
Cavarero, Adriana, LInterpretazione Hegeliana di Parmenide (Trento: Publicazioni 
di Verifiche, 1984), 
Comford, F.,, Plato and Parmenides (London: Routledge, 195 8). 
Courtenay, William, 'Nominalism and late Late Medieval Religion', in The Pursuit 
of Holiness in late Medieval and Renaissance Religion, ed. Charles Trinkaus and 
Heiko Oberman (Leiden: Brill, 1974). 
Croce,, Bendetto, 91hat is Living and "at is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel, trans. 
Douglas Ainslie (London: MacMillan, 1915). 
Derrida, Jacques, De 1'Esprit. - Heidegger et la Question (Paris: Galil6e, 1987). 
Descartes,, Ren6, The Philosophical Works of Descartes, 2 vols., ed. E. S. Haldane 
and G. T. R. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931-4. 
Donatello, K., 'Speaking of Nothing', in Philosophical Review 83. 
Dreyfus, L. Hubert, Being-in-the- World, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1994). 
Fackenheim,, Emil, The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought, (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1967). 
Feuerbach,, Ludwig, Principles of the Philosophy of the Future, trans. Manfred Vogel 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1986). 
Thoughts on Death and Immortality, trans. James A. Massey (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1980). 
Flynn, C. Bernard, 'Descartes and the Ontology of Subjectivity', in Man and World 
16(1983). 
Fleischer,, Margot, Die Zeitanalysen in Heideggers 'Sein und Zeit' (Wiirzburg: 
K6nigshausen und Neumann, 199 1). 
Frdnkel, H., 'Parrnemdesstudien', rev. & trans. Allen and Furley in Studies in 
Parmenides, vol. 11, pp. 7-47. 
Gadarner, Hans-Georg, Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. David E. Linge 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977). 
Hekel's Dialectic, trans. Christopher Smith (New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press, 1976). 
Gale, R., Negation and Not-Being, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975). 
Geiman, Clare Pearson, 'Heidegger's Antigones' in R. Polt and G. Fried (eds. ), A 
Companion to Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 2001). 
Gillespie, Michael Allen, Nihilism before Nietzsche (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996). 
Hegel, Heidegger, and the Ground of History (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1984). 
Gallop, D., Parmenides of Elea (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984) 
'Is or Is not? ', in The Monist 62 (1979). 
Granier. Jean, La Problime de la Viriti dans la Philosophie de Nietzsche (Paris: 
Seuil, 1966). 
Harvey, Van A., Feuerbach and the Interpretation of Religion (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, The Philoso hy of History, trans. J. Sibree (New p 
York: Dover, 1959). 
213 6 
- 
Phinomenologie de LEsprit, 2 vols., trans. Jean Hyppolite (Paris: Aubier. 
1941). 
_Phenomenology of 
Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1977). 
- 
The Encyclopedia Logic, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, H. S. Harris 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991). 
Science of Logic, ed. H. D. Lewis, trans. A. V. Miller (Atlantic Highlands: 
Humanities Press, 1969). 
Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 3 vols., trans. E. S. Haldane and Frances 
H. Simson (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995). 
Early Theological Writings, trans. T. M. Knox (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 197 1). 
Leqon sur les Preuves de L'existence de Dieu, trans. Jean-Marie Lardic (Paris: 
Aubier, 1994). 
Heidegger, Martin, History of the Concept of Time, trans. Theodore Kisiel 
(Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992). 
Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1995). 
Nietzsche, vols. 1,, 111,1115 IV, ed. David Farrell Krell, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi 
(San Francisco: Harper Collins Publishers, 199 1). 
Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Gregory Fried & Richard Polt (New Haven 
& London: Yale University Press, 2000). 
Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), trans. Parvis Emad and 
Kenneth Maly (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999). 
Basic Questions of Philosophy, trans. Andr6 Schuwer & Richard Rojcewicz 
(Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994). 
Parmenides, trans. Andr6 Schuwer & Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington & 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998). 
The Metaphysical Foundations ofLogic, trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington & 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992). 
Logik. - Die Frage nach der Wahrheit, ed. W. Biemel, GA 21 (Frankfurt: 
Vittorio Klostermwm, 1976). 
Basic Concepts, trans. Gary E. Aylesworth (Bloomington & Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1998). 
Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. Richard Taft (Bloomington & 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997). 
The Fundamental Concepts ofMetaphysics, trans. William McNeill & Nichola 
Walker (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995). 
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Parvis Emad & Kenneth Maly 
(Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988). 
The Basic Problems ofPhenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington 
& Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1982). 
What is Metaphysics, in Basic Writings, ed. & trans. David Farrell Krell 
(London: Routledge, 1996). 
'On the Essence Of Truth', in Basic Writings, ed. & trans. David Farrell Krell 
(London: Routledge, 1996). 
The Origin of the Work of Art', in Basic Writings, ed. & trans. David Farrell 
Krell (London: Routledge, 1996). 
237 
tetter on Humanism', in Basic Writings, ed. & trans. David Farrell Krell 
(London: Routledge, 1996). 
Modem Science,, Metaphysics, and Mathematics'. in Basic Writings, ed. & 
trans. David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge, 1996). 
The Question Concerning Technology', in Basic Writings, ed. & trans. David 
Farrell Krell (London: Routledge, 1996). 
Building Dwelling Thinking', in Basic Writings, ed. & trans. David Farrell 
Krell (London: Routledge, 1996). 
'vVhat Calls for Thinking? % in Basic Writings, ed. & trans. David Farrell 
Krell (London: Routledge, 1996). 
The Way to Language', in Basic Writings, ed. & trans. David Farrell Krell 
(London: Routledge, 1996). 
The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking', in Basic Writings, ed. & 
trans. David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge, 1996). 
Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998). 
Heine, Henri [Heinrich], Histoire de la Religion et de la Philosophie en Allemagne, 
traduction et notes, Jean-Pierre Lefebvre (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1993). 
Heller, Peter, Dialectic and Nihilism, (Cambridge, Mass.: The University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1966). 
Hook., Sidney, From Hegel to Marx (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950). 
Houlgate, Stephen, An Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy (London: Routledge, 
1991). 
Husserl, Edmund Logical Investigations, vols. I& 11, trans. J. N. Findlay (London: 
Routlege & Kegan Paul, 1970). 
Husserl., Edmund,, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology, First Book, trans. F. 
Kersten (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998). 
Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology, Second Book, trans. R. Rojcewicz 
& A. Schuwer (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998). 
On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, trans. John 
Barnett Brough (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 199 1). 
Experience and Judgment, trans. James S. Churchill & Karl Ameriks 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973). 
Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Conftontation 
with Heidegger (1927-1931), eds. T. Sheehan and R. Palmer (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 
1997). 
Hyppolite, Jean, Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. 
Samuel Cherniak and John Hekman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1974). 
Studies on Marx and Hegel, trans. John O'Neil (New York: Basic Books, 
1969). 
Jaeger, W., The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1947). 
Mriger, Ernst, 'Total Mobilization' in R. Wolin (ed. ), The Heidegger Controversy 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993). 
Der Arbeiter (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1982) 
Kahn, C. H.. 'The Thesis of Parmenides', in Review of Metaphysics 2224 (1969-70). 
Kant, Immanuel, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. James W. 
Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977). 
238 
_Grounding 
for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981). 
_On 
History, ed. Lewis White Beck, trans. Lewis White Beck, Robert E. Anchor 
& Emil L. Fackenheirn (New York: Macmillan, 1963). 
Critique of Pure'Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan. 
1993). 
Kierkegaard, Soren, The Concept of Anxiety, trans. Reidar Thomte & Albert B. 
Anderson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). 
Fear and Trembling; Re petition, Trans. Howard V. Hong & Edna H. Hong 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). 
Kisiel, Theodore, 'On the Way to Being and Time: Introduction to the Translation of 
Heidegger's Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs', in Research in 
Phenomenology XV (1985). 
The Genesis of Heidegger'S Being and Time (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1993). 
Lee, E., 'Plato on Negation and Not-Being in the Sophist', in Philosophical Review 
81(1972). 
Lef6bvre, Henri, LExistentialisme (Paris: Sagittaire, 1946). 
Lewis, F., 'Plato on "not ... . California Studies in Classical Antiquity 8 (1976). L6with, Karl, Meaning in History, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949). 
Nature, History, Existentialism and other Essays in the Philosophy of History, 
ed. Arnold Levison (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1966). 
Marcuse, Herbert, l'Ontologie de Hegel et la Theorie de l'Historicitj (Paris: tditions 
de Minuit, 1972). 
Marx, Karl, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, (London: Lawrence & 
Wishart, 198 1). 
Marx,, Werner, Heidegger and the Tradition, trans. Theodore Kisiel and Murroy 
(Green Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 197 1). 
Munier, Roger, Heidegger, Seminaire tenu par Professeur Martin Heidegger sur la 
Differenzschr de Hegel (Paris: 1968). 
Murelatos, A. P. D., The Route of Parmeides (New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press, 1970). 
Nietzsche, Friedrich, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, trans. Walter 
Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books Edition, 1989). 
The Will to Power,, ed. Walter Kaufmann, trans. Walter Kaufmann & R. J. 
Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books Edition, 1968). 
Untimel Meditations3 trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge y 
University Press, 199 1). 
Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, trans. Marianne Cowan 
(Washington: Regency Publishing, 1998). 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 1969). 
Beyond Good and Evil, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 1973). 
Kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari (Berlin: de Gruyter, 
1967f). 
Ockham, William, Philosophical Writings, ed. & trans. Philotheus Bohner (London: 
Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1957). 
Ott, Hugo, Martin Heidegger A Political Life, trans. Allan Blunden (London: Harper 
Collins, 1994). 
239 
Owen, G. E. L., 'Plato on not-Being', in Plato I. - Metaphysics and Epistemology, ed. 
G. Vlastos (New York: Anchor Books, 1970). 
Palmier, Jean-Michel, Les Ecrits Politiques de Heidegger (Paris: Herne, 1968). 
Parmenides. See Gallop, David. Also Cassin, Barbara. 
Peck, A., 'Plato versus Parmenides', in Philosophical Review 71 (1962). 
Pelletier, F. J., Parmenides, Plato and the Semantics of Not-Being (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1990). 
Philipse, Herman, Heidegger'S Philosophy of Being, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1998). 
'Transcendental Idealism', in B. Smith and D. W. Smith (eds. ) The 
Cambridge Companion to Husserl (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
Pippin, Robert, Idealism as Modernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997). 
Plato, Sophist, trans. Nicholas P. White (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993). 
The Republic, trans. Desmond Lee (London: Penguin, 1987). 
Poellner, Peter, Nietzsche and Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 
'Existential Moments', in H. Friese (ed. ) The Moment (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press, 2001) 
Polt, Richard & Fried, Gregory (eds. ), A Companion to Heidegger's Introduction to 
Metaph-ysics, (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2001). 
Prufer, Thomas, 'Heidegger, Early and Late, and Aquinas', in R Sokolowski (ed. ) 
Edmund Husserl and the Phenomenological Tradition (Washington, D. C.: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1989). 
Robinson, J. M., An Introduction to Early Greek Philosophy (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1968). 
Rose, Gillian, Dialectic of Nihilism: Post-Structuralism and Law (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1984). 
Rosen, Stanley, Nihilism: A Philosophical Essay (New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press, 1969). 
Rouse, Joseph, 'Science and the "Theoretical" Discovery of the Present-at-Hand', in 
D. lhde and H. J. Silverman (eds. ), Descriptions (Albany: Suny Press, 1985). 
Sartre,, Jean-Paul, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (London: 
Routledge, 2000). 
L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme (Paris: Les Editions Nagel, 1946). 
Schacht, Richard, 'Husserlian and Heideggerian Phenomenology', in Philosophical 
Studies 23 (1972). 
Schalow, Frank, 'At the Crossroads of Freedom: Ethics without Values', in R. Polt 
and G. Fried (eds. ), A Companion to Heidegger'S Introduction to MeCaphysics (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001). 
Schatzki, Theodore, 'Coping with Others in Folk Psychology' in Wrathall, Mark and 
Malpas, Jeff (eds), Heidegger, Coping, and Cognitive Science, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 2000). 
Scheler, Max, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Value, trans. M. S. 
Frings and R. L. Funk, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973). 
Sheehan, Thomas, 'Heidegger's New Aspect: On In-Sein, Zeitlichkeit, and The 
Genesis of Being and Time, in Research in Phenomenology 25 (1995). 
Schopenhauer, Arthurý The World as Will and Representation, vol. 1, trans. E. Payne 
(New York: Dover. 1966). 
240 
Sikka, Sonia, Forms of Transcendence: Heidegger and, Vedieval Mystical Theologv. 
(Albany, N. Y.: SUNY Press, 1997). 
Stokes, M. C., One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy (Washington: Centre for 
Hellenic Studies, 1971). 
Sluga, Hans, ' "Conflict is the Father of All Things": Heidegger's Polemical 
Conception of Politics', in R. Polt and G. Fried (eds. ) A Companion to Heidegger's 
Introduction to Metaphvsics (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001). 
Taminiaux, Jacques, Le Regard et 1'Excedent (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972). 
Taran, L., Parmenides (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965). 
Taylor, Charles, 'Responsibility for Self, in G. Watson (ed. ) Free Will (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1982). 
Tornay, Stephen, The Nominalism of William of Ockham (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1936). 
Untersteiner, M., Parmenide - Testimonianze e Frammenti (Florence: 1958). 
Wahll Jean, Le Maleur de la Consience dans la Philosophy de Hegel, (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France,, 195 1). 
Sur L 'Interpretation de LHistoire de la Metaphysique d'apres Heidegger 
(Paris: Centre de Documentation Universitaire, 195 1). 
Wolin, Richard (ed. ), The Heidegger Controversy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1993). 
Wrathall, Mark & Malpas, Jeff, (eds. ), Heidegger, Authenticity, and Modernity, 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000). 
'141 
